

Regas uile 5/7

DAVID MATAS  
BARRISTER & SOLICITOR

|                     |          |           |
|---------------------|----------|-----------|
| INK. UTRIKESDEP.    |          |           |
| D.Nr. 04/41217      |          |           |
| 2004-08-04<br>07-05 |          |           |
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(EC)

Ställt för  
EC/Hamrin

|                                                                                                     |
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| Inkom Arkivet den                                                                                   |
| 2006-07-04                                                                                          |
| Handlingen har kommit in till Arkivet utan<br>åtgärdsanteckning men får ändå bindas.<br>Arkivchefen |

July 2, 2004

Harald Wallenberg

Could you please give the attached fax to Harald Hamrin. I am told  
to indicate "UD-EC (Hamrin)".

David Matas

a.a.  
H.H.

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Minister  
of Foreign Affairs



Ministre  
des Affaires étrangères

Ottawa, Canada K1A 0G2

The Honourable L'honorable  
Bill Graham P.C., Q.C., M.P., c.p., c.r., député

MAY 28 2004

Mr. David Matas  
Barrister and Solicitor  
602-225 Vaughan Street  
Winnipeg, Manitoba  
R3C 1T7

*David*  
Dear Mr. Matas:

Further to my letter of November 17, 2003, in which I informed you that I would present your proposal of Canada-Russia cooperation in the area of archival research to Mr. Igor Ivanov, who was Russia's Foreign Minister at the time, I am pleased to report that Minister Ivanov responded to my request earlier this year.

In his response, Mr. Ivanov recalled that the joint Russian-Swedish working group on Raoul Wallenberg's fate published its findings in January 2001 after studying the material available in various Russian archives, including those of the President of the Russian Federation, the Federal Security Service, and the Ministry of Defence. He indicated that you are nevertheless welcome to access the material available at the Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation. This material has also been reviewed by the Swedish side.

Although I realize that this is not exactly the response that you were looking for, I hope that you will consider this as a step in the right direction.


Sincerely,

*and best personal regards,  
Bill*

*Hope that this gets us started in the right track.*

Canada





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Dalai Lama Nobel Peace Prize Tibet  
Nina Lagergren Sister of Wallenberg  
Guy Von Dardel Brother of Wallenberg  
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Chen Shui-Bian President of China

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New York, July 2<sup>nd</sup> 2004

Ambassador Hans Magnusson  
Deputy Director General  
Head of Department for Central and Eastern Europe

|                  |    |     |
|------------------|----|-----|
| INK. UTRIKESDEP. |    |     |
| D.Nr. 04/41895   |    |     |
| 2004-08-09       |    |     |
| 07-08            |    |     |
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Dear Ambassador,

We are proud to announce that our new website [www.raoulwallenberg.net](http://www.raoulwallenberg.net) has been selected by Jeffrey Zelman, author of "Designing with web Standards", to appear in the main page of his site Zelman.com.

We understand that Internet is a valuable tool to reach a broad population around the world and we put a great effort in creating a website able to transmit our Raoul Wallenberg's values in a clear and educational way.

As you may notice, English and Spanish are the main languages of our site. A group of volunteers are developing a Japanese version, which will be online soon. Some articles are translated into German, Portuguese, French and Polish. However, we believe that a website dedicated to Raoul Wallenberg must have also a Swedish version.

Enclosed, please find some printed information from our website that I am sure will be of your interest.

We would appreciate your comments and suggestions about the above. Let us know if you have any ideas regarding how to implement a Swedish translation, so our work can reach the Swedish people.

Looking forward to your response, I remain.


Baruch Tenenbaum  
Founder

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THE INTERNATIONAL  
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Home > Wallenberg > A hero without a...

# A hero without a grave

**Yoav Tenenbaum**

The Holocaust of the Jewish People was an exceptional event in human history. Although humanity has been witness, on more than one occasion, to acts of murder and genocide, never has it been subjected to something resembling the Jewish Holocaust. A systematic, rational, industrial plan, its objective was to eliminate completely an entire nation.

Jewish culture, the cradle of Western civilization, ought to have disappeared alongside the people who had embraced it for thousands of years. This programme of extermination, so meticulously implemented, was carried out by one of the most cultured nations the world has ever known. Human history has never been witness to a similar event. The Holocaust was an exception. There has never been anything like it.

In the context of this exceptional historical event exceptional individuals emerged. Challenging the whole machinery of Germany and its allies, they were prepared to risk their own lives in order to save the lives of Jews. The mere fact that a Gentile rendered his or her assistance to a Jew so as to escape death would have signified for that Gentile a similar destiny as that of the Jew. Nevertheless, individuals, of different nationalities, of diverse social backgrounds, gave shelter, whether directly or indirectly, to Jews who, thanks to them, remained alive. The Righteous Gentile, as the non-Jew who was ready to risk his or her life in order to save the lives of Jews is known, is a unique phenomenon within a unique event in History. They were only a few.

Had there been many of them perhaps we would not be lamenting the death of six million Jews. But, thanks to these few, humanity has not completely lost the shadow of its dignity. Thanks to them, human history can still cling to the hope that evil can be overcome - if one only tries. And to have tried then, under the conditions of the Holocaust, required a level of courage and heroism which very few of us possess.

Among these exceptional individuals someone emerged who, in a way, became the exception of the exception. Raoul Wallenberg. A member of a well-known, wealthy Swedish family, Wallenberg had nothing awaiting him in the continental Europe of World War II. In the comfort of the Sweden of that time, Wallenberg decided, however, to accept a United States initiative and go, as a diplomat, to Budapest so as to study what could be done for the Jews of that city who, very soon, would have been sent to Nazi concentration camps.

Challenging the entire machinery of Germany and its Hungarian allies, employing his imagination as an offensive weapon, Wallenberg resolved to do the impossible. With the help of people, some of them diplomats, of good will, Wallenberg demonstrated that human courage has no limits. Through a process of persuasion, threats and an unmatched dose of diplomatic creativity, this young 32 year old Swede managed to save the lives of tens of thousands of Hungarian Jews. His heroism was crowned by tragedy. Although the Germans and their Hungarian allies endeavoured to cause an accidental death to Wallenberg, he survived this ordeal in order to be subsequently arrested by the Soviet troops, who had just liberated Budapest, never to be seen alive again. Wallenberg is, then, a hero without a grave.


*\* Yoav Tenenbaum is a Member of the Executive Board - The International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation.*



Raoul Wallenberg by Peter Malkin

<http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/?en/wallenberg/610.htm>

7/2/2004



THE INTERNATIONAL  
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Home > Wallenberg > Tributes > Events > Hungarian heroes > Hungarian heroes...

June 22, 2004

# Hungarian heroes remembered

On June 22, 2004, the Embassy of Hungary to Buenos Aires was the place in which the Hungarian heroes of the Second World War, saviors of people persecuted by Nazism, were remembered

Budapest was Raoul Wallenberg's theater of operations, a special Swedish envoy sent to save the lives of thousands of Jews Condemned to death by the Third Reich and his local allies. After the successful rescue of about one hundred people, Wallenberg disappeared on January 17, 1945, arrested by the Red Army at the doors of the Magyar capital.

There were many other distinguished diplomats who, along with Wallenberg, put their lives at risk for the neighbor; Charles Lutz, Giorgio Perlasca, Ángel Sanz-Briz, Apostolic Nuncio Angelo Rota and many others.

All of them, as well as several hundreds Hungarian citizens, were remembered in the moving ceremony presided by Ambassador Ferenc Szönyi who stressed the fundamental role that a person can play, even in the most dire circumstances, in the development of history. The ambassador also pointed out the educational work of the Wallenberg Foundation at schools and universities.

Volunteer Rodrigo Rendo spoke on behalf of the IRWF, giving an **emotional speech** that moved the audience, specially the many survivors of the Holocaust therein present: Jack Fuchs, Charles Papiernik, Diana Wang, Tomas Kertesz, Laszlo Ladanyi and Sozia Klawir.

The writer Peter Kiss read the poem "**Forced March**", by Radnoti Miklós, poet, former prisoner of different labor camps during the Holocaust. Miklós had been born in Budapest in 1909 and was executed by the Nazis in Absa, Gyor County, on November 9, 1944.

The evening was amused by the interpretation of the piece "Alegro barbaro" by Béla Bartók.

To conclude, the Wallenberg Foundation, as usual, presented the Embassy of Hungary with the sculpture "Homage to Raoul Wallenberg". The piece was given to Ambassador Szönyi, by the sculptress, the prestigious artist Norma D'Ippolito.

Among the people present it is worth mentioning: Ambassadors Roberto Nigido, Italy; Antonio de Almeida Ribeiro, Portugal; Alexandru Micula, Rumania; Slawomir Ratajsky, Poland; Rolf Schumacher, Germany; Vatican Representative, Monsignor Nicola Girasoli; rabbis Abraham Skorka and Simón Moguilevsky; AMIA and DAIA representatives and Esteban Takács, President of the Hungarian Entities Federation in the Argentine Republic.

## ● PHOTO GALLERY



Norma D'Ippólito awards the "Raoul Wallenberg Tribute" sculpture to Ambassador Ferenc Szönyi

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
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<http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/?en/wallenberg/tributes/events/hungary/1435.htm>

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Home > News > International...

June 18, 2004

# International acknowledgment of Sousa Mendes on the 50th anniversary of his death

**The world paid homage to Diplomat rescuers of the Holocaust**

In the year of the 50th anniversary of Aristides de Sousa Mendes' death (1885-1954), the International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation and the Angelo Roncalli Committee organized more than 80 commemorations around the world. Dozens of religious, cultural and educational activities took place in 30 countries in the five continents. Among the many countries that joined in the acknowledgement were France, the United States, the Vatican, China and Israel.


June 17 marks the day in which the Portuguese diplomat, disobeying orders from his government, started to issue visas to rescue about 30,000 people persecuted by the Nazis, which occupied France in 1940. His courage and determination had an extraordinary impact during the next five years of the Second World War: he inspired many other diplomats and encouraged similar rescues until the end of the war.

In New York a mass dedicated to Sousa Mendes was celebrated in the church of Our Lady of Fatima, in Yonkers officiated by Monsignor Celestino Migliore, Apostolic Nuncio of the Vatican to the UN.

"This act is the proof that in life there are more important things than life itself", pointed out Baruj Tenenbaum, founder of the Wallenberg Foundation. "We, as Jews, must keep the balance between the complaints for the suffering and the total acknowledgement of the people who helped us", said Tenenbaum.

Among the audience present, that filled the temple, it is worth mentioning the presence of Gonalo de Santa Clara Gomes, Ambassador of Portugal to the UN; Alexandre Manuel Galvo Mexia de Almeida Fernandes, General Consul of Portugal to New York; Sheila Abranches and Aristides Mendes, Sousa Mendes' relatives and the colorful presence of dozens of representatives of the Portuguese community in New York wearing traditional costumes. Once the service was over, a reception took place in which Ms. Abigail Tenenbaum, vice-president of the Wallenberg Foundation, presented the Sousa Mendes Medal and invited Mr. Baruch Tenenbaum to award John Crisostomo, distinguished Portuguese activist dedicated to promote the life and deeds of the Portuguese

<http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/?en/news/1449.htm>



Baruch Tenenbaum and Apostolic Nuncio to the UN Celestino Migliore



Nuncio Migliore spoke in homage to Sousa Mendes

7/2/2004

savior.

Crisostomo presented the projection of the documentary film "Diplomats for the damned", which shows the rescue actions carried out by diplomats during the Holocaust. Mr. Crisostomo read the names of prominent Diplomat Rescuers and the twenty two countries from which they came.

"History seems to compensate tyrants and criminals, because they are the heroes and protagonists in people's minds, especially among the youngest. This situation must be counteracted with the promotion of positive examples", Crisostomo said. "We must acknowledge and honor those people who dedicated their lives for the well being of others, especially those people who saved lives. Today is a good moment to start".

The homages for the person who declared that "he would rather be with God against men than with men against God", remind us of how the act of only one person changed history and influenced in the conducts of many people who dared imitate him. That is why June 17 can be considered as the "Day of Thanks and Acknowledgments" to all the diplomatic saviors of the Second World War.

In Rome, a mass was celebrated in the Basilica Saint Mary in Trastevere, officiated by Cardinal Renato Martino, President of the Peace and Justice Commission of the Vatican.

In the course of the prayers, Cardinal Martino included an invocation for the peaceful coexistence of people and communities of different beliefs, races, religions as well as a declaration against anti-Semitism and racial discrimination.

Before the end of the ceremony, the special representative of the IRWF sent to Italy, Rabbi Mario Ablin, was invited by the High Vatican Prelate to address the audience. In the course of his message, Ablin announced the decision of granting the Sousa Mendes award to Cardinal Martino who showed his satisfaction by standing up due to people's applause.

"It is our duty to remember all Christians who, encouraged by their faith, reacted bravely offering their help to the persecuted Jews, sometimes under the risk of losing their own lives. Their blessed memory must be kept alive", pointed out Pope John Paul II.

In Bordeaux, the city in which Sousa Mendes undertook his rescue action, the "50 anniversary Sousa Mendes Medal" was presented to Father Bernard Jacques Riviere, due to his long and successful dedication to promote the deeds of the former Portuguese Consul.

The Wallenberg Foundation received hundreds of adhesions to the unprecedented initiative, including by the Prime Minister of Portugal, H.E. Jose Manuel Durao Barroso; US Congressman, Tom Lantos; Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Elie Wiesel; the Mayor of Yonkers, Phil Amicone and Raoul Wallenberg's niece, Louise Von Dardel.

- See the complete list of commemorations

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
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Baruch Tenenbaum presented the Award to Joao Crisostomo



Children in Portuguese traditional costumes



THE INTERNATIONAL  
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Home > News > Tribute to...

May 13, 2004

# Tribute to diplomats and UN officials

On 13 May 2004 the International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation paid tribute to the **diplomats and UN Officials** murdered in 2003 while fulfilling their duty. The ceremony took place at the Chilean Embassy in Buenos Aires. The host was the head of the diplomatic legation, **Ambassador Juan Gabriel Valdés**.

Among the Saviours of the Holocaust there were hundreds of diplomats from several countries that disobeyed immoral instructions in order to save the lives of thousands. It is worth mentioning here the names of Raoul Wallenberg (Sweden); Aristides de Sousa Mendes (Portugal); Monsignor Angelo Roncalli (later Pope John XXIII) and Hiram Bingham IV (USA), among many others.

In the spirit of those courageous men and women, the IRWF remembered the diplomats who passed away recently.

Ambassador **Juan Gabriel Valdes**, Swedish Ambassador, **Madeleine Ströje-Wilkens**; **José Ignacio García Hamilton**, Vice-President of the International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation and the Resident Coordinator of the UN System to Argentina, ad-interim, **Juan Manuel Sotelo**, spoke on the occasion.

Each one of them lighted a candle as sign of respect and grief for all and each of the fallen.

The ceremony included an exhibition of **memorial panels** produced by the IRWF, and the projection of a documentary of the UN in homage to the officials murdered in Baghdad.

Prestigious Argentine sculptress **Norma D'Ippolito** presented to Ambassador Valdés her sculpture "**Homage to Raoul Wallenberg**", a gift from the IRWF to the Chilean people.

Within the frame of a packed auditorium some of the most important adhesions to the ceremony were read aloud; among them the ones signed by the President of Chile, Ricardo Lagos; Nina Lagergren and Louise von Dardel, sister and nephew of Raoul Wallenberg, respectively; Helen Clark, Prime Minister of New Zealand; John So, Mayor of Melbourne; Christian Ferrazino, Mayor of Geneva; Pavel Bem, Mayor of Prague; Klaus Wowereit, Mayor of Berlin; Rabbi Adrian Herbst; Director of the Latin-American Rabbinical Seminar and Monsignor Justo Laguna, Bishop of Moron, Buenos Aires.

- Photo gallery



José García Hamilton, Madeleine Ströje-Wilkens, Juan Gabriel Valdés and Juan Manuel Sotelo

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Home > News > First Raoul...

May 14, 2004

# First Raoul Wallenberg Educational Center in Argentina is opened

On Friday May 14th 2004, the first "Raoul Wallenberg" Educational Center in Argentina was inaugurated. The ceremony took place in Gregorio de Laferrere, a district 30 kms. away from Buenos Aires.

The initiative is sponsored by the General Economic Confederation (CGE); the NGO "Poder Ciudadano", the Movement of Unemployed People of La Matanza (MTD) and the International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation (IRWF).

The Raoul Wallenberg Educational Center is added to the list of similar initiatives of the IRWF in Venezuela, Uruguay and Ecuador.



Carlos March, Laszlo Ladanyi, José I. García Hamilton, Tomas Kertesz, Ricardo Faerman and Toti Flores.

Raoul Wallenberg is the Swedish diplomat who saved tens of thousands of people from a certain death during the Holocaust. He disappeared after being kidnapped in 1945 by the Soviet Army. His deeds, based on values of solidarity and civic courage, are promoted in the world by the IRWF through educational projects.


The educational complex includes two kindergarten classes, and productive initiatives such as a bakery, a serigraphy workshop, a publishing house, a sewing workshop, and a school of professions are functioning "We conceived this center as a firm step towards social reinsertion of unemployed workers and the exercise of the right to a worthy life for us and our children," said Toti Flores, leader of the MTD, "This Educational Center is now and forever called Raoul Wallenberg, for in the figure of this outstanding public official we have found the inspiration that leads us to respect human rights, starting with the right to work".

The MTD has been working since the beginning of 2002 towards the opening of an educational project where the principle of "permanent education" can be put into practice. The purpose is to exercise the right to a democratic education, including the participation of the community in the teaching - learning process, by promoting such values as self management, solidarity, cooperativism and the care for the environment.

The Educational Complex of the MTD has been working for almost two years in the premises once used by an old private school that was

<http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/?en/news/1246.htm>

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Sign of the "Raoul Wallenberg" Educational Center

# First Raoul Wallenberg Educational Center in Argentina is opened

dismantled in different robberies.

Among the many people that attended the ceremony were Laszlo Ladanyi and Tomás Kertesz, both saved by Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest in 1944.

Ricardo Faerman, President of the CGE, Carlos March, Executive Director of Poder Ciudadano; José I. García Hamilton, Vice-President of the IRWF and Toti Flores, leader of the MTD, spoke in the ceremony.

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
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Wallenberg was remembered on a new anniversary of his disappearance

English | Español | 



THE INTERNATIONAL  
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Home > Wallenberg > Tributes > Events > Wallenberg was...

January 17, 2004

# Wallenberg was remembered on a new anniversary of his disappearance

On 17 January 2004 the 59th anniversary of the disappearance of **Raoul Wallenberg**, arrested by the Soviet army in 1945, took place.

The International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation commemorated in America and Europe the figure and feats accomplished by the Swedish diplomat that saved the lives of tens of thousands of people persecuted by the Nazi regime while fulfilling his official duties in Hungary.

In a ceremony organized in Budapest by the Hungarian Wallenberg Association (HWA), a memorial meeting took place at a Wallenberg commemorative plaque in the XIII District, unveiled 15 years ago. These meetings are made every year since 1989. During the ceremony, Rabbi Robert Garai read a poem by Miklos Radnoti, a poet murdered by the Nazis in 1944. Minister of Interior, Monika Laperth, delivered a speech.



Dr Frank Vajda and Dr Reuben Glass in the Commemorative Seat in Australia.

Also in Budapest, Wallenberg's sister and her granddaughter, Nina and Louise Lagergren, inaugurated an **exhibition dedicated to the "Hero without a Grave"**, opened at the "House of Terror" museum.

Among the people present is worth mentioning the Sweden Ambassador to Hungary, Bengt Ludborg; the representatives of the HWA, Ferenc Orosz and Bela Huff; the mayor of Budapest, Gabor Demszky, and the directors of the museum, Maria Schmidt and Gabor Kiszely.

After the opening, Mrs. Lagergren and her granddaughter visited a secondary school that since September 2004 will bear the name of Raoul Wallenberg.

Following an initiative of the IRWF, Wallenberg was remembered in the USA in several educational institutions. Among them it is worth mentioning Cheadle Hulme School; Gesher Jewish Day School, from Northern Virginia; New Community Jewish High School; Bet Shraga Hebrew Academy; Pardes Jewish Day School and The Greenfield Day School.

Moreover, as part of a remembrance campaign launched by the IRWF, Wallenberg was recalled in the prayers delivered by Rabbis Douglas Kohn, Emanu El Congregation, San Bernardino, California; Claudio Kupchik, First Hebrew Congregation, Wetchester County, New York; Ilana Rosansky, Shalom Temple, Salem, Massachusetts, and Amy Perlin, B'nai Shalom Temple, Northern Virginia.

America and Europe's media joined the IRWF campaign of remembrance. The prestigious Argentine daily newspaper **"La Nación"**, published an editorial on the 59th. anniversary of Wallenberg's disappearance. The paper, founded in 1870 and with an average of 200,000 copies sold per day, also published a letter signed by Baruch Tenenbaum, founder of the IRWF. In Britain, another letter signed by Mr. Tenenbaum was published by the distinguished London based weekly, **The Jewish Chronicle**.

<http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/?en/wallenberg/tributes/events/1290.htm>

7/2/2004

Hans Magnusson

2004-07-01 08:25

Till: "International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation -  
New York" <irwf@irwf.org>

Kopia: Harald Hamrin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK

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Fax till:

Ärende: Ang: To Mr. Hans Magnusson

Dear Mr Tenenbaum,

Thank you very much for your information. I can assure you that we - myself and my colleague Mr Harald Hamrin - are and will remain ready to collaborate with you and your organization, the work of which we see as very important.

Yours sincerely

Hans Magnusson.

"International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation - New York" <irwf@irwf.org>



"International Raoul  
Wallenberg Foundation - New  
York" <irwf@irwf.org>

2004-06-30 19:44

Till: Hans Magnusson/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK

Kopia:

Blank:

Fax till:

Ärende: To Mr. Hans Magnusson

Sänd svar till "International  
Raoul Wallenberg Foundation -  
New York"

Mr. Hans Magnusson  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs

---

Dear Mr. Magnusson,

It was a great pleasure to meet you at the Swedish Embassy to the United States in occasion of the presentation of the Royal Order of the Polar Star to Congressman Tom Lantos and Mrs. Annette Lantos, last June 14th.

**The International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation (IRWF)** is a non-profit organization, with the aim of promoting peace among nations and people, as well as developing educational projects based on concepts of solidarity, dialogue and understanding. You can visit our web site dedicated to Raoul Wallenberg at: [www.raoulwallenberg.net](http://www.raoulwallenberg.net).

The Foundation, with branches in New York, Buenos Aires, Jerusalem and Caracas, has focused all of its efforts to honor the deeds of Raoul Wallenberg, who is considered one of the greatest heroes of our times. Our mission is to render homage, promote the message and remember the actions of all those Heroes of the Holocaust, who like Raoul Wallenberg, Aristides de Sousa Mendes and Angelo Roncalli, among many others, risked their lives to save persecuted people during the Second World War.

Allow me to mention that a High School bearing the name of Raoul Wallenberg was inaugurated in Argentina on May 14<sup>th</sup>, following the ones already inaugurated in Uruguay, Venezuela, Brazil and Ecuador. For more information, please visit: <http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/?en/education/schools/>

As a joint initiative of the IRWF and the former Mayor of the City of Monforte de Lemos Mr. Nazario Pin Fernandez, a street named after Raoul Wallenberg was recently inaugurated in Spain. Pictures of the "Rua Raoul Wallenberg" were published at: <http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/?en/wallenberg/tributes/publicarea/>

To celebrate the 91st birthday of Raoul Wallenberg, our foundation organized on August 4th. a series of world-wide events. The ceremonies took place in 6 cities: New York, Tel Aviv, Budapest, Buenos Aires, Montevideo and Santiago de Chile. For more information about each of the ceremonies please visit: <http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/?en/wallenberg/tributes/programs/>


More than fifty Heads of State, Nobel Prize Laureates, Governors and distinguished personalities from all walks of life accompany us in this singular enterprise that aims at educating the younger generations on the exemplary behaviour of the Saviours of the Holocaust. To see the list of Honorary Members please visit: <http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/?en/about/members/>

We hope this information is of your interest and we hope to collaborate with you in honoring the Swedish diplomat.

Sincerely,

Baruch Tenenbaum  
Founder

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USA  
[www.raoulwallenberg.net](http://www.raoulwallenberg.net)



August 12, 2004

Mr. Hans Dahlgren  
State Secretary for Foreign Affairs  
Fax 46 8 723 11 76

☐ REGAS  
☐ WPIA HD  
☐ WPIA HARMED HAM  
☐ a.a.

#### Honorary Members

Dalai Lama Nobel Peace Prize Tibet  
Nina Lagergren Sister of Wallenberg  
Guy Von Dardel Brother of Wallenberg  
Tom Lantos Congressman for California USA  
Mohammed VI King of Morocco  
Vaclav Havel President of the Czech Republic  
Jean Chretien Prime Minister of Canada  
Hans-Adam II Prince of Liechtenstein  
Gerhard Schröder Chancellor of Germany  
Elie Wiesel Nobel Peace Prize USA  
Oscar Arias Nobel Peace Prize Costa Rica  
Gerald Ford Former President of USA  
Vicente Fox Quesada President of Mexico  
Vaira-Vike Freiberga President of Latvia  
Peter Hollingworth Gov. Gen. of Australia  
Stjepan Mesic President of Croatia  
Janez Drnovsek President of Slovenia  
Felipe González President of Spain  
Moshe Katsav President of the State of Israel  
Leszek Miller Prime Minister of Poland  
Thomas Klestil President of Austria  
Jorge Sampaio President of Portugal  
Ariel Sharon Prime Minister of Israel  
Alexander Kwasniewski President of Poland  
John Hume Nobel Peace Prize North Ireland  
David Trimble Nobel Peace Prize North Ireland  
Gustavo Noboa President of Ecuador  
José Ramos Horta Nobel Peace Prize Timor  
Eduard Shevardnadze President of Georgia  
Shimon Peres Nobel Peace Prize Israel  
Ferenc Madi Prime Minister of Hungary  
Valdas Adamkus President of Lithuania  
Askar Akayev President of the Kyrgyz Republic  
Mikulas Dzurinda Prime Minister of Slovak Republic  
Andris Berzins Prime Minister of Latvia  
Lester Bird Prime Minister of Antigua & Barbuda  
Helen Clark Prime Minister of New Zealand  
Kjell Magne Bondevik Prime Minister of Norway  
Leo Falcam President of Micronesia  
Adrienne Clarkson Governor General of Canada  
Tuilaepa Mallelegaoi Prime Minister of Samoa  
Guido de Marco President of Malta  
Milo Djukanovic President of Montenegro  
Rudolf Schuster President of Slovak Republic  
Otmar Hasler Prime Minister of Liechtenstein  
Arnold Rüütel President of Estonia  
Solomon Passy Chancellor of Bulgaria  
Said Musa Prime Minister of Belize  
Vernon Shaw President of Dominica  
Adrian Nastase Prime Minister of Romania  
Arthur Robinson President of Trinidad & Tobago  
Mireya Moscoso President of Panama  
Ion Iliescu President of Romania  
Glafcos Clerides President of Cyprus  
Felix Wankar Prime Minister of Dominica  
José Manuel Barroso Prime Minister of Portugal  
Jean C. Juncker Prime Minister Luxembourg  
Samuel A. Hinds Prime Minister of Guyana  
Theo-Ben Gurirab Prime Minister of Namibia  
Alfonso Portillo Cabrera President of Guatemala  
Einars Repse Prime Minister of Latvia  
Vladimir Spidla Prime Minister of Czech Republic  
Algirdas Brazauskas Prime Minister of Lithuania  
Julia Cartwright Governor General of New Zealand  
José E. Dos Santos President of Angola  
Ralph Gonsalves Prime Minister Vincent/Grenadines  
Paul Kagame President of Rwanda  
Ricardo Lagos President of Chile  
Abel Pacheco President of Costa Rica  
Dragisa Pesic Prime Minister of Yugoslavia  
Norodom Ranariddh President of Cambodia  
Vladimir Voronin President of Moldova  
Colville Young Governor General of Belize  
Meles Zenawi Prime Minister of Ethiopia  
Isaias Afewerki President of Eritrea  
Kenny Anthony Prime Minister of Saint Lucia  
Branko Crvenkovski Prime Minister of Macedonia  
John F. Nash Jr. Nobel Economics Prize, USA  
Edward Natapei Prime Minister of Vanuatu  
Chen Shui-Bian President of China

Dear Mr. Dahlgren,

It was a great pleasure to hear the news of the ceremony to honour the memory of Raoul Wallenberg's rescue mission that will be held in Budapest City Hall on 27 September 2004. On behalf of the **International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation (IRWF)**, I wish to extend my warm congratulations and best wishes.

The aim of the International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation is to spread the message and remember the actions of the Saviors who risked their lives to save persecuted people during the Holocaust, like Raoul Wallenberg, Giorgio Perlasca, Nuncio Angelo Roncalli, Aristides de Sousa Mendes, Jan Karski among others.

More than sixty Heads of State, Nobel Prize Laureates, Governors and distinguished personalities such as Mrs. Nina Lagergren and Professor Guy Von Dardel, accompany us in this singular enterprise that aims at educating the younger generations on the exemplary behavior of the Saviors of the Holocaust. To see the list of Honorary Members please visit:  
<http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/english/comitew.htm>

May you have continuous success in your noble endeavors.

Baruch Tenenbaum  
Founder

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Meanwhile, in Australia, the City of Port Phillip commemorated the life and work of Raoul Wallenberg with a **"contemplative seat"** outside St Kilda Town Hall. The seat was unveiled by Por Philip's Mayor, Liz Johnstone, on 18 January.


The seat was designed by landscape architect Andrew Brophy.

Constructed of recycled kauri and metal, the contemplative seat wraps around the liquid amber tree planted in Wallenberg's honour in June 1994 by the Reverend Tim Costello, the then St Kilda mayor. It includes an inscription from the Talmud in both English and Hebrew: "...and whoever preserves the life of a single human being ... it is as if he preserved an entire world."

The Star of David is represented in a series of broken lines on metal along the ground reflecting the destruction of Europe's Jewish population and the dispersal of surviving Jews across the world in a vast diaspora. The memorial has had the support of Lars-Erik Wingren, the Swedish Ambassador.

Frank Vajda (photo), member of the IRWF and saved by Wallenberg in 1944, attended the ceremony.

|                                             |                                                |                                          |                                    |
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|---------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|

THE INTERNATIONAL  
RAOUL WALLENBERG FOUNDATION[Home](#) > [Education](#) > [Schools](#) > [Preschool named...](#)

April 4, 2004

# Preschool named after Wallenberg in Ecuador

Fuente: [El Clarin de Babahoyos](#)

Mrs. Patricia Vecilla Mackliff is a woman tied to the private sector, studied Languages in England, Advertising and Marketing in the United States; in Ecuador she studied German and seminars of educational psychology. She founded years ago the Preschool and school "Sunrise"

## Why did you change the name Sunrise to Raoul Wallenberg?

This is a way of paying my gratitude and that of my children Baruj and Dafna to Mr. Baruch Tenenbaum who is the founder of The International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation in New York. This is a private non-profit institution dedicated to encourage the inter-religious dialogue, inspired by the outstanding deeds of this man during World War II. It is important that we unite against all forms of discrimination or persecution, regardless of the moment, place or circumstances.

## When was Sunrise created?

It was created in 1996 with the instruction of English as second language and for the last four years it has been functioning as a bi-lingual Preschool and School, where we treat English as our priority.

## Is it true that you will move abroad?

I will travel as I have always done and I will head the institution, the parents can be confident.


## Do you plan to build your own building?

Yes. There is a program for the year 2005 to start the classes in an adequate place, which includes sports fields, swimming pools and a laboratory for special classes. I consider that the edification of this educational center is one of the blessings that God has reserved for me.

## What is your message to the parents?

We will always love to count with their support since an institution requires a lot of investment and dedication. We are personally committed to the education of the children, based on an excellent pedagogy, but it also includes the values that each human being should practice in addition to educating the children about God Almighty.

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# Kofi Annan meets the Wallenberg Foundation

**Baruch Tenenbaum presented an exclusive medal to the Secretary General of the UN**

The **International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation** was invited by the Secretary General of the United Nations, **Kofi Annan**, to a meeting specially held on Sunday August 4, the day of the **90th anniversary of the birth of the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg**.

During the meeting, that took place at the Secretary General's residence in New York, **Baruch Tenenbaum**, founder of the IRWF, presented a **Commemorative Medal** specially commissioned and coined to mark the anniversary. **Mrs. Nane Annan**, wife of the world leader and niece of the Swedish diplomat, also attended the meeting.

This is the third time Mr. Annan meets the international NGO whose mission is to convey through educational programs the values of courage and solidarity demonstrated by Wallenberg, as well as by other saviors, during his six months rescue mission in Budapest between 1944 and 1945. Wallenberg saved tens of thousands of people, mostly Jewish, condemned to death by the Nazi regime. He later disappeared after being abducted by the Soviet Army on 17 January 1945. His whereabouts are still unknown.



Baruch Tenenbaum gives the Raoul Wallenberg Medal to Kofi Annan; beside him, his wife Nane Annan, niece of Raoul Wallenberg.

On presenting the Medal, **Tenenbaum pointed out:**

"As one of the people Wallenberg rescued accurately pointed out, 'Raoul saved the lives of tens of thousands but, paradoxical as it may seem, tens of thousands could not save him'. Therefore, the Wallenberg Foundation is going to mobilise 100,000 people all around the globe in order to know what really happened to Wallenberg, a man that is alive and will continue to be alive forever".


Mr. Tenenbaum stressed that the IRWF is committed to continue with the educational programs that it is carrying out all around the world, bringing to future generations the message of one of the true heroes of our times. The IRWF is supported by more than fifty heads of state, scholars, Nobel Prize laureates and intellectuals from the entire globe.

The IRWF has branches in New York, Jerusalem and Buenos Aires.

For his part, the UN Secretary General recalled the example given by the Swedish diplomat as a beacon to be followed by future generations.

Finally, Mrs Annan, the daughter of Wallenberg's sister, **Mrs Nina Lagergren**, showed Mr Tenenbaum an album of Wallenberg's photographs and a book containing hundreds of letters written by the diplomat, mostly to his mother, Maj Von Dardel. In his last letter

to his mother, written in December 1944, Wallenberg sent his greetings to his sister Nina "and the little girl". That "little girl" is precisely Mrs Annan, now a renowned international lawyer and painter, who dedicates most of her time to UN educational and child-care programs. Mrs Annan assured Mr Tenenbaum that both she and her mother are delighted with the work carried out so far by the IRWF.



Baruch Tenenbaum with Kofi and Nane Annan in the residence of the Secretary General of the UN in NY.


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# Mass in the Metropolitan Cathedral of Buenos Aires

As part of a range of activities organised around the world marking Raoul Wallenberg's 90th birthday a special **Remembrance Mass** was held at the Buenos Aires Cathedral.

Organised by the local branch of the IRWF the Mass was celebrated by **Father Horacio Moreno**, president of Casa Argentina en Jerusalem, parent organisation of the IRWF.

During the service Father Moreno recalled the work of the Swedish diplomat and led the congregation - which included people saved by Wallenberg, Israeli, US, Swedish, German and European Union diplomats as well as representatives of the main Jewish organisations and temples of Argentina - in prayers in remembrance of Wallenberg.

As part of the service IRWF members **Jose Ignacio Garcia Hamilton** and **Nicholas Tozer**, - winners of the Foundation's 2002 Sousa Mendes Prize- read out the biography of the Swedish diplomat and the lessons during the Mass respectively.

Following the service Father Moreno and the congregation gathered at the **Memorial Mural within the Cathedral**. The Mural donated by the IRWF in 1997 is in remembrance of the victims of the Holocaust and the terrorist attacks on the Israeli Embassy and the AMIA Jewish Centre of Argentina.




Clockwise: Nicholas Tozer, Father Horacio Moreno, Natalio Wengrower, Rabbi Simón Moguilevsky, Ladislao Ladanyi, José I. García Hamilton and other visitors in front of the Memorial Mural

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# Wallenberg was remembered in Budapest

On Monday, 4 August, the International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation and the Wallenberg Association of Hungary jointly organized a ceremony to render tribute to Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest, Hungary, the city where Wallenberg helped save tens of thousands of persecuted people -mostly Jews- by the Nazis.

Budapest is also the city where Wallenberg was detained by the Soviet Army on January 1945. Since then his whereabouts are still unknown.



Wallenberg Statue in Budapest

The tribute took place beside the Wallenberg Statue, a work of Hungarian artist Imre Varga, placed on the Buda side of the capital of Hungary.

The presentation was held simultaneously with another five ceremonies organized by the IRWF in Buenos Aires, New York, Tel Aviv, Montevideo and Santiago (Chile).



Dr. Marcos Resnitzky and Dr. Wimmer Gyulane, former secretary and translator of Wallenberg in Budapest

Following Mr. Andreas Sipos -Chairman of the WAH-'s opening, Dr. Ibolya David -vice speaker of the Hungarian Parliament and former Minister of Justice- delivered the first speech that highlighted Wallenberg's deeds as the ones accomplished by Christians who saved Jewish people.

A letter of endorsement signed by Madam Louise Von Dardel, niece of Wallenberg, was read aloud.

Dr. Marcos Resnitzky, volunteer and special envoy of the IRWF to Hungary, delivered a moving speech where he recalled not only Wallenberg's feats but also the atrocities perpetrated in Hungary by Nazis and Soviets alike. He also pointed out that today's terrorism

<http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/?en/wallenberg/tributes/events/673.htm>

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has similar roots as the one of by the regimes conducted by Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin.


Afterwards, Dr. Resnitzky presented the Wallenberg Medal, specially coined by the IRWF, to Dr. Wimmer Gyulane and to Andreas Sipos, on behalf of the WAH.

Representatives of the US and Israeli embassies, among others dignataries, attended the ceremony. Professor Tibor Vamos, President of the Hungarian Holocaust Foundation, also were present at the celebration.


Poems were read and music performed at the end of the ceremony.

TV stations were also present. National Television (MTV12), the Hungarian News Channel (HIR TV) and Duna TV broadcasted the ceremony.

After the ceremony members of the WAH presidium and Dr. Resnitzky visited other Wallenberg memorial places accompanied by Mr Ferenc Orosz, former Chairman of the AWH.



Dr. Ibolya David, vice-speaker of the Parliament




Marcos Resnitzky gives the W-medal to Andras Sipos

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# Raoul Wallenberg remembered in Miami

Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish hero who saved thousands of Jews and others who had been persecuted by the Nazis, was remembered in Miami.

A religious ceremony to remember the "**hero without a grave**" was organized on the new anniversary of Wallenberg's mysterious disappearance by **José Weiss**, President of the **Venezuelan branch of the International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation**.

Wallenberg was arrested by the Soviet army in 1945, and since then, **nothing more has ever been heard about him**.

Rabbi Mario Rojzman, accompanied by singer, Geniene Miller, celebrated the "Shabat" service in the synagogue of the Aventura Turnberry Jewish Beth Jacob congregation, in front of a large audience.

The activities of the Wallenberg Foundation will continue in the year 2003 with a series of **school conferences**, the coinage of commemorative medals in honor of the Holocaust saviors, issuance of postal stamps, and presentations in different cities in Europe, Latin America and the United States.




"Student" by Yehuda Vardi.

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


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
# The Argentine Postal Service issued a postal stamp remembering Raoul Wallenberg

The Argentine Postal Service issued the fifth Raoul Wallenberg stamp in the world after Sweden, Israel, Hungary and the United States, upon an initiative of the International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation.



Envelope and postmark with the date of issue

The design consists of the diplomat's portrait together with the reproduction of one of the passports he issued to save people.



Raoul Wallenberg stamp


The Argentine Postal Service published a philatelic leaflet about the postal stamp.

ARGENTINA


VENEZUELA

ISRAEL

USA



Interior of the philatelic leaflet.




Cover of the philatelic leaflet.

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# A street in Spain was named after Raoul Wallenberg

For the first time in Spain's history, a street was named after **Raoul Wallenberg**, the Swedish diplomat who saved tens of thousands of Jews and others persecuted by Nazism. Wallenberg disappeared in January 1945 after he was arrested by the Soviet Army.

On January 31, 2003, the city council of Monforte de Lemos, a city in the Galician Province of Lugo, unanimously agreed to name a street in their city, Rua de Raoul Wallenberg.

Rua Wallenberg is located in a part of the center of the City of Monforte in the old Jewish quarter where there are monuments.

The promoters of this initiative are the Mayor of Monforte de Lemos, Nazario Pin Fernandez, and Monforte's historian and delegate of the group of Jewish quarters of Spain, Felipe Aira Pardo; thus, following an initiative presented by the International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation, and NGO founded by Argentine, **Baruch Tenenbaum**. In August 2002, Tenenbaum anticipated the news from the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, during a meeting held in New York.

The proposal was celebrated by the President of the Xunta de Galicia, Manuel Fraga Iribarne. In a letter addressed to Tenenbaum, he expressed his satisfaction that a street in Galicia would be the first in Spain to have Wallenberg's name.


The legacy of the Jewish community in the City of Monforte de Lemos is vast and rich. It is thus presented in this way by Aira Pardo in his history Monforte, the Hebrew community and the Converts, research carried out at the request of Mayor Pin Fernandez.

A document from the year 915 A.D. which belongs to the Saint Vincent Benedictine Monastery stands out within that research paper. The document refers to the Jewish presence in the community at large. Moreover, it tells the history of the powerful Counts of Lemos who, in the XIV century depended on the services of Jews in important positions in the State.

According to historical documentation, it is known that in the year 1334 A.D., the feudal Lord of Monforte had Don Samuel as his treasurer. He was a good Hebrew friend of the powerful noble. Furthermore, Don Samuel's brother, Cagaben Bueno, was a tax collector for Don Pedro during those years. The son of that noble, Fernan Ruiz de Castro, loyal to the pro-Jewish policy of his sovereign Peter I, "The Cruel", had a great friendship with the Hebrew community and hired distinguished Jews within the House of Lemos, with its capital in Monforte, Aira Pardos' research points out.

Rua de Raoul Wallenberg enlarged the online index **Wallenberg Around The World**, published by the Wallenberg Foundation.

**ARGENTINA**  
[irwf@irwf.org.ar](mailto:irwf@irwf.org.ar)**VENEZUELA**  
[joseweiss@cantv.net](mailto:joseweiss@cantv.net)**ISRAEL**  
[irwf@irwf.org.il](mailto:irwf@irwf.org.il)**USA**  
[irwf@irwf.org](mailto:irwf@irwf.org)



THE INTERNATIONAL  
RAOUL WALLENBERG FOUNDATION

English | Español |

Home > Education > Schools > Raoul Wallenberg...

# Raoul Wallenberg school inaugurated in Venezuela

As result of a proposal made by the **International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation**, a school carrying the name of the Swedish diplomat was inaugurated on September 18th, 2002.

Before a large audience of students, teachers, government officials, including national, municipal and community authorities, the meeting was organised by **Nussia and José Weiss**, who are in charge of the Venezuelan branch of the International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation. Also present were **Anabel and Jorge Aquino**, the principals of the Raoul Wallenberg Pre-school Educational Unit, situated in the Catia district of the capital city of Venezuela.


The inauguration of the Raoul Wallenberg School had been announced to the UN Secretary General, **Kofi Annan**, by **Baruch Tenenbaum**, creator of the International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation, in a meeting they held on August 4th, 2002 to mark the anniversary of the Swedish diplomat's 90th birthday. Wallenberg disappeared in January 1945 after having saved the lives of tens of thousands of people, mostly Hungarian Jews, persecuted by the Nazi regime.

**Nane Annan**, wife of the United Nations leader and a niece of Raoul Wallenberg, sent the Wallenberg Foundation a **letter of gratitude** in which she expresses her satisfaction about the work being carried out by the NGO.

In turn, in a message specially sent from Jerusalem, Tenenbaum pointed out:



Unidad Educativa Preescolar Raoul Wallenberg



Letter of Nane Annan, niece of Raoul Wallenberg and wife of Secretary General of United Nations, Kofi Annan concerning the inauguration of the Wallenberg School in Venezuela.



"It is very exciting for all of us to see the birth of such an ambitious idea. Especially one that is so dear to the Wallenberg Foundation, as is the fact that a school now carries the name of one of the Heroes of the XX century. Thus, one of the most important wishes of Wallenberg's sister, **Nina Lagergren**, has come true: to pass on to new generations the values that encouraged the conduct of this true "Heroe without a Grave".

During the ceremony a commemorative plaque marking the inauguration of the Wallenberg School was unveiled and a **portrait of the missing Swedish diplomat**, by artist Peter Malkin, was presented by the IRWF.

Venezuela becomes, thus, the **second country in Latin America** to have a Wallenberg School. In the near future a street is to be inaugurated with his name and a plaque in his memory will be unveiled at the Foreign Ministry, making this Caribbean country a hemispheric forerunner as far as its acknowledgements of the life and work of Raoul Wallenberg.

In accordance with what was expressed by the President of Federal Germany, **Johannes Rau** during his **meeting held in Berlin** in March, 2001, Baruj Tenenbaum said:

"There are things in life that are more important than life itself. In accordance to what the voice of our forefathers tells us to do, we must look for Truth and Justice. There are lights and shadows in the world; and even though it is important not to forget the shadows, we have decided to dedicate our efforts to remembering the exceptions that constitute the lights. We have decided to promote the person of Raoul Wallenberg, a protestant who saved tens of thousands of Jews condemned to death, and many others like him who risked everything to help the others."

ARGENTINA  
irwf@irwf.org.ar

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ISRAEL  
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USA  
irwf@irwf.org



SVERIGES AMBASSAD

Ham & Adel pro

2004-07-06

BUDAPEST

Ambassadör

+36 1 4606030

2004-10-25 ✓  
H. Hamrin  
Hb dit /

Amb Harald Hamrin  
UD

04/37251

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| 2004 -07- 0 9 |      |         |
| Avd. P        | Gr L | Mal Eu' |

EC

### Förslag att skapa ett Raoul Wallenberg center i Budapest

1 bil

Jag får härmed insända kopia av ett brev från min israeliska kollega med ett förslag som hon har erhållit från Raoul Wallenberg föreningen i Budapest. Hon har även sänt förslaget till den amerikanske kongressmannen Tom Lantos.

Föreningen föreslår att man skapar ett dokumentations- och informationscenter i Budapest för att samla och ställa ut föremål och information som har samband med Raoul Wallenbergs räddningsaktion.

Vidare skulle centret hålla kontakt med andra organisationer som engagerar sig i Raoul Wallenberg-frågan. Centret skulle kunna ordna större utställningar. En kostnadsskiss ingår i föreningens förslag.

När jag igår träffade den israeliska ambassadören och frågade jag henne, om man möjligtvis kunde tänka sig att föreningens förslag kunde kopplas ihop med Holocaust centret för att skapa samordningsvinster, såg hon skeptisk ut.

Jag ser fram emot dina och andras synpunkter på det närslutna förslaget.

Bengt Lundborg

Postadress:  
1146 Budapest  
Ajtósi Dörér sor 27/A  
UNGERN

Besöksadress:  
Ajtósi Dörér sor 27/A

Telefon:  
+36 1 460 6020

Telefax:  
+36 1 460 6021

E-post:  
ambassaden.budapest@foreign.ministry.se

IZRAEL NAGYKÖVETE  
BUDAPEST



שגריר ישראל  
בודפשט

Embassy of Sweden  
H.E. Mr. Bengt Lundborg  
Budapest

Dear Ambassador Lundborg,

Please find enclosed a plan proposal for the establishment of Raoul Wallenberg Information Centre and Exhibition Hall.

The proposal in writing was made after the members of the Raoul Wallenberg Association came to meet me and asked for my help.

I am forwarding the proposal to you as well to find out whether you and your Government can assist in any way.

Budapest, June 29, 2004

Friendly yours,

Judith Varnai Shorer

**Raoul Wallenberg Foundation and Association  
Budapest**

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**Plan Proposal for Establishing and Operating  
the  
Raoul Wallenberg  
National Documentation and Information Centre  
and Exhibition Hall**

**The idea in general terms**

To establish an institution, named after Raoul Wallenberg (hereinafter RW), which would have nation-wide competence and its centre would be in Budapest. It would collect and continuously put on display materials and information related to RW's life and activities within and outside Hungary. Moreover, it would store information about organizations that bear RW's name; would foster relations with those organizations; would organize permanent and temporary exhibitions; and would occasionally offer premises for any events related to the above-mentioned activities.

**The idea in some more detail**

1. An institution for permanent exhibitions
  - collecting and putting on display documents and other materials related to RW's activities,
  - making interviews with persons who knew and/or worked with RW; editing those interviews and making them available for those interested in them;
  - collecting and storing in a systematic manner (printed and electronic) media materials that are related to RW;
  - collecting and storing in a retrievable manner articles and books that cover the life and activities of RW.
2. Liaising with organizations that bear RW's name. Initiating and organizing joint political and/or other actions with those entities.
3. Organizing events within and outside Hungary with the above-mentioned organizations.
4. The institution would serve as a basis for research on RW's activities, and on other efforts during WW II to save the lives of people. It would collect, systematically store and make available for researchers such information.
5. The institution would arrange informing students of primary and secondary schools, plus any other interested educational institutions, about RW's activities – focusing especially on events of the Holocaust memorial days.
6. Writing articles for, editing and issuing occasional and periodical publications.

### Conditions required for the institution

- The facility that would house the exhibition hall and offices should be at least 150 square metres in space. That would include a sizeable exhibition hall (80 to 100 sq m) and two offices (20 sq m each) as a minimum. If the facility is rented, there would be a one-off expenditure to convert it into the required shape. If the facility is owned, a purchase price would also be incurred.
- Certain devices and aids would have to be purchased (one-off expenditure) to facilitate exhibitions and events.
- Two persons would have to be employed in full time to attain said objectives.
- Supposing the funds are available to cover the one-off and the continuous expenditures, the institution would have the opportunity to apply for grants in aid from various outside sources.

### Budget

|                                                                               |                         | yearly           |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------|
| Cost of creating the facility. If it is hired, conversion costs are incurred. | HUF 1 million (one-off) |                  |
|                                                                               | + rent                  | HUF 1 million    |
| If the facility is purchased, the price would at least be                     | HUF 10 million          |                  |
| Conversion of the facility                                                    | HUF 1 million (one-off) |                  |
| Overhead costs of continuous operation                                        | HUF 200 000/month       | HUF 2.4 million  |
| Payroll expenditure for 2 persons (pay and its public charges)                | HUF 500 000/month       | HUF 6 million    |
| Initial financing of events (including purchase of devices/aids)              |                         | HUF 3.0 million  |
| total: if facility is hired (starting cost total)                             |                         | HUF 13.4 million |
| if facility is purchased (starting cost total)                                |                         | HUF 22.4 million |

16 June 2004

*George Kaiser*

György Kaiser, member of the Executive Board of  
the Raoul Wallenberg Association

Dr. József Sebes  
President of the Raoul Wallenberg  
Foundation



SVERIGES AMBASSAD

SOFIA

Andre ambassadsekreterare  
Anna Olsson

Regar wik. 12/7

2004-07-07

EC

UD-EC

Ambassadör Harald Hamrin

|                     |          |             |
|---------------------|----------|-------------|
| INK. UTRIKESDEP.    |          |             |
| D.Nr. 04/41225      |          |             |
| 2004-08-04<br>07-12 |          |             |
| AVD.<br>P           | GR.<br>2 | MÅL I<br>Eu |

EC/Hamrin/PB

### Brev angående Raoul Wallenberg

(4 bilagor)

40811 ✓  
Hbr t. Roth,  
amb. Sofia  
Rep. n/s/PB

Bifogat översänds för kännedom och eventuell vidare åtgärd  
översättning av brev som inkommit till ambassaden från Ljuben  
Hadzhiev angående Raoul Wallenberg.

Som framgår av brevet uppger Hadzhiev att han suttit i samma fängelse  
som Raoul Wallenberg under slutet av 1948 och att han hört och sett  
Wallenberg vid flera tillfällen.

Hadzhiev är beredd att träffa ambassaden för att lämna ytterligare  
information. Tacksam underrättelse huruvida detta är önskvärt från  
departementets sida.

  
Bertil Roth

Postadress:  
Box 620  
1000 SOFIA  
BULGARIEN

Besöksadress:  
Alfred Nobel 4

Telefon:  
+359 2 930 19 60

Telefax:  
+359 2 973 37 95

E-post:  
swemb@einet.bg

(Ambassadens översättning)

Till  
Svenska ambassaden i Sofia  
Bertil Roth  
Ambassadör

**Bäste herr Roth,**

År 1948 studerade jag på helfart vid Tekniska universitetet i Wien, Österrike.

Av oförutsägbara och oönskade omständigheter blev jag fängslad på ett särskilt fängelse den 21 februari 1948. Senare, den 1 september 1948, förflyttades jag till ett annat fängelse och delade cell med den diplomerade ingenjören Alfred Scorcini (bror till Otto Scorcini, en f.d. general av den tyska armén). Jag fick veta att samma dag som jag fängslats satt Raul Wallenberg, en f.d. svensk ambassadör i Budapest, i samma cell som A. Scorcini och senare förflyttades till cellen bredvid. Jag såg och hörde honom vid flera tillfällen fram till den 1 januari 1949.

Om Ni vill ta reda på flera detaljer kan Ni besöka mig i Russe. Jag kan lämna omfattande information, möjligen också om Wallenbergs kvarlevor, som kan vara av intresse inte bara för hans släkt utan också för Sverige med tanke på att frågan gäller en sådan stor personlighet och diplomat. Jag är tyvärr förhindrad att besöka Er eftersom jag, som ett resultat av mina 10 år i fängelset, har jag svårt att gå med två proteser.

Min adress: Ljuben Dimitrov Hadzhiev  
Flotski 4, 7000 Russe  
tfn. 082/27 35 52

Hjärtliga hälsningar till Er och släkten Wallenberg!

Högaktningsfullt: / Dipl. ingenjör Ljuben Hadzhiev

Bil.: 1 Dokument från den ryska åklagarmyndigheten – Moskva

ДО

Р 95

**ПОСОЛСТВОТО НА ШВЕЦИЯ**  
**Пълномощен министър**  
**Негово Превъзходителство**  
**Бертил РУТ**  
**Шведска легация**

СОФИЯ

**УВАЖАЕМИ ГОСПОДИН БЕРТИЛ РУТ,**

През 1948 година бях редовен студент в Техническия университет във Виена, Австрия.

По непредвидени и нежелани от мен обстоятелства, на 21.02.1948 г. бях отвлечен в един специален следствен затвор. По-късно, на 01.09.1948 г. бях преместен в друг стационарен затвор и попаднах в една килия с дипл.инженер АЛФРЕД СКОРЦИНИ / брат на Ото Скорцини, бивш генерал от германската армия и после в УЗА-армия/. До деня на моето вкарване в тая килия, на същото място е бил РАУЛ ВАЛЕНБЕРГ, бивш шведски посланик в Будапеща. Същия ден преди моето настаняване при А.Скорцини той е бил преместен в съседната килия. До 01.01.1949 г. няколко пъти го виждах и чувах.

Ако искате по-големи подробности, може да ме посетите в Русе. Ще Ви дам още някои подробности, а може би и за намиране на тленните му останки, което ще интересува неговия голям род, а и самата Швеция, ЗА ЕДИН ГОЛЯМ ЧОВЕК И ДИПЛОМАТ. Бих желал аз да дойда при Вас, но след 10 годишна каторга, имам две изкуствени протези.

Адресът ми е: гр.Русе 7000, бул. "Флотски" 4 (част от бул. "Придунавски" 4), Любен Димитров Хаджиев. Тел. 082/27 35 52.

Поздравявам Вас и рода (фамилията) на г-н Раул ВАЛЕНБЕРГ!

С уважение!.....

Дипл.инж. Любен ХАДЖИЕВ

ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ: 1. Документ от руската прокуратура - Москва.



2004-07-07



ГЕНЕРАЛЬНАЯ ПРОКУРАТУРА  
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

ГЛАВНОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ ПО НАДЗОРУ  
ЗА ИСПОЛНЕНИЕМ ЗАКОНОВ В  
ВООРУЖЕННЫХ СИЛАХ

« 4 » сентября 1992 г.

№ 3В-37009-48

103160, г. Москва, К-160

СПРАВКА О РЕАБИЛИТАЦИИ

Выдана гр-ну Болгарии Димитрову Любену, 1926 года рождения, в том, что он, будучи студентом высшей технической школы в г. Вене, 7 апреля 1948г. необоснованно арестован и по постановлению особого совещания при МГБ СССР от 16 октября 1948г. на основании ст.58-6 ч.1 УК РСФСР лишен свободы в ИТЛ сроком на 10 лет.

По определению Военной коллегии Верховного Суда СССР от 5 июня 1953г. он от дальнейшего наказания досрочно освобожден, с признанием, что дальнейшее содержание его в местах заключения не вызывается необходимостью.

В соответствии со ст.3 Закона Российской Федерации "О реабилитации жертв политических репрессий" от 18 октября 1991г. Димитров Любен реабилитирован.



ПРОКУРОР ОТДЕЛА УПРАВЛЕНИЯ  
ПО РЕАБИЛИТАЦИИ

Н.С. Власенко

17.02.2004  
219  
М.С. Власенко  
23.00.00  
Нотариус

## Г. РУСЕ

№ 502  
от 28 декабря 1992 г.

2004-07-17

До г-н Любен Димитров Хаджиев  
Бул. "Ал.Стамболийски" 4  
гр. Русе

Приложена предаваме ъи, "СПРАВКА ЗА ПОЛИТИЧЕСКА РЕАБИЛИТАЦИЯ" № Зв-37009-48 от 4.септември 1992 г.от ГЕНЕРАЛНАТА ПРОКУРАТУРА на РУСКАТА ФЕДЕРАЦИЯ

Приложение: Съгласно текста.

ПОЛУЧАТЕЛ:

Любен Д. Хаджиев


## ПРЕДЛАЖ:



В. В. АСТАГИН

17-01-2084 г. / Комисия Успешно  
ПОДАРИЛО В РАЙОН *17/1*  
СЕТ. 19. *2/19* НА ПОТАРИМАНАТА КАМАРА, УДОСТОБЕТЕЛНА  
ВЪВЕДЕНИТЕ ТОВАРИЩЕ, ОБЩОСТ *Оригинал*  
ДЪЛ СОУКРАВЕТЕЛНАТА ДОКУМЕНТИ ПРЕСТАВИЛИ ОТ  
*Иванка Стефанова Стефанова*  
С ДОСТОЯТЕЛСТВО (П.К.) *17/1*  
КАТО ВЪВЕДЕНИТЕ ПРЕСТАВИ ЗАЛЕ ЗАМНИ, ПРИДАВКА, ПОПРАВИКИ И ДРУГИ  
ДОСТАВКИ

54 ..... СЛУЖБА ЗАДАТАКА: 2-00 .....  
 Нотариус: ..... 



Regas, wik 13/7

# The Raoul Wallenberg International Movement for Humanity

4845 Bourret Avenue, Suite 34, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3W 1L2  
Tel (514) 343-0137 • Fax (514) 738-6340



His Excellency Ambassador Harald Hamrin  
Ministry of the Foreign Affairs  
SE 103 39 Stockholm Sweden

|                  |          |           |
|------------------|----------|-----------|
| INK. UTRIKESDEP. |          |           |
| D.Nr. 04/41223   |          |           |
| 2004-08-04       |          |           |
| 07-13            |          |           |
| AVD<br>P         | GR.<br>2 | MÅL<br>ku |

EC

Your Excellency Ambassador Hamrin,

Inbjudan från

August 4th, the birthday of Raoul Wallenberg, is a day very much marked in our souls. I am writing to you from Montréal, where every year members of the Board of Directors of the Raoul Wallenberg International Movement for Humanity and numerous friends of Raoul Wallenberg go to Raoul Wallenberg Square, located in the centre of the city, to lay flowers at the Raoul Wallenberg monument and say words of gratitude to this great Swede who saved a hundred thousand lives, risking his own.

I can assure you that the affiliates of RWIMH mark this day in many countries of the world.

Dear Mr. Hamrin, you are one of the individuals who have done a lot to keep his memory alive and to find out the truth of his fate in confinement. I would be greatly honoured if you would accept my appeal to participate in our future event devoted to the 60th anniversary of Raoul Wallenberg's rescue operations in Budapest and to deliver a speech. The subject may be "Sweden and Its Heroic Son, Raoul Wallenberg," or one of your own choice.

We are organising a Raoul Wallenberg Tribute on Sunday, October 19, 2004 at 6 p.m. in Ottawa at the Atrium Gallery, Ben Franklin Place, 101 Centrepont Drive. On October 19, the Raoul Wallenberg exhibition will be also open in Ottawa.

I would be very obliged if you would inform me as to your decision regarding your speech at your earliest convenience.

Thanking you in advance for your attention and sending you my best wishes,


Sincerely yours,

*Vera Parnes*

Dr. Vera Parnes  
President

EC / Hamrin /  
040901

Brev ✓ t.  
Ham  
exp.



The Honourable Ambassador Harald Hamrin  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Department of Eastern Europe and Central Asia

Dear Mr. Hamrin,

I am pleased to inform you that we are organizing a Raoul Wallenberg Tribute on Sunday, October 17, 2004 at 6:00 p.m. in Ottawa at the Atrium Gallery (Ben Franklin Place, 101 Centrepont Drive). I humbly invite you to this event. Your presence and your speech would be highly appreciated. We are especially interested in your new search for the truth about Raoul Wallenberg's destiny.

I would be very obliged if you would inform me as to your decision regarding this event at your earliest convenience.

Thanking you in advance for your attention.  
With all the best wishes

Respectfully yours,

Dr. Vera Parnes  
President

P.S. We plan to open the Raoul Wallenberg exhibition devoted to the 60- th anniversary of Raoul Wallenberg's rescue operations in Ottawa as well. I will inform you about all the details. The exhibition is to be shown on October 16-17, 2004 at the same address.

P.P.S. I would be obliged if you inform me about the Raoul Wallenberg event in September.  
V.P.



# INVITATION

The Raoul Wallenberg International Movement for Humanity

HAS THE HONOUR OF INVITING YOU TO A SPECIAL TRIBUTE  
CELEBRATING THE 60th ANNIVERSARY OF RAOUL WALLENBERG'S  
RESCUE OPERATION IN BUDAPEST:

## "RAOUL WALLENBERG - SYMBOL OF JUSTICE AND HUMANITY"

SUNDAY, THE 17th OF OCTOBER 2004  
AT 6:00 P.M.

The Atrium Gallery  
Ben Franklin Place, 101 Centrepont Drive  
Ottawa (Nepean), Ontario

RSVP

Dr. Vera Parnes  
President  
RWIMH  
514-343-0137

Mrs. Vera Gara  
Representative of RWIMH  
in Ottawa  
613-722-6422

Raoul Wallenberg International Movement for Humanity:  
514-345-2656

Mr. Peter Rona, Executive Director: 514-332-1656; 514-794-1656



SVERIGES AMBASSAD

Telefax

1 (2)

2004-08-04

Tel Aviv

Christian Carlsson

|                  |      |        |
|------------------|------|--------|
| INK. UTRIKESDEP. |      |        |
| DNR 2004/41460   |      |        |
| 2004-08-0504     |      |        |
| Avd. P           | Gr 2 | Må EU? |

PIK-PA

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET, dnr 103V

Till: UD-PIK-PRESS

Kopia: UD-MENA (Åström Gröndahl)

Artikel om Raoul Wallenberg

(1 bil.)

I härmed insändes artikel om Raoul Wallenberg från dagens upplaga av dagstidningen Jerusalem Post. Artikeln har publicerats i anknytning till det evenemang som i går arrangerades i Jerusalem för att fira Wallenbergs födelsedag.

Som framgår av artikeln är Max Grunberg ordförande i *Raoul Wallenberg Honorary Citizen Committee*. Det är även värt att nämna att med anledning av sitt arbete utnämndes Grunberg till riddare av Kungliga Nordstjärneorden, första klassen, i november 2002.

CARLSSON

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4, Weizmann Street  
64 239 TEL AVIV  
ISRAEL

Prenumeration:

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+972 3 695 8111

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Hemsida:  
www.swedenabroad.com/telaviv

Israeli embassies and the Uzbek chief prosecutor's office also left seven people injured, although none are in critical condition, said general prosecutor's spokeswoman Svetlana Artikova.

A criminal case has been opened in the US, as is standard procedure when an American interest overseas is attacked, said a US Embassy spokeswoman.

The bombings came as 15

ing on condition of anonymity said that the type of explosive used in Friday's attacks was "different from what was used" in the earlier violence. Authorities said explosives in the March-April attacks, were made from commonly available fertilizer ingredients - in some cases packed into empty water bottles.

President Islam Karimov has said a group called Jamoat, or "Society," was behind both

instructors. Suspects have testified that they were targeting police stations and prisons, and also had plans to attack embassies and Western organizations.

Opposition critics have alleged the attackers may have been motivated by Muslim anger over Karimov's attempt to stem Muslim extremism by jailing thousands of Muslims who worship outside state-run mosques.

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## Wallenberg still alive for survivor's son

• By DALIA NAAMANI-GOLDMAN

Max Grunberg doesn't want to repeat his father's mistake. He wants to show his gratitude.

His father was hidden by a non-Jewish family in Germany for two years, but when found out was sent to two concentration camps, ending up in Auschwitz.

"On occasion we would visit the family, but my father was unable to show gratitude to the family because of what happened to him in the camps," he said. "I never could understand why he could show appreciation and gratitude of them [only] to me."

But Grunberg began to make amends 17 years ago. That was when he first heard of Raoul Wallenberg through a second generation Holocaust survivors' group.

Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat, is known for helping to save thousands of Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust. He was arrested by the Soviets in 1945 and has been considered "missing in action" ever since. This year marks the 60th anniversary of his arrival in Budapest, Hungary, and his arrest and disappearance.

After researching Wallenberg and the diplomat's actions on his own, Grunberg was introduced to Raoul Wallenberg's sister, brother and niece through friends. It was only upon hearing the family's pain that he knew he needed to help in the effort to find Wallenberg.

"I felt for myself the gratitude [my father] couldn't show," he said. "I saw how disappointed they were in the Jewish community as a whole because it didn't try to find him and motivate politicians to take action."



RAOUL WALLENBERG

Since then, Grunberg founded the Raoul Wallenberg Honorary Citizen Committee, which works to put the mystery of Wallenberg's disappearance back on the diplomatic agenda. Today he is trying to fight a February 2003 letter from the Russian Embassy in Tel Aviv that called the Wallenberg case a historical matter.

Grunberg was one of several speakers at Tuesday's "Remembering Raoul Wallenberg," an event held to commemorate him on his birthday. Swedish Ambassador Robert Rydberg, Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Israel Yonah Metzger, and Naomi Gur, who was saved by Wallenberg, were among the speakers at the B'nai B'rith Hall in Jerusalem. The program, sponsored by the International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation and the Jerusalem Working Group for Recognition of Major Jewish Rescuers during the Shoah, also included musical tributes to Wallenberg.

"I don't want to remember him," Grunberg said. "In my mind he is alive. He took action to save people and didn't think twice about it when he had the opportunity."

## S. Korea te

• By DALIA NAAMANI-GOLDMAN

South Korean government officials are continuing to urge thousands of pilgrims scheduled to come to Israel in the next week to cancel their plans, *The Korea Herald* reported Tuesday.

The Protestant pilgrims, who plan to participate in the Jerusalem Jesus March 2004, have been warned by the Korean Foreign Ministry that

## Cadets pr teach first a

• By JENNY HAZAN

Twelve Israeli teens will be leaving this Thursday for remote villages in India to provide first aid and health education, youth leadership programs and literacy activities to peers around Delhi.

Pirhei Refua (Youth Medical Cadets), in collaboration with Magen David Adom and the ministries of Education and Foreign Affairs, has offered medical training courses to more than 2,000 Israelis aged 17 and 18 since it was established in 1994.

But only around 50 of those who have participated in training courses have been selected to participate in the weeklong, India-bound delegation.

The selection process is rigorous and includes physical and academic examinations, said director Koby Monovich. The 12 participants were selected from 250 applicants.

"The idea is to give Israeli students the opportunity to transfer their knowledge of



REGERINGSKANSLIET

2004-08-05

**Utrikesdepartementet**

*Enheten för Östeuropa och Centralasien*

*Ambassadör*

*Harald Hamrin*

*Telefon 08-405 33 43*

*E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se*

Professor Guy von Dardel  
6 A Chemin Adolph Pasteur  
CH-1209 Genève

SCHWEIZ

Raoul Wallenberg - ceremoni i Budapests stadshus

Broder!

Jag vill med dessa rader – för den händelse Du inte redan hört därom via Nina – informera Dig om en begivenhet, som kommer att gå av stapeln i Budapest den 27 och 28 september i år.

Måndagen den 27 september, sannolikt med början kl. 11.00, äger en ceremoni rum i Budapests Stadshus till minne av att i år 60 år förflutit sedan den ungerska Förintelsen och de svenska räddningsaktionerna – legationens, Raoul Wallenbergs och Svenska Röda korsets – i samband därmed. Talare blir, som det nu ser ut, bl a en representant för det ungerska UD, Budapests överborgmästare samt från svensk sida kabinetssekreterare Hans Dahlgren.

Omedelbart efter denna minnesstund, som beräknas pågå i ca. en timma, vidtar ett svensk-ungerskt vetenskapligt symposium, som fortsätter under tisdag förmiddag den 28 september. Vid symposiet kommer den svenska räddningsaktionen att diskuteras och förhoppningsvis även framtida forskningsuppgifter att identifieras. Symposiet organiseras tillsammans av Utrikespolitiska Institutet i Stockholm och Holocaust Documentation Center i Budapest.

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105 90 MINFOR S

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
2004-08-05

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Dessutom organiseras för de svenska deltagarna på eftermiddagen  
söndagen den 26 september en rundtur i minibuss till olika  
”svenskplatser” i 1944 års Budapest.

Låt mig veta om Du skulle vara intresserad av att delta i dessa  
arrangemang!

Med de bästa hälsningar från ett äntligen sommarvarmt Stockholm!

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Harald Hamrin". The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping initial "H" and a final flourish.

Harald Hamrin



REGERINGSKANSLIET

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04/45355

P 2 EU'

2004-08-05

(EC)

**Utrikesdepartementet**

Enheten för Östeuropa och Centralasien  
Ambassadör  
Harald Hamrin  
Telefon 08-405 33 43  
E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

LSH  
Attn. Rebecka Enhörning  
Strandvägen 3  
111 30 Stockholm

Konservering av svenska Budapestlegationens flagga från 1945

Kära Rebecka!

Återsänder Din offert i undertecknat skick. Hör av Dig när Du återkommit från semestern!

Fakturan skall, när det blir dags, sändas till: UD A-INT, Attn. Liss-Erik Larsson, 103 39 Stockholm.

Med bästa hälsningar

Harald Hamrin

exp 6/8 J

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Telex  
105 90 MINFOR S



# LSH

Livrustkammaren  
Skoklosters slott  
Hallwylska Museet

LSH Textilkonservering

OFFERT

K 790

Ägare: Utrikesdepartementet/ Harald Hamrin

|                                |                                  |                             |
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| 1. Föremål                     | 7. Konserveringsplan             | 13. Övrig dok. / litteratur |
| 2. Tillverkningstid / ort      | 8. Konserveringsåtgärder         | 14. Använd arbetstid        |
| 3. Teknisk data                | 9. Konserveringsmaterial         | 15. Arbetet utfört av       |
| 4. Analyser / provtagningar    | 10. Tillstånd efter konservering | 16. Protokollsupprättare    |
| 5. Tillstånd före konservering | 11. Avlägsnade delar             | 17. Datum                   |
| 6. Funktion / förvaring        | 12. Foto                         | 18. Bilagor                 |

1. Svensk flagga i ylle

2. Längd: 104 cm  
Bredd: 143 cm

5. Tillstånd: Endast halva flaggan återstår.  
Flaggan är smutsig och har många hål.  
Den vänstra ytterkant mycket skadad.

6. Kommer att visas utan monter.

7. Flaggan behöver ett stöd tyg för att kunna visas hängande.  
Konserveringsförslag: Flaggan tvättas och ev behöver den spännas.  
Den fästes ned mot ett tunt stödtyg för att kunna hängas.  
En tunn pappskiva monteras mot fodret som extra stöd.  
Pappskivan kommer att kunna avlägsnas när flaggan behöver transporteras. Flaggan kan då rullas med sitt foder på en papprulle.

14. Beräknad arbetstid: 20 timmar à 530 kr = 10.600 kr exkl moms  
Materialkostnad tillkommer.

Stockholm 24 juni 2004

Rebecka Enhörning  
Textilkonservator

Offerten godkännes

Datum: 2004-08-05

Om uppdraget inte blir av, debiteras 530 kr exkl moms för rådgivning, bedömning och upprättandet av offert. Ägaren svarar själv för försäkring av föremålet



REGERINGSKANSLIET

2004-08-11

Utrikesdepartementet

Ambassadör Bertil Roth  
Ambassaden Sofia

Enheten för Östeuropa och Centralasien  
Ambassadör Harald Hamrin  
Telefon 08-405 33 43  
E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

Brev angående Raoul Wallenberg

Brev Roth-Hamrin, 2004-07-07

Broder!

Med anledning av Hadzhievs brev till Dig föreslår jag följande:

Det dyker alltså upp mer eller mindre trovärdiga vittnesmål av personer, som påstår sig ha träffat Raoul Wallenberg i olika sammanhang. Många av dessa vittnesmål kan direkt läggas ad acta. I detta fall menar jag dock att en första något fördjupad kontroll bör göras för att se om det alls är värt att gå vidare.

Hadzhievs brev innehåller en rad oklarheter, som han bör beredas tillfälle att reda ut. Han skriver sålunda att han år 1948 studerade i Wien, där han blev "fängslad på ett särskilt fängelse den 21 april 1948". Låg detta fängelse i Wien eller syftar han på ett sovjetiskt fängelse och i så fall vilket och när och hur fördes han dit? Den 1 september förflyttades han "till ett annat fängelse". Vilket var detta fängelse? Vilka uppgifter i övrigt har han om Wallenberg, som enligt Hadzhiev var cellgranne "fram till den 1 januari 1949". Vad hände detta datum: vem förflyttades då - Hadzhiev eller Wallenberg och vart? Vad syftar Hadzhiev på med sin antydning om information om Wallenbergs "kvarlevor"? Och slutligen: varför hör Hadzhiev av sig först nu?

Som Du ser: ett antal preliminära frågor, som bör besvaras innan vi kan bedöma det meningsfulla i att ev. gå vidare i ärendet. Jag överläter på

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
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2004-08-11

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Dig att avgöra om Du själv vill ta hand om ärendet eller överlåta det på någon av Dina medarbetare.

Med sommarvarma hälsningar

The signature is written in dark ink and is a stylized, cursive representation of the name 'Harald Hamrin'. It starts with a large, sweeping 'H' and ends with a sharp, upward-pointing stroke.

Harald Hamrin

Aug

04/46528  
P 2 EU'

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(EC)

Harald Hamrin

Till: The Wallenberg International Movement for  
Humanity <Wallenberg@Videotron.ca>

Montreal

2004-08-17 12:11

Kopia: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

Blank:

Fax till:

Ärende: Ang: Tribute to Raoul Wallenberg in Ottawa on  
October 17, 2004

Dear Ms. Parnes,

thank you for the invitation to the Raoul Wallenberg Tribute in October (on the 17th or 19th???). I shall return to this issue as soon as I have a better idea about my fall program.

As to your P.P.S. about "the Raoul Wallenberg event in September" I can give you the following information. The Swedish Institute of International Relations is organising a symposium together with the Budapest based Holocaust Documentation Center. The symposium will take place in Budapest on September 27 and 28. Participants from Sweden and Hungary will present papers. The symposium will be open to the public. Information on the symposium will be sent in a few weeks' time by the Holocaust Center to interested individuals and organisations.

Yours sincerely,

Harald Hamrin

The Wallenberg International Movement for Humanity <Wallenberg@Videotron.ca>



The Wallenberg International  
Movement for Humanity  
<Wallenberg@Videotron.ca>

2004-08-15 04:57

Till: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

Kopia:

Blank:

Fax till:

Ärende: Tribute to Raoul Wallenberg in Ottawa on  
October 17, 2004

<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" />

The Honourable Ambassador Harald Hamrin

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Department of Eastern Europe and <?xml:namespace prefix = st1 ns =

"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" />Central Asia

Dear Mr. Hamrin,

I am pleased to inform you that we are organizing a Raoul Wallenberg Tribute on Sunday, October 17, 2004 at 6:00 p.m. in Ottawa at the Atrium Gallery (Ben Franklin Place, 101 Centrepont Drive). I humbly invite you to this event. Your presence and your speech would be highly appreciated. We are especially interested in your new search for the truth about Raoul Wallenberg's destiny.

I would be very obliged if you would inform me as to your decision regarding this event at your earliest convenience.

Thanking you in advance for your attention.

1/9-04  
aa / YB

With all the best wishes

Respectfully yours,

Dr. Vera Parnes  
President

P.S. We plan to open the Raoul Wallenberg exhibition devoted to the 60- th anniversary of Raoul Wallenberg's rescue operations in Ottawa as well. I will inform you about all the details. The exhibition is to be shown on October 16-17, 2004 at the same address.

P.P.S. I would be obliged if you inform me about the Raoul Wallenberg event in September.

V.P.



### Honorary Members

Dalai Lama Nobel Peace Prize Tibet  
Nina Lagergren Sister of Wallenberg  
Guy Von Dardel Brother of Wallenberg  
Lantos Congressman for California USA  
Mohammed VI King of Morocco  
Jiří Havel President of the Czech Republic  
Jean Chrétien Prime Minister of Canada  
Hans-Adam II Prince of Liechtenstein  
Gerhard Schröder Chancellor of Germany  
Elio Velasco Nobel Peace Prize USA  
Oscar Arias Nobel Peace Prize Costa Rica  
Gerald Ford Former President of USA  
Vicente Fox Quesada President of Mexico  
Vaira-Vike Freiberga President of Latvia  
Peter Hollingworth Gov. Gen. of Australia  
Stjepan Mesić President of Croatia  
Janez Janša Prime Minister of Slovenia  
Rodrigo Rato President Comm. of Madrid Spain  
Shimon Peres President of the State of Israel  
Leszek Miller Prime Minister of Poland  
Thomas Klestil President of Austria  
Jorge Sampaio President of Portugal  
Ariel Sharon Prime Minister of Israel  
Aleksander Łukaszewski President of Poland  
John Hume Nobel Peace Prize North Ireland  
Michael D. Higgins Nobel Peace Prize North Ireland  
Gustavo Noboa President of Ecuador  
José Ramos Horta Nobel Peace Prize Timor  
David Shevardnadze President of Georgia  
Shimon Peres Nobel Peace Prize Israel  
Ferenc Mádl President of Hungary  
Valdas Adamkus President of Lithuania  
Rakayev President of the Kyrgyz Republic  
Zuzana Ruzicková Prime Minister of Slovak Republic  
Andris Bērziņš Prime Minister of Latvia  
Bird Prime Minister of Antigua & Barbuda  
Ernie Clark Prime Minister of New Zealand  
Kjell Magne Bondevik Prime Minister of Norway  
Leoy Falcáum President of Micronesia  
Clarence Clark Governor General of Canada  
Pepin Mahutangi Prime Minister of Samoa  
Guido de Marco President of Malta  
Milo Đukanović President of Montenegro  
Ivan Šusterčík President of Slovak Republic  
Harald Reiermann Prime Minister of Liechtenstein  
Arnold Rüütel President of Estonia  
Solomon Passy Chancellor of Bulgaria  
Said Musa Prime Minister of Belize  
Vernon Shaw Prime Minister of Dominica  
Mircea Cioba Prime Minister of Romania  
Patrick Manning Prime Minister of Trinidad & Tobago  
Mireya Moscoso President of Panama  
Ion Iliescu President of Romania  
Giorgos Papandreu President of Cyprus  
Pierre Charles Prime Minister of Dominica  
Jurao Barroso Prime Minister of Portugal  
Jean-Claude Juncker Prime Minister Luxembourg  
Bernard Henri Lévêque Prime Minister of Guyana  
Jacob Zuma Prime Minister of Namibia  
Ricardo Portillo Cabrera President of Guatemala  
Elīnors Repše Prime Minister of Latvia  
Miloslav Toman Prime Minister of Czech Republic  
Imants Brazauskas Prime Minister of Lithuania  
Sir George Porter Governor General of New Zealand  
José E. Dos Santos President of Angola  
Salvador Prime Minister Vincent/Grenadines  
Paul Kagame President of Rwanda  
Ricardo Lagos President of Chile  
Abel Pacheco President of Costa Rica  
Radmila Pestic Prime Minister of Yugoslavia  
Rodomir Ranzardzhiev President of Cambodia  
Vladimir Voronin President of Moldova  
Colville Young Governor General of Belize  
Meles Zenawi Prime Minister of Ethiopia  
Isaias Afewerki President of Eritrea  
Sir Anthony Prime Minister of Saint Lucia  
Todor Petrovski Prime Minister of Macedonia  
Robert F. Nash Jr. Nobel Economics Prize, USA  
Howard Natapeli Prime Minister of Vanuatu  
Chen Shui-Bian President of China

orrientes 1145 Piso 11 C1043AAL BUENOS AIRES  
Fax 54 11 4382 7872  
lrwf@lrwf.org.ar

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August 12, 2004

Mr. Hans Dahlgren  
State Secretary for Foreign Affairs  
Fax 46 8 723 11 76

~~REHAS~~  
~~WPIA 40~~  
~~WPIA HANNO HARRN~~  
~~a.a.~~  
10- MK / HANS DACHGREN  
2004-08-24 / JH

Dear Mr. Dahlgren,

It was a great pleasure to hear the news of the ceremony to honour the memory of Raoul Wallenberg's rescue mission that will be held in Budapest City Hall on 27 September 2004. On behalf of the **International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation** (IRWF), I wish to extend my warm congratulations and best wishes.

The aim of the International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation is to spread the message and remember the actions of the Saviors who risked their lives to save persecuted people during the Holocaust, like Raoul Wallenberg, Giorgio Perlasca, Nuncio Angelo Roncalli, Aristides de Sousa Mendes, Jan Karski among others.

More than sixty Heads of State, Nobel Prize Laureates, Governors and distinguished personalities such as Mrs. Nina Lagergren and Professor Guy Von Dardel, accompany us in this singular enterprise that aims at educating the younger generations on the exemplary behavior of the Saviors of the Holocaust. To see the list of Honorary Members please visit: <http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/english/comitew.htm>

May you have continuous success in your noble endeavors.

Baruch Tenenbaum  
Founder

The International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation  
e-mail: [irwf@irwf.org](mailto:irwf@irwf.org) - [www.raoulwallenberg.net](http://www.raoulwallenberg.net)  
Tel 1 212 737 3275 - Fax 1 212 535 6262  
34 East 67 St. 2nd floor - New York, NY 10021 - USA

**www.raoulwallenberg.net**  
Antebi 3 94547 JERUSALEM  
tel. 972 2 625 7996 Fax 972 2 623 4430  
email irwf@irwf.org.il

34 East 67th. Street NEW YORK NY 10021  
Tel. 1 212 737 3275 Fax 1 212 535 6262  
email [irwf@irwf.org](mailto:irwf@irwf.org)





SVERIGES AMBASSAD

TELEFAX

1(4)

2004-08-26

Moskva

Ambr Stefan Gullgren  
+7 095 937 92 00

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| INK. UTRIKESDEP. |         |           |
| D.Nr. 04/44724   |         |           |
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*Vi bör begära beläggande dokumentation* (EC)  
+ Inommar S. Sergej  
UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET, dnr 398 ✓

För: ~~EC~~ (Magnusson)

Raoul Wallenberg

Ert fax 27, 2004-06-30  
(1 bil.) ✓

Ryska utrikesministeriet har inkommit med svar på frågorna i den aide-mémoire i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet som ambassaden överlämnade till gruppchefen Sergej Beljajev, 2:a europeiska avdelningen, den 2 juli med anledning av Er begäran i ovancit.

Svarer, i form av en note med bilaga i form av aide-mémoire, inkom till ambassaden den 19 augusti. Det vidarebefordras härmed jämte ambassadens översättning av aide-mémoire till svenska.

WIGEMARK

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Ulitsa Mostilmovskaja 60  
119 590 Moskva

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(7 095) 937 92 00

E-post:  
ambassaden.moskva@foreign.ministry.se

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Telefax:  
(7 095) 937 92 02

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http://www.sweden.ru

SK

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№ 6933 /2ЕДПриложение,  
на 1 стр.

Министерство Иностранных Дел Российской Федерации свидетельствует свое уважение Посольству Королевства Швеция и, ссылаясь на ноту Посольства № 132/04 от 1 июля 2004 г. и памятную записку Посольства от 2 июля 2004 г., имеет честь препроводить памятную записку по поставленным в упомянутых документах вопросам.

Министерство пользуется случаем, чтобы возобновить Посольству уверения в своем высоком уважении.



Москва, «18» августа 2004 года

ПОСОЛЬСТВУ  
КОРОЛЕВСТВА ШВЕЦИЯ  
г.Москва

## ПАМЯТНАЯ ЗАПИСКА

Реммер Андрей Константинович, 1881 или 1878 года рождения, уроженец Курляндии, немец, из дворян, гражданин СССР, работал техническим руководителем на кирпичном заводе в г.Иркутске. В 1939 г. арестован органами Народного комиссариата внутренних дел СССР по обвинению в шпионаже и приговорен 25 мая 1939 г. военным трибуналом Забайкальского военного округа по статье 58-6 Уголовного кодекса РСФСР к 10 годам лишения свободы. 15 апреля 1940 г. умер в Орловской тюрьме, отбывая наказание. Реабилитирован в 1992 г. В 2000 г. военной прокуратурой Сибирского военного округа признан подвергшимся необоснованным политическим репрессиям. Свидетельство о смерти выдано 24 августа 2001 г. сыну А.К.Реммера, Генриху Андреевичу Реммеру, проживавшему в Крыму, г.Ялта, ул. Серафимовича, д.14.

Александр (Шандор) Катон вызывался на допрос начальником отделения 4 отдела 5 Главного управления Министерства государственной безопасности (МГБ) СССР Кузьмишиным в Лефортовской тюрьме 22 июля 1947 г. с 22 часов до 22 часов 10 минут.

Российские архивные службы подтверждают предположение Посольства Швеции о вызове Вильмоша Лангфельдера и Александра (Шандора) Катона на допрос во внутренней (Лубянской) тюрьме начальником 4 отдела 3 Главного управления МГБ СССР Карташовым 23 июля 1947 г. с 2 часов 15 минут до 18 часов 30 минут и с 2 часов 35 минут до 18 часов 30 минут соответственно. Российская сторона сожалеет о допущенной ранее технической ошибке в дате.

SVERIGES AMBASSAD  
Moskva  
Christina Johannesson

ÖVERSÄTTNING  
2004-08-24

Översättning från ryska

AIDE-MEMOIRE

Andrej Konstantinovitj Remmer, född 1881 eller 1878 i Kurland, av tysk adelssläkt, sovjetisk medborgare, arbetade som teknisk chef på tegelfabriken i staden Irkutsk. 1939 arresterades han av Sovjetunionens Folkkommisariat för inrikes ärenden anklagad för spionage. 25 maj 1939 dömdes han i krigsrätten i Zabajkalje militärområde enligt § 58-6 RSFSR:s Brottsbalk till 10 års frihetsberövande. 15 april 1940 dog han i Orjol-fängelset under avtjänande av straff. Rehabiliterad 1992. År 2000 förklarade Militära åklagarämbetet i Sibiriska militärområdet att han fallit offer för omötkiverad politisk repression. Dödsattest utfärdades den 24 augusti 2001 till A.K. Remmers son Genrich Andrejevitj Remmer som bor på Krim i staden Jalta (adress: Jalta, ulitsa Serafimovitja 14).

Enhetschef Kuzmisjin på avdelning 4, Femte överstyrelsen, Sovjetunionens Ministerium för statlig säkerhet (MGB) kallade Aleksandr (Szandor) Katon till förhör i Lefortovo-fängelset den 22 juli 1947 mellan kl. 22.00 och 22.10.

Ryska arkiv bekräftar Sveriges ambassads antagande om att Kartasjov, chefen för 4:e avdelningen, Tredje överstyrelsen på Sovjetunionens MGB, kallade Vilmosz Langfelder och Aleksandr (Sandor) Katon till förhör i det inre fängelset (Lubjanka) den 23 juli 1947 mellan 02.15 och 18.30 respektive 02.35 och 18.30. Den ryska sidan beklagar att man tidigare gjort ett misstag i angivelsen av datum.

Genève 15.08.2004

Chk 27/8 - 04

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| INK. UTRIKESDEP.    |       |        |
| D.Nr. 04/49153      |       |        |
| 2004-09-20<br>08-27 |       |        |
| AVD. P              | GR. 2 | MÅL EU |

(EC)

Amkarsadör Harald Hamrin

Raoul Wallenberg

EC | Hamrin | JvB  
040830

Brev t. von Dardel  
Genève  
exp. 31/8/01

Broder,

Tack för ditt brev av den 5:e ds.  
Även om jag tillåts inte få  
någon officiell inbjudan till  
mötet i Budapest i slutet av  
september, är det givet att jag  
skulle vara mycket intresserad  
att delta.

Jag är naturligtvis beröven över  
att det inte går någonting mot-  
svarande i Sverige. Det är dock  
i år 60-årsminnet av Raoul Wallenbergs  
försörjande.

Med vänlig hälsning

G. Dardel

Kopia till  
Hans Magnusson  
Hans Dahlgren  
Ving Lagergren

Kopia

Senare 15.08.2004

☒ REHAS  
☒ a.a./opm  
AA 041102/AR

original för

Amkarradör Harald Hamrin

för seden diare för

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| INK. UTRIKESDEP. |      |        |
| DNR 2004/49153   |      |        |
| 2004-11-03       |      |        |
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(EC)

Broder,

Tack för ditt brev av den 5:e ds.  
Även om jag litetvis inte fått  
någon officiell inbjudan till  
mötet i Budapest i slutet av  
september, är det givet att jag  
skulle vara mycket intresserad  
att delta.

Jag är ramfäst över  
att det inte görs någonting mot-  
svarande i Sverige. Det är dock  
i år 60-årsminnet av Raoul Wallenbergs  
försörjande.

Med vänlig hälsning

*[Signature]*

\* Kopia till  
Hans Magnusson  
Hans Dahlgren för kändedom  
Vina Lagergren

Lo.



REGERINGSKANSLIET

04/49249 ARKIVEX.

2004-08-30

(EC) P 2 EU'

**Utrikesdepartementet**

Enheten för Östeuropa och Centralasien  
Ambassadör Harald Hamrin  
Telefon 08-405 33 43  
E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

Professor Guy von Dardel  
6 A Chemin Adolph Pasteur  
CH-1209 Genève  
SCHWEIZ

Raoul Wallenberg.

Broder!

Tack för Ditt brev av den 15 augusti. Jag skall försöka ge Dig all den information jag i skrivande stund har – utöver vad jag meddelade Dig i mitt förra brev av den 5 augusti.

Den formella inbjudan till ceremonin på morgonen den 27 september kommer att sändas ut av Överborgmästaren i Budapest och till symposiet den 27 och 28 september av den Budapestbaserade Holocaust Documentation Center. På grund av att augusti är ungersk "semestermånad" räknar jag inte med att inbjudan till Dig och andra kommer att gå ut förrän en bit in i september. Avsikten med mitt förra brev var sålunda i första hand att "förvarna" Dig om vad som komma skall för att underlätta Din planering. Däremot vore jag tacksam om Du till mig direkt ville meddela huruvida Du har för avsikt att delta i den bussrundtur som vi tänker arrangera för tillresta svenskar på eftermiddagen (sannolikt med start omkr. kl. 16.00) söndagen den 26 september, då vi tänker besöka olika "svenskplatser" i Budapest.

Jag vill också kommentera Din "besvikelse" över att vi inte arrangerar "någonting motsvarande" i Sverige med anledning av att det "i år är 60-årsminnet av Raoul Wallenbergs försvinnande".


Ceremonin i Budapests stadshus kan ses som ett led i den rad av olika aktiviteter som anordnas i Ungern i år för att ihågkomma 60-årsminnet av den ungerska Holocaust, som ju inleddes i och med den tyska ockupationen av Ungern i slutet av mars 1944. Vi är glada och tacksamma för att de svenska räddningsaktionerna på detta sätt ihågkoms från ungersk sida och att en svensk representant, kabinetssekreterare Hans Dahlgren, bereds tillfälle att hålla ett anförande vid detta tillfälle.

2004-08-

Med det svensk-ungerska vetenskapliga symposiet förhåller det sig, som jag skrev i mitt förra brev, på följande vis. Symposiet anordnas gemensamt av Utrikespolitiska Institutet (UI) och Holocaust Documentation Center. UI har i sin tur av regeringen fått ett anslag för ett projekt vars syfte är att se över möjligheterna att stimulera till oberoende forskning om Raoul Wallenberg. UI har valt att göra detta bl a genom att ta initiativ till det svensk-ungerska symposiet – framför allt därför att ungerska arkiv och de svenska räddningsaktionerna i Ungern är relativt dåligt utforskade. UI planerar också att senare ta liknande initiativ i andra länder, framför allt i Ryssland och USA. Självfallet innebär detta på intet vis att den svenska regeringen och UD fränhänder sig någon del av ansvaret för arbetet med att finna svar på de alltför obesvarade frågorna om vad som skedde med Raoul Wallenberg efter hans försvinnande.

Vad slutligen detta senare, alltså Raoul Wallenbergs försvinnande, beträffar skedde ju detta inte i år för 60 år sedan utan i mitten av januari 1945. Jag kan försäkra Dig att vi, så snart alla berörda personer är tillbaka från semestern och det pågående ambassadörsmötet är avslutat, kommer att diskutera frågan hur vi på lämpligt vis skall ihåkomma detta i början av nästa år. Självfallet kommer jag då att hålla Dig och Nina underrättade om hur våra tankar går. Lika självfallet är vi tacksamma för alla synpunkter Du och Nina kan vilja delge oss.

Med vänlig hälsning



Harald Hamrin

cc: Fru Nina Lagergren, Dahlbergsvägen 22, 182 62 Djursholm

Kabs Hans Dahlgren – UD-MK

Hans Magnusson – UD-EC

exp. 31/8/2004  
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REGERINGSKANSLIET

ARKIVEX.

09/46527

2004-09-01

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(EC)

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Östeuropa och Centralasien  
Ambassador Harald Hamrin  
Telefon 08-405 33 43  
E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

Dr. Vera Parnes  
Raoul Wallenberg International Movement for  
Humanity  
4845 Bouret Ave., Suite 34  
Montreal QC  
Canada H3W1L2

Raoul Wallenberg Tribute, October 17, 2004

Dear Dr. Parnes,

✓  
thank you very much for your two letters of August of this year,  
inviting me to participate in the October 17th Raoul Wallenberg  
Tribute in Ottawa.

I hope that in the meantime you have received my e-mail, in which I  
gave you some information concerning the September Raoul  
Wallenberg event in Budapest and in which I also said that I would get  
back to you regarding my participation in the Ottawa Tribute. I have  
now gone through my fall calendar and I am sincerely sorry to inform  
you that it will not be possible for me to participate in the Ottawa  
Tribute. As you may imagine the second half of this year will keep me  
busy with various Raoul Wallenberg related activities in Sweden and  
other places in Europe. We are also planning to commemorate the 60th  
anniversary of Raoul Wallenberg's arrest in January of 1945 and I shall  
certainly keep you informed about our plans.

While I sincerely regret that it will not be possible for me to be present  
in Ottawa on October 17th, I am certain that the Swedish Embassy in  
Ottawa will be ready to give you any assistance in that connection.

Sincerely yours,

Harald Hamrin

c: Ambassador Lennart Alvin – Swedish Embassy, Ottawa

Postadress  
103 39 Stockholm  
Besöksadress  
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exp. 1/9/05



REGERINGSKANSLIET

ARCIVEX.

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Fax

Sid. 1 (1)

2004-09-02

P 2 EU<sup>1</sup>

(EL)

## Utrikesdepartementet

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Ambassadör Harald Hamrin  
Telefon 08-405 33 43  
E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

Ambassaden Kiev, dnr 7 ✓

Kopia (utan bil.): Ambassaden Moskva, dnr 30 ✓ 04/46504

### Genrich Remmer och Raoul Wallenberg

1 bil: amb. Moskva, telefax 2004-08-26, dnr. 398

✓

Härmed översändes bif. missiv från ambassaden Moskva med bil. i form av aide-mémoire från ryska utrikesministeriet innehållande svar på två frågor som ställts från svensk sida.

Den andra frågan gäller vissa förhör 1947 i fallet Wallenberg och berör inte ambassaden Kiev.

Den första frågan gäller Genrich Remmers uppgifter enligt vilka hans far Andrej Remmer skulle ha haft vissa kontakter med Raoul Wallenberg i Moskva efter dennes arrestering 1945. Det ryska svaret går i korthet ut på att Andrej Remmer faktiskt arresterades 1939 och dömdes till 10 års frihetsberövande. Hans skall dock ha dött i ett sovjetiskt fängelse redan 1940. Han rehabiliterades 1992. Ärendet avslutades år 2001 med att dödsattest utfärdades. Om de ryska uppgifterna är korrekta, vilket vi t v inte har anledning att betvivla, kan Andrej Remmer omöjligen ha kommit i kontakt med Raoul Wallenberg. Ärendet kan därmed läggas ad acta. Endast om Genrich Remmer kan leda i bevis att de ryska uppgifterna inte är korrekta finns det anledning att ta upp fallet till förnyad granskning.

CABINET

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08-405 10 00

E-post  
registrator@foreign.ministry.se

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105 90 MINFOR S

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
Susanne Berger  
Arlington USA



"sberger"  
<sberger@prodigy.net>  
2004-09-05 23:40

Till: <harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se>  
Kopia:  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: **Review**

ang  
R. Wallenberg



Dear Mr. Hamrin --

enclosed please find my review of the Eliasson Commission Report.



Best regards --- Susanne Untitled Document.doc

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# **STUCK IN NEUTRAL**

## **The reasons behind Sweden's passivity in the Raoul Wallenberg case**

Susanne Berger  
4793 Williamsburg Blvd  
Arlington, VA 22207 USA  
sberger@prodigy.net

22 August, 2004

### **I. Introduction**

### **II. The Swedish Definition of the Raoul Wallenberg Case**

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- b. "Proper"
- c. The dangers of simplification

## **2. The Swedish government and the Swedish Foreign Office**

- a. A strange creature
- b. "Moral courage is our only secret weapon"
- c. Hidden motives
- d. Old mindsets

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- b. The general definition of the Budapest Mission
- c. Intelligence aspects of the Budapest Mission
- d. Lack of Swedish - American coordination

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- b. Distant relation?
- c. Wallenberg business interests in Hungary
- d. Wallenberg interests and their political effect
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- b. The current Russian view
- c. Early definitions
- d. More relevant records have to exist
- e. Different possibilities
- f. A possible watershed

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- b. Need for a more specific analysis of the historical context
- c. Focus on early years
- d. Lack of systematic analysis
- e. Consequences of failure to conduct a systematic analysis

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- b. The neutrality dilemma

*"In the minds of responsible government officials it is a far smaller evil to leave a missing person case unsolved than to seriously question the foundations of the state."*

*(Arvid Fredborg)*

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

In March 2003 the first independent, non-governmental Commission in the Raoul Wallenberg case presented its findings in Stockholm. Headed by Ingemar Eliasson, a centrist politician and the current Swedish 'Riksmarsalk,' the group had the task of examining the Swedish political leadership's actions in the Raoul Wallenberg case from 1945-2001. After a twelve-month investigation the Commission's analysis officially confirmed what everyone has known for decades: That the Swedish government in large part mishandled the Wallenberg case, especially through its disturbing lack of initiative during the critical early years 1945-47.

Wide-ranging and impressive in both exposition and analysis, the report nevertheless falls short in a number of ways: It cannot explain why Swedish officials in charge behaved the way they did, nor does it clarify why successive Swedish governments pursued the case with so little enthusiasm. That Sweden chose to abandon Raoul Wallenberg is one thing - that the abandonment occurred with such apparent ease, despite the serious and persistent doubts concerning Russian claims about his fate, is quite another. In its search for Wallenberg over the years Sweden has resembled a car where the driver always has one foot on the brake. Why such excessive caution? Was the mishandling of the Wallenberg case simply a matter of ineptitude and indifference or is it symptomatic of deeper problems?

Even though answering these questions would pose a challenge to any commission, other shortcomings are less understandable. The Commission excluded from its deliberations several critical areas of inquiry, among them the full

activities of the Swedish Legation and the Swedish Red Cross in Budapest in 1944/45, and later, the Swedish Foreign Ministry's often questionable handling of witness testimonies in the case. It also did not consider the deeper economic and political aspects of the Budapest mission and its aftermath, as well as their associated effects on the Wallenberg investigation. Most importantly, by focusing almost exclusively on the early phase of the Wallenberg case, the Eliasson Commission missed a chance to determine whether Swedish passivity was a unique and isolated phenomenon, or if it fit a more general pattern of behavior. So far, official Swedish criticism, like the Russian, has stayed firmly confined to the past. It has not yet touched the present and with it any individuals who are still living.

Nevertheless, the publication marks a decisive step in the right direction: For the first time Sweden has cast a critical eye on its own behavior in the Wallenberg affair. In doing so, it has firmly established the idea that earlier Swedish approaches to the Wallenberg question were too narrow and that a deeper, broader analysis is necessary in order to come to terms with the case. The report is a 700+ page acknowledgment that in historical investigations details and complexities matter; especially details that, for various reasons, were long ignored or never considered.

The new study did not yield any direct clues about Wallenberg's fate, but that was never the intention: The truth about what happened to Raoul Wallenberg is surely known in Moscow and, as the Eliasson report emphasizes, a resolution can only come from there. The Report concludes that if Russia has stubbornly kept the Wallenberg secret, Sweden largely has enabled Russia to do so. As for the U.S., the Commission argues it failed Raoul Wallenberg twice. First, by not providing him with adequate protection for an extremely dangerous mission, which the U.S. had co-initiated and financed; and secondly, by not independently insisting on a resolution of his fate after Sweden repeatedly rejected U.S. assistance.

In the Eliasson Commission's assessment a closer reading of previously released U.S. and Swedish records raises important questions about the nature of Raoul Wallenberg's assignment, including his association with Allied Intelligence Services during the war. The Report argues that uncertainty about Wallenberg's mission may in part explain early Swedish passivity in the case because Swedish officials considered Raoul Wallenberg primarily an American problem, not a Swedish one. The U.S., by implication, had its own reasons not to press the issue. The Eliasson Commission sharply criticizes the Swedish position, but stops short of asking why Sweden so readily embraced such an excuse and why it was so eager to shun any responsibility for Raoul Wallenberg.

The Commission's Report and other current Wallenberg research ultimately leave two key issues unaddressed:

*1. Why did Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance evoke such extreme passivity from his own government and his powerful relatives, the Wallenberg family? And 2. Why does Russia refuse to reveal the truth about Raoul Wallenberg's fate, despite strong indications that it almost certainly knows what happened to him? [It certainly knows much more than it has publicly revealed so far]*

The Eliasson Report claims that Swedish actions over the years were primarily determined by the changing 'pictures' that officials constructed for themselves from the few available fragments of information about Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance. As the Commission sees it, since this information was often incomplete and contradictory, it further contributed to some of the inconsistent behavior by Swedish officials. Here too, however, the Commission's analysis does not go far enough. Diplomats do not merely assemble facts: They interpret them in terms of their potential consequences, be it political, economic or strategic. In other words, how the major actors in Sweden and in Russia assessed the associated risks and overarching interests for themselves, how they *defined* the case through the years against the twin backdrop of neutrality and Cold War politics - therein lies the key to the riddle.

In Sweden this refers foremost to the Swedish government and Foreign Office [Utrikesdepartementet or UD], but also to the Wallenberg Family and the Swedish public, including journalists and historians; in Russia this means the former Soviet government and its successors, with strong emphasis on the Security Services. Their basic definitions and interests determined the early responses to Wallenberg's disappearance and continue to shape actions today. For most of the major parties involved, with the exception of Raoul Wallenberg's immediate family, the case remains a hot iron that few like to touch. Consequently, they find the current status quo in the Wallenberg question not only acceptable but in many ways preferable - for very different reasons. There are indications that the basic definitions and, with them, the basic attitudes to the Wallenberg case are changing. However, so far these changes have not been substantial enough to penetrate to the core of the mystery.

## II. THE SWEDISH DEFINITION OF THE RAOUL WALLENBERG CASE

### 1. The Swedish Public

#### a. The not-so-favorite son

Sweden's relationship with what should be its favorite son has always been a complicated one. His courage and accomplishments are admired but one senses little obvious affection for the man himself. Most often a question about him will earn little more than a shrug: "*In Sweden nobody cares about Raoul Wallenberg*", followed by "*The Wallenberg case is dead*." Appearances, however, may be deceiving. While the distance between Raoul Wallenberg and his countrymen is certainly real, the reasons for this distance, and therefore its basic nature, are quite complex. In fact they are both deeply cultural and historical, as well as purely circumstantial.

Despite his background as a member of one of Sweden's most powerful families, Raoul Wallenberg has stayed very much a stranger in his own country. Surprisingly little is known about him, in particular about his adult life immediately before his departure for Budapest. Wallenberg the person has remained elusive and literally two-dimensional: The public knows him only from three or four black and white photographs. He has left no tangible inheritance in Sweden, very little correspondence, no publications, no wife or child, or even close friends. It has been forgotten that in the early years the question of Raoul Wallenberg's fate evoked great sympathy at home. Thousands of Swedes signed petitions demanding Wallenberg's return. In June 1964, during Soviet Premier Khrushchev's official visit to Stockholm, the daily newspaper "Expressen" - against advice from the Foreign Office - boldly ran the provocative headline, in Russian:

*"Question: Where is Raoul Wallenberg?"*

Various Swedish governments, however, failed to capitalize on this public support and also did nothing to encourage it further.

Sweden began the critical evaluation of its wartime behavior much later than most European countries. As a result, many of the issues which inevitably affect the Wallenberg case, such as Swedish neutrality policy and Swedish wartime business dealings, including those of the Wallenberg family, remained largely taboo topics until the 1970's, 80's and even the 1990's. Unwilling or unable to dig in their own backyard, Swedish historians never subjected the case to scholarly analysis. Most did not consider Wallenberg a serious research topic and simply assumed that most of the facts were known. Even now one senses a certain reluctance to delve deeply into the subject. It is no surprise that the first in-depth economic-historical study of Wallenberg business affairs during WW II was made by two Dutch scholars and not by Swedish historians or that no full length biography has been published in Sweden on either Raoul Wallenberg or, for example, Count Folke Bernadotte. The history of the Holocaust and Wallenberg's role were until recently not part of the regular Swedish school curriculum.

The Swedish public today is clearly annoyed that the case has still not been solved. Mixed with this may well be irritation at its own helplessness. Unable to pierce not only one but numerous walls of silence, the public simply gave up. But while Sweden has never openly embraced Raoul Wallenberg, there are signs that it is paying attention. The fact that the Press conferences for both the presentation of the Swedish-Russian Working Group in January 2001 and Eliasson Commission reports attracted record requests from journalists is just one example.

#### b. "Proper"

A major reason for Sweden's reticence in the Wallenberg case may be found in the country's socio-political history which is rather unique in comparison to the rest of Europe. Most notably, the relationship between ordinary Swedes and their government has been relatively conflict free. Swedish neutrality in WWII further confirmed and even enhanced this trait. As a result, Swedish citizens traditionally have not been inclined to question official rules or to directly challenge the role of the government. In his memoirs, renowned Hungarian cancer researcher Georg Klein recounts his first impression of Sweden when he arrived there in 1947 as a young university student:

*"Clean, rich, well-dressed, proper, an almost incredible contrast to the war hardened Europe. Is this really a peninsula on Europe's body? No, this is an island, protected not only from the*



*war, but also from the strength derived from shared suffering, this down-to-earth perspective on life and death."*

"Proper" is the operative word here: Klein recalls how a waiter refused him entry to a restaurant because he was not wearing a tie. Given the state of the world at the time, an almost absurd insistence on formality, with a clear message: Above all, form matters. And from the very beginning, Raoul Wallenberg's life has defied those clear forms. He was born a Wallenberg but was raised outside the influential banking family. He was an architect by training but jobbed as a businessman. He was not a real diplomat, not a real spy and ultimately neither dead nor alive. And, like any visionary, he was not afraid to test boundaries and to break the rules. For form-abiding Swedes this has been very difficult to handle. Making waves or rocking the boat - all that is seriously frowned upon in Viking culture. Nordic tradition teaches the value of community and equality through its concept of "Jante", a set of social rules which stresses the importance of modesty, and above all the idea that no one person should consider him-or herself more important than others.

### c. The Dangers of Simplification

A certain pique over Wallenberg's flaunting of this cultural code resonates in the reproach of his former colleagues who have characterized Raoul Wallenberg's behavior in Budapest as - among other things - "*dumb-daring*" [*dumdristig*] and who have wondered out loud whether this attitude may not have been at least partially responsible for Wallenberg's later fate. It implies that Wallenberg's absolute determination to succeed, while surely idealistic, was also inherently reckless and egotistical; that there was a selfishness in his action for which he now paid the price. Wallenberg's colleagues considered his behavior *un-diplomatic*, in the truest sense of the word. In their minds, rather than having set an example for what a diplomat can be, he had seriously jeopardized Swedish interests. Worse, as Wallenberg's fellow diplomats saw it, he not only broke the rules but in the process he put their own lives in danger. The result was a ready reservoir of anger and resentment. His colleagues especially objected to the subsequent glorification of his achievements which they considered exaggerated.

They are not alone. Swedish historians like Paul Levine and Attila Lajos have argued that Wallenberg's fame today is due mainly to the uncertainty about his later fate. They claim that the post-war "myth-making" around Raoul Wallenberg has prevented a realistic evaluation not only of his achievements but of the events in Budapest in general. Levine and Lajos make an important point: In the end "myth-making" is always a form of simplification. When it goes too far, when things are over-simplified, the essence of the problem is lost. It is therefore absolutely necessary to place Wallenberg into the correct historical context, because only then can the mechanisms of the Holocaust on all sides - perpetrators, victims, rescuers and bystanders - be fully analyzed and understood.

But the argument misses the larger issue: The possible exaggeration of Raoul Wallenberg's accomplishments, while certainly of concern, is merely one aspect of a much larger problem. Wallenberg's legacy, after all, ultimately rests less in the number of people he rescued [and he saved many], than in the humanitarian spirit he embodied and the courage he displayed. What he brought to Budapest was the idea of possibility - that rescue was indeed attainable. It was this attitude, the will to take action and to sustain it, combined with a unique talent for organization and negotiation, which turned a small Swedish protective effort into an extensive rescue operation with hospitals, safe houses and organized food supplies.

Certain factors, like his official status as diplomat of a neutral country, worked in his favor and he had the help of many people who have not received adequate credit. But Wallenberg inspired those around him and that will always be his greatest accomplishment. The very real and much more serious problem that remains today, both for Holocaust research and the Wallenberg case, is the *overall* simplification of events - before, in and after Budapest - on *all* levels - political, social and economical - which has led to serious distraction from the deeper questions about the origins of genocide as well as those surrounding Wallenberg's fate.

## 2. The Swedish government and Foreign Office

### a. "A strange creature"

If the success of Wallenberg's operation is the perfect illustration of what a man with both the vision and the will to make it work can achieve, then Sweden's efforts to save Raoul Wallenberg are its direct counterpoint. Lack of creativity and imagination run like a red thread through the official handling of the Raoul Wallenberg case. The Eliasson report chronicles the repeated missteps and half measures taken by Swedish officials in the early phase of Wallenberg's disappearance, the most critical time to have brought about his safe return. Many diplomats in the Foreign Office did not consider Wallenberg one of their own, plus his mission as such did not necessarily enjoy their full sympathies. Pro-German sentiments, deep seated and longstanding, were prevalent among the Swedish elite which filled the higher ranks of the Foreign Ministry during WWII

The Eliasson report concludes that Swedish officials considered Wallenberg basically a "*saeregen foereteelse*," a somewhat "strange creature". Wallenberg was too much of an outsider and in addition he had acquired the stigma of a troublemaker. As an official Swedish representative in Hungary he had been wildly successful, but his success had the flair of an individualistic achievement. It did not really altogether constitute a triumph of Swedish diplomacy. Instead, like his Budapest colleagues, many in the Foreign Office felt that Wallenberg had gotten himself into a mess of his own making and they now resented having to solve it for him.

The notion that Wallenberg in January 1945 had left to contact the Russians without seeking prior authorization from his superiors has persisted for years. The Swedish Minister in Moscow, Staffan Soederblom, wrote in an early telegram to Stockholm that Wallenberg had disappeared while "*sneaking over*" to the Russian lines. A recently discovered document proves this not to have been the case. Yet none of his Budapest colleagues who knew better bothered to publicly correct this misconception. Consequently, it confirmed the image of Raoul Wallenberg as a slightly reckless, somewhat irresponsible individual.

### b. "Moral courage is our only secret weapon"

In stark contrast to Raoul Wallenberg's all out can-do/must-do approach, Swedish officials never took the position that Wallenberg's case had to be pursued, no matter how difficult the circumstances or uncertain the outcome. As a result, looking for Wallenberg became a reluctant duty rather than a need. In tens of thousands of pages in the Raoul Wallenberg file at the Foreign Ministry one cannot find a single hint that Sweden ever considered staking anything on Raoul Wallenberg's return or, as the years progressed, for information about his fate. The Swedish government also never appealed to the international community for much needed support and the implication is that Wallenberg had little to no tangible worth for Sweden. The key problem clearly lies in how Sweden chose to define the Wallenberg question. Most officials saw it strictly as a problem of Foreign Policy, not an issue of principle. As such, Wallenberg never ranked high on the list of priorities. As the years went by, the Swedish Foreign Office placed more and more emphasis on handling the case, not solving it.

Even when doubts crept in, the Foreign Office stuck to its position. And these doubts were sometimes severe. In 1958 new witnesses came forward who claimed to have had contact with Raoul Wallenberg in Vladimir prison after 1947. In light of these developments the Second Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm, William Owen, had a conversation with his Swedish colleague Gunnar Lorentzon. According to Owen's report to the State Department from April 1959, Lorentzon readily admitted that Foreign Minister Unden's highly legalistic approach to the Wallenberg question had been a mistake. He acknowledged that rather than waiting until Sweden had full proof of Raoul Wallenberg's presence in the Soviet Union, the Swedish government should have insisted on the truth much more forcefully. In fact, Lorentzon added, Oesten Unden had recently asked him

*"whether in his judgment Wallenberg was still alive, to which [Lorentzon] replied that he thought that there was a 75-35 or 65-25 chance that he was..."*

Owen continued:

*"When Lorentzon was asked whether he would rule out the possibility that Khrushchev might produce Wallenberg alive at some future time, he replied that he thought it possible, and that in such an event it would be a major sensation in Sweden. "*

But doubts and policy have to balance, and even with doubts this strong, policy always won out. When in 1981 a Soviet U-boat ran ashore in Swedish territorial waters many thought this incident should be used to press the Soviets for the truth about Raoul Wallenberg. Instead, Swedish officials, in this case former State Secretary Leif Leifland, again retreated and invoked once more the arguments of propriety:

*"We were then, and I am still of the opinion that a civilized nation should not engage in blackmail."*

Those who were advocating a more activist Swedish position in the Raoul Wallenberg question simply found themselves outnumbered. The memoirs of Carl Fredrik Palmstierna, the Private Secretary of King Gustav VI, make it abundantly clear that Swedish passivity was a general problem and not limited to a handful of individuals. In 1956 Dag Hammarskjöld, then Secretary General of the U.N., was supposed to travel to Moscow, but decided not to raise the Wallenberg case. Palmstierna's anger is palpable:

*"Again that damn UD attitude."*

Palmstierna clearly felt that only determined Swedish insistence vis a vis the Soviets, based on the righteousness of its cause, would yield any result. In 1956 he summarized his views in a letter to Rolf Sohlman, Swedish Ambassador in Moscow, emphasizing that

*"moral courage is our only secret weapon."*

The Swedish King Gustav VI also showed little interest in Wallenberg's fate, remarking to his Secretary:

*"You surely understand that Raoul Wallenberg is long dead."*

Palmstierna blamed Udden's influence for the King's conviction and commented:

*"Would royal interference have been of any use? Maybe yes, maybe no. However, when it is a matter of life and death for a Swede who has been cast out by his own country's highest authorities into such an adventure, every effort should be made on his behalf. Gustav VI Adolf never took the courageous step he alone could have taken."*

### **c. Hidden Motives**

While the Eliasson report outlines for the first time in full the early actions and attitudes of Swedish decision makers, it remains largely silent as to the deeper motives that prompted them. Among basic factors the report cites Sweden's small size and hence small influence compared to Russia, and the strictly hierarchical authority structure of the Soviet system as a possible explanation for the failure of Swedish officials to bring about a positive Soviet reply in the Wallenberg question. Only the highest Soviet representatives were authorized to provide information on critical issues. It would therefore have fallen to Oesten Udden as senior official to demand answers, which he simply did not - not at the formal discussions with his Soviet counterparts at the United Nations in November 1946, nor during the long months of difficult negotiations that had led to the signing of the \$300,000,000 Swedish-Russian Credit and Trade Agreement in October 1946.

The Eliasson Commission cites these failures as evidence that statements by the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow, Staffan Soederblom, to Stalin and other highranking Soviet officials in 1946 - when he repeatedly expressed his belief that Raoul Wallenberg had died in the chaos of war - did not simply reflect Soederblom's personal opinion. Instead, the Swedish Minister apparently had been quite certain that the position he presented in those meetings was in general agreement with UD's ideas on the subject. This assessment is further supported by the fact that Soederblom had returned home to Stockholm for consultations both before his discussions with Alexander Abramov, departmental head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, in December 1945 (Soederblom had been on leave in late 1945) and with Stalin in June 1946 (Soederblom had just returned from a brief trip to Stockholm in May 1946).

At the very least, Soederblom's statements appear to have had Uden's tacit backing. When in the spring of 1946 Soederblom suddenly relays to the Swedish Foreign Ministry his impression that despite all expectations Abramov may well be hinting at a possible exchange of Raoul Wallenberg, he receives no answer. In May 1946 he returns to Stockholm for consultations with Uden and from that moment on he does not mention the issue of exchange again. Instead, one month later he conveys to Stalin his conviction that Raoul Wallenberg is dead.

Like his Ambassador in Moscow, Uden appears to have readily embraced the idea that already in 1946 Raoul Wallenberg was either dead or could not be saved. His reasoning remains largely unclear, considering Sweden held in hand a formal "receipt" for Wallenberg from the highest Soviet authorities: Deputy Foreign Minister Dekanosov's official note from 17 January, 1945 which stated that Raoul Wallenberg and his possessions had been placed under Soviet protection. According to the Eliasson Commission, a partial explanation may be found in Uden's political philosophy which was rooted in a fervent belief in international law and the values of collective security, born out of the ruins of WW I. This left him almost "reflexively opposed" to any ideas of official government representatives exchanging or bartering human beings. Uden considered such a thing unacceptable conduct among states.

The wish to position a small country like Sweden to play a meaningful role between the superpowers further inclined the Swedish leadership against placing any demands on their Soviet neighbor. So did a slight sense of guilt over Swedish actions during the war which in 1941 had allowed German troops transit through its territory from Norway to Finland. The extradition of 167 Baltic refugees in January 1946, as well as certain aspects of the negotiations for the Trade and Credit Agreement have to be evaluated against this very background. However, while these surrounding conditions made an exchange of Raoul Wallenberg undeniably difficult, they also offered opportunities. The Eliasson Commission stresses that while it can appreciate the "moral dilemma" the Swedish officials faced over the question of a possible exchange,

*"in hindsight it can be stated as remarkable that the Swedish Foreign Policy leadership never appears to have considered the question at all."*

Instead, as Oesten Uden defined it, in the Cold War era Sweden had to make a choice - to search for Wallenberg or to protect the larger national interest. By March 1957 Uden let it be known officially that for all intents and purposes the search for Raoul Wallenberg was over. Publicly the Swedish government challenged the Soviet assertion of February 1957 that Wallenberg had died of a heart attack in prison already in 1947. Behind the scenes, however, Uden gave different marching orders. Only one day after the receipt of the Gromyko memorandum the American Embassy, Stockholm reported to the State Department in a confidential message that

*"the [Swedish] Foreign Office indicated to the [U.S.] Ambassador that since it had no proof that Wallenberg was alive after 1947, it is inclined to believe the Soviet story."*

To his own staff Uden announced that

*"... It appears that Raoul Wallenberg is dead ... One can speculate about other possibilities, for example, that he has disappeared or is in such a state that he cannot be shown. These are theoretical possibilities and not very likely. To maintain or build a relationship with the Soviet Union in a way that this can happen without sacrificing more important values, belongs to our most important tasks in Foreign Policy. We have in my opinion no reason to hold a continuous grudge against the Soviet Union."*

This was the first official formulation of UD's dualist-pragmatist position that in fact had marked the case from the very beginning: It claimed publicly that the search for Wallenberg's fate was of the highest priority when in reality it certainly was not.

The Eliasson Commission strongly questions Uden's framing of the Wallenberg question in terms of an either-or argument, as well as the extent of negative repercussions Uden foresaw for Sweden if it had insisted too forcefully on a resolution of the Wallenberg case. And rightly so, because Uden was not afraid of challenging Russian officials on other occasions. Uden's biographer Yngve Moeller describes how Uden flew into a rage during a talk with the Soviet Ambassador to Stockholm, Rodionov, because the Russians had expressed objections to the so-called "Trondheim Shipping Lane" [Trondheimleden]. The Norwegian port city of Trondheim allowed Sweden to receive shipping merchandise even when the Baltic Sea was frozen. Moeller writes that Uden was so angered by the Russian position, that he threatened to cancel his official vacation in the Soviet Union,

*"...but the Kremlin was so perplexed about Uden's outburst that they buried their objections in deep silence."*

Uden apparently did not learn anything from this experience. In the end the Eliasson Commission can only describe Uden's behavior as "remarkable." The report does cast a wide net of criticism: Cabinet Secretary Erik Boheman, Foreign Minister Christian Guenther, Head of the Political Department, Sven Grafstroem and even former Prime Minister Tage Erlander are all

singled out for severe reprimand. The report draws the conclusion that the attitudes of Uden and his colleagues had proved devastating for Raoul Wallenberg's chances of return, yet it clearly considers their behavior a unique phenomenon, unique and unexplained.

The Eliasson Commission report focuses heavily on the time of 1945-47, what the report considers the decisive years. Later years are only sketchily dealt with. One wishes that the same detail were available here. As the Commission sees it, since Raoul Wallenberg's fate was most likely decided by 1947, later Swedish behavior was not as relevant. Furthermore, the Commission claims that with the presentation of the Gromyko Memorandum, which asserted that Raoul Wallenberg had died of a heart attack in 1947, the Soviet position was intractably locked down. With that, the chances of winning Raoul Wallenberg's release in later years sharply declined, according to the report.

It is not clear why the Eliasson Commission considers the Soviet position so entrenched. The Gromyko memorandum was, after all, so vague that it appeared to leave room for future adjustments. In fact, there are indications that the content of the memorandum may have been influenced at least in part in its preparatory stages by the attitude and remarks of high-ranking Swedish officials. As the Eliasson Report stresses repeatedly, both Rolf Sohlman and Oesten Uden in 1955/56 had gone so far as to suggest to the Soviets possible explanations for Raoul Wallenberg's fate. In retrospect, especially Sohlman's remark to Nikolai Bulganin in November 1955 appears noteworthy. Sohlman directly alludes to the possibility that

*"Beria and his consorts were to blame (for Wallenberg's fate)."*

Lack of urgency on the part of Swedish officials to press the case also emerges from a report distributed to the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in preparation for Prime Minister Erlander's impending state visit to Moscow in March 1956:

*"... Some people who are close to Erlander told the members of the Soviet Embassy in Sweden that Erlander would not have raised the [Wallenberg] question in Moscow but was forced to discuss it in order to prevent the bourgeois parties from blaming the Swedish government in the forthcoming Parliamentary elections .... for not being active enough .. in .... the Wallenberg case."*

While the Eliasson Commission acknowledges that Uden's reaction to the Gromyko Memorandum marks the full official formulation of Swedish 'Realpolitik' in the Wallenberg case, it rejects the notion that Sweden gave up on Raoul Wallenberg after 1957. It cites, for example, the official Swedish demarche of 1959 as an example of continued efforts. It does, however, not explain how such a demarche could possibly have been effective without the appropriate policy in place to back it up.

#### **d. Old mindsets**

In the summary of its findings the Eliasson reports states that it

*"cannot find any substantial fault with the actions taken by the [Swedish] foreign policy leadership during the 1950's."*

This may well be its most controversial statement, especially since its own report occasionally contradicts this assertion. In light of the many important questions which remain concerning Swedish conduct in later years, such a carte-blanche appears inappropriate or at the very least premature. One example is the decision to officially close the Wallenberg case in 1965. It remained closed for a full fifteen years, until 1979, when a new witness and the efforts of US Congressman Tom Lantos revived the issue. The Swedish government's approach to the Soviet Union that same year to exchange Raoul Wallenberg for Stig Bergling, a former Swedish Security official who had been arrested in March as a Russian spy, was clearly too little too late. The Eliasson Commission strongly questions the wisdom of closing the case for fifteen years, but adds that

*"it is not really clear what could have been done."*

Yet the decades after 1950 certainly saw a number of opportunities where it may have been possible to learn more about Wallenberg's fate. However, these were not pursued or if so, rather halfheartedly. One of the most memorable was an apparent Soviet approach in 1966, delivered through a representative of the Protestant Church in Berlin, Carl-Gustav Svingel, which appeared to suggest an exchange, for unspecified compensation, of Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerstroem who had been arrested in 1963 as a Soviet agent. The Foreign Office refused to even discuss the offer and never even formally

interviewed Svingel. Whatever might have been behind the overture, one fact remains: Sweden captured one of the most important Cold War spies and got absolutely nothing in return. This issue alone should be worth a closer look.

The question of what type of signals Sweden sent Russia concerning Raoul Wallenberg in later years, and vice versa, also deserves closer scrutiny. While Swedish leaders like Prime Minister Tage Erlander continued to raise the question of Wallenberg's fate after 1957, all the while earning strong Soviet rebuffs, there are indications that many of these later approaches lacked in both determination and conviction.

In May 1964, for example, Swedish and Russian diplomats held discussions in preparation for Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev's upcoming state visit to Sweden. The political atmosphere at the time was highly charged and the lingering issues in the Raoul Wallenberg threatened to further strain Swedish-Soviet relations. During one of these preparatory discussions Swedish Ambassador Gunnar Jarring indicated to the head of the Scandinavian Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Kovalyov that Sweden's main priority was to avoid any negative fallout for the planned visit, especially in the media.

*"[Raoul Wallenberg's] family and the press will never tolerate a missed opportunity for inquiry but it should cause for sure unpleasant publicity."*

Jarring was particularly anxious about the testimony of Swedish Professor Nanna Svartz which had not yet been released to the public. In early 1961 Professor Svartz reported that while attending a medical conference in Moscow she had been told by a leading Soviet physician, A. L. Myasnikov that Raoul Wallenberg was alive at the time in Soviet captivity. In their conversation Jarring explains to Kovalyov that Sweden requires clarification of Svartz's report. However, far from seizing the opportunity of either Wennerstroem's arrest, or Khrushchev's visit to press for answers, Jarring appears to go out of his way to inform the Russians that the Wallenberg case as such was no longer a priority for Sweden:

*"We do not doubt the note that was presented in 1957," Jarring tells Kovalyov, "but .... it would certainly not be inappropriate ... to conduct "a new check or - put differently - a completing check."*

In the following paragraphs of his memo Jarring acknowledges that it is all pretense:

*We [Jarring and Kovlayov] pretended to await the results [of the check] and we understood fully well that they could not be ready before Khrushchev's visit."*

According to Kovalyov's account of the meeting, Jarring was even more explicit:

*"... The Swedish side only wants to make the Khrushchev visit a success. Investigation, Jarring added, which the Soviet government would promise, could bring the same result as the investigation in 1957. On my question what additional investigations the Swedes are talking about .... Jarring could not answer. Jarring said that he personally understands the difficulties involved but in this particular case he must take the position as an official representative of Sweden."*

Even with concessions to the often murky phrasing of diplomatic language and the difficult political conditions at the time, the message to the Russians was clear: The Raoul Wallenberg case was by now little more than a political irritant and all that was needed were Russian assurances of a "completing check." When Kovalyov, at the end of the discussions about Wallenberg, casually mentions Wennerstroem's upcoming sentencing, Jarring informs Kovalyov that

*"Sweden does not link these two issues."*

It would be quite interesting to know exactly how and why the Swedish government arrived at this position.

The Eliasson Commission argues that after 1950, with the arrival of Swedish Security Police Inspector Otto Danielsson and Permanent Undersecretary of State, Arne Lundberg, UD's handling of the Wallenberg case dramatically improved. How far these improvements ultimately reached, however, is open for debate. Oesten Unden was after all still firmly in charge. And when Unden left office in 1962, the Unden mindset remained deeply entrenched, embodied, among others, by his protege, Sverker Astroem. Per Ahlmark, former head of the centrist Folkpartiet and one of Astroem's harshest critics, points out that although Astroem was present in key decision making positions at all critical moments in the case, he does not mention Raoul Wallenberg with one word in his memoirs:

*"The search for Wallenberg was one of the most important issues in UD. Not one word about that in the book. He claims that 'the different governments after the war used every opportunity to bring forth a positive reply about Wallenberg.' ... Why such a lie? Perhaps it is because Unden was Astroem's boss and idol. Unden's ideological neutralism between*

*Stalin's Soviet Union and the Western powers was shared by his pupil."*

It is an open secret that high ranking UD decision makers, especially Oesten Unden and Rolf Sohlman, bore strong sympathies for the Soviet Union. In 1956 the CIA received information which cast suspicions on Sohlman's attitudes and CIA officials considered an official investigation. Sverker Astroem, for his part, has been publicly accused of aiding Stig Wennerstroem before his arrest in 1963. If in fact real, what effects did those Soviet sympathies have in practical terms? The Eliasson Commission does not address this issue in depth. It claims that they had no obvious effect, at least none that can be ascertained in the official record. Nevertheless, as Magnus Petersson, a Swedish Security Policy expert, argues in an analysis written for the Eliasson Commission, Sweden's attempt to balance Soviet interests, its so-called "*Politics of Accommodation*" [Anpassningspolitik],

*"combined with a not insignificant, ideologically determined anti-Americanism among many of the responsible Swedish politicians, could border on or in effect constitute anticipation of Soviet demands or wishes."*

Even if accusations of espionage should turn out not to be true, it is a fact that in the post-war years Astroem saw himself as a critical counterweight to what he considered the false neutralism Sweden had entered into after WWII. While nominally neutral, Sweden had secretly entered a quasi-alliance with the U.S. Astroem's views have been highly influential, especially in his capacity as key advisor to the country's leadership, including former Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme. In the eyes of Ahlmark and other critics, like Unden, Astroem championed a policy of "*practical neutrality*" as the centerpiece of Swedish post-war neutrality, with devastating consequences. As the critics see it, such a position ultimately draws

*"no line between democracy and dictatorship"*

and is a major reason behind Sweden's failure to submit its recent history to a more critical review, including its behavior in the Raoul Wallenberg case.

The key question that is yet to be answered is exactly why Raoul Wallenberg's fate evoked so little sympathy and so little interest from the people in charge of his case. Sweden's failure to take advantage of important openings, by not maximizing all efforts, raises questions about possible hidden motives. Carl-Fredrik Palmstierna remarked on this already in 1976:

*"I could very well imagine that certain gentlemen in UD were afraid of Wallenberg's return. Those who had bet for the sake of prestige or career that he was dead, and had hindered the investigation, would then appear in an unpleasant light."*

As time went by, it became ever more difficult to pursue the case, especially in light of new political challenges, like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and other crises. Former State Secretary Pierre Schoeri remarked on this in an internal memorandum in 1985, closely echoing Unden's formulation from 1957:

*"The point in time had to arrive some time where we had to tell ourselves that the likelihood that Raoul Wallenberg lives is so little that it costs too much to continue to drive the [Wallenberg] question. ... I cannot, dare not claim that he could not still be alive..... But I think that after all years gone without us receiving new certain information, the likelihood that he still continues to live has to appear so little that we cannot longer allow that the question will burden - sometimes poison - our relationship with the Soviets..."*

Today, it can be argued that Sweden has even less incentive to solve Raoul Wallenberg's fate. It is a fact, that the longer Wallenberg lived in captivity, the more problematic the matter becomes for both Russia and for Sweden. Even if Wallenberg died in 1947, revelations about the background of his case may bear a lot of risks or at the very least involve a number of uncertainties. Other than the satisfaction of having done the right thing, there would be few potential benefits.

### III. OTHER DEFINITIONS: THE U.S., the Wallenbergs and Russia

#### 1. THE U.S.

##### a. "Swedish Diplomat with an American Task"

In the assessment of the Eliasson report, one major reason why the Swedish Foreign Office officials did not vigorously pursue Wallenberg's rescue was the idea that he had been a de-facto employee of the U.S. government. The reasoning was that since Wallenberg had freely taken on the job with the War Refugee Board, he accepted the risks of such an assignment. Consequently, primarily he and his US employers were to blame for his fate. The Eliasson Commission emphatically states that such notions and the neglect to vigorously pursue Raoul Wallenberg's return were *"unacceptable."*

The truly important question the Eliasson Commission does not sufficiently explore is why Sweden's distancing from Raoul Wallenberg was so extreme. In the Commission's assessment the U.S. had designed the *"content"* of the mission - Sweden had simply aided in its *execution*. In reality, however, the facts appear to have been far less clear cut. Wallenberg's assignment was certainly not driven by American interests alone, but came about as a result of a confluence of various private and public interests. Swedish and American interests overlapped in this on various levels.

Sweden had two major incentives why it supported the American efforts in 1944: By then it had become clear that the Allies and not Germany would win the war, plus Sweden had received strong US criticism for its economic dealings with Nazi Germany which had gone far beyond the limits set by international [bilateral] trade agreements and the rules governing Swedish neutrality. This concerned in particular the Wallenberg firm's SKF trade in ballbearings. As the Eliasson Report points out, there are indications of a straightforward understanding: Swedish support for American aims in Hungary would weigh favorably in U.S. consideration of Swedish behavior. It does, however, not state the key irony: By a strange twist of fate Raoul Wallenberg's mission served to compensate not only for the misconduct of his country but for that of his own relatives.

By the same token, it can be asked why the U.S. did not insist more on pursuing the question of Wallenberg's fate. The Eliasson Report only touches upon this issue indirectly, by emphasizing the questions that persist about Raoul Wallenberg's work in Budapest. It points to the high level US approval Raoul Wallenberg's assignment received, including instructions signed directly by U.S. Foreign Minister Cordell Hull. The Eliasson Commission believes that this raises questions about the true nature of Wallenberg's mission and those who sent him. In addition, the report points to U.S. documents speaking of an *"American program"* and that Raoul Wallenberg should be available

*"for any task the WRB may assign him."*

In the same breath, the Eliasson Commission raises the question why Sweden had to *'make'* a diplomat when it had numerous real diplomats readily available to go to Hungary. The Commission's conclusions base themselves largely on reinterpretation of already available material rather than on new documentation. Even though many questions remain, it appears that the Commission in this instance may have over-interpreted some of the available material. There are, for example, clear indications that if Sweden saw Raoul Wallenberg as an American hire, the US ultimately considered Wallenberg Stockholm's responsibility. As George Kennan at the U.S. Embassy, Moscow points out to the U.S. Secretary of State, Acheson, on September 25, 1945, in the immediate aftermath of Wallenberg's disappearance:

*"We feel that any action [here] on our part on behalf of Wallenberg, a Swedish national, would serve no useful purpose."*

The U.S. had, however, immediately pursued the question of Raoul Wallenberg's whereabouts when it learned of his disappearance. Already on 22 May, 1945 General Bonner Key, the U.S. Representative of the Allied Control Commission in



Hungary, learned from his Soviet counterpart, General Levushkin, that Wallenberg most likely was in Soviet hands. The relative speed with which the U.S. inquired about Raoul Wallenberg has given rise to speculation that it may have been prompted by his possibly formal role with U.S. Intelligence. The currently available records do not support such a conclusion. For several reasons, however, both the U.S. and Sweden were eager to secure Raoul Wallenberg's personal papers and made a concerted effort to find them

#### b. The general definition of the Budapest mission

While the central focus of Raoul Wallenberg's mission was clearly humanitarian and remained so throughout, two other aspects strongly affected it, one economic, one political: a. the protection of Swedish/Allied business interests in Hungary, as well as the rescue of important businessmen and skilled technical workers. These business interests included in particular those of two leading Hungarian industrialists, Manfred Weiss and Leopold Aeschner. and b. American and British intention [as well as that of some of the Hungarian resistance groups] of limiting future Soviet influence in Hungary. Point a. involved to a large extent Raoul Wallenberg's connections with the Swedish business community, especially Sven Salen and the Wallenberg Family. Point b. involved the members of various Intelligence Services active in Stockholm and in Budapest in 1944

The Eliasson Commission hardly mentions any of these implications. Sweden and the Western Allies had a great deal at stake in Eastern Europe and especially in Hungary in 1944. Interests ranged from an extensive mercantile trade in textiles and foodstuffs, to light manufacturing industry, to Hungary's state of the art weapons, munitions and aircraft industry. Major Swedish businesses like SKF and Swedish Match not only had local affiliates in Budapest but enjoyed monopoly status in Hungary. Official Swedish priorities were clear: Aside from the rescue of families and loved ones, the key goal was to save what Kalman Lauer repeatedly refers to in his letters to Raoul Wallenberg as "*Zukunftsmenschen*" - "*People of the Future*," both in political and economic terms.

Swedish business was therefore looking for a representative who would have both the necessary authority, i.e. diplomatic status, as well as the necessary skills and experience, i.e. business background to deal with the worsening conditions in Hungary. A regular diplomat would not have fulfilled these criteria. Hungarian businesses too were desperately trying to protect as many assets as they could, especially individuals with critical skills and know-how, plus licenses and patents. This was a welcome development for Swedish businesses, especially those with formal ties to the Manfred Weiss family. And in Sweden this happened to be mainly companies owned by Sven Salen and the Wallenbergs. So it is not by accident that individuals like Henrik [Ritter] de Wahl, managing director of Hungary's largest industrial concern, the Manfred Weiss Works, [the Hungarian "Krupp"], and Erik Bjoerkman, head of Skandinaviska Banken and of the Swedish-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, were closely involved in the planning meetings between Iver Olsen - an OSS man and the U.S. War Refugee Board Representative in Stockholm - and Raoul Wallenberg in June 1944.

Raoul Wallenberg's official task was to report on the possibilities of Jewish rescue but he had no Swedish governmental authority to conduct far reaching rescue operations. In fact his mission, at least on the Swedish end, was to be limited in both time and scope. However, from the very beginning Raoul Wallenberg had made it clear that he intended to use the system he and his colleagues were putting in place to save as many people as possible.

*"In my opinion the help project should continue on the highest scale"*

he writes to Kalman Lauer in late July 1944.

*"It would be wrong to assume that Sweden's part is done in terms of bringing aid to the Jews as soon as the repatriation action is concluded."*

This position put Wallenberg at odds not only with his fellow Swedish diplomats in Budapest, but also with the original Swedish supporters of the Budapest mission.

Lauer warns Wallenberg about this problem already in late August 1944:

*"I would like to tell you about the conversation I had with [Norbert] Masur [Swedish businessman and leading member of the Jewish Community in Stockholm]. He asked me if you even had the possibility of helping over there. The 'Professor' [codename for the Jewish Community, Stockholm] is of the opinion that only transport here [to Sweden] can be considered helpful; everything else seems meaningless to them. Gratitude for your work you can probably not expect. So be very careful before you throw yourself into any adventures."*

Iver Olsen, meanwhile, was pleased with Wallenberg's approach which reflected the activist line outlined in the official instructions provided by Foreign Minister Cordell Hull. Nevertheless, Olsen sharply complained that he did not receive enough information from Wallenberg in Budapest and repeatedly threatened to withhold additional funds. It seems that from the outset the initial backers of the rescue initiative - Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish Foreign Office, the Swedish business community Stockholm, the Jewish Community and even Iver Olsen - all seemed to have a different idea about what the mission was in fact intended to accomplish.

### c. Intelligence aspects of the Budapest mission

Until 1944, Jewish rescue had not been U.S. political priority. One reason was the relatively strong degree of Anti-Semitism present in the traditional American political establishment. Even among Jewish leaders there existed differing views about priorities, such as the pursuit of the long-term aims of Zionism, in particular the creation of a Jewish state, vs. the relatively short-term goals of rescuing Jews from Nazi persecution. By 1944, however, public pressure had mounted to such a degree, that the issue of saving the remaining Jewish communities in Europe had finally become a major focus of U.S. policy. For his part, John Pehle, the head of the U.S. War Refugee Board (WRB), had a very keen interest in humanitarian matters. Pehle had argued hard in favor of bombing of the railway lines to Auschwitz, for example. It is equally clear that the WRB and the U.S. Intelligence agencies, namely the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) coordinated their affairs very closely and in many cases sent joint agents to Europe. However, while the OSS hoped to profit from Wallenberg's mission in a variety of ways, there is serious doubt that he ever was a recruited agent. In a formal CIA interview in 1955, Iver Olsen adamantly denied any OSS role for Raoul Wallenberg. Unless Olsen is lying or Raoul Wallenberg was recruited by other OSS groups without the knowledge of Olsen, or by the British, again unknown to Olsen, there is little doubt that Wallenberg's mission was indeed almost exclusively humanitarian.

Wallenberg and his organization would of course have been an extremely valuable source of information on conditions in Hungary. This especially since U.S. and British Intelligence networks were faced with serious gaps in their intelligence gathering Iver Olsen himself makes this clear in a message to OSS headquarters in Washington in June 1944:

*"... The Baltic operations authorized by the War Refugee Board are also getting under way, as are certain projects in Hungary. In all .. matters the facilities of the OSS have been used and it is expected that the OSS will reap some advantage ..."*

What he does not mention is the role Swedish Intelligence played in these plans. It had actively supported Olsen's activities in the Baltics and OSS records show that Swedish Intelligence cooperated with the Americans in matters concerning Hungary as well. The OSS chief in Stockholm, Taylor Cole, recalls in his memoirs that one of his key projects in Stockholm was the contacts with the Hungarian Legation to discuss possible Allied military intervention in Eastern Europe. The Americans cooperated in this closely with their British and Swedish counterparts. In October 1944, Thorsten Akrell, assistant to the Swedish Head of Counterintelligence Carl Bonde and codenamed "The Kid," personally smuggled a radio receiver into Hungary, and other technical equipment was delivered as well. Swedish Intelligence also had devised a signal plan for the Hungarian opposition group MFM [Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom] whose leader, Geza Soos, was in touch with the Swedish Legation through both Raoul Wallenberg and his colleague Per Anger. Taylor Cole directly states that

*"our Hungarian interests and contacts occasioned a meeting with Raoul Wallenberg,"*

indicating that the separation between intelligence matters and other issues was rather fluid.

Aside from his contacts with Soos and other leading members of the Hungarian resistance - including the group around former Prime Minister Istvan Bethlen - Wallenberg apparently also served as communication channels for certain circles around a prominent Hungarian exile and Social Democrat in Stockholm, Vilmos Boehm, who was then employed by the British Legation. In the beginning Boehm supposedly did not provide Wallenberg with the names of so-called "illegals" in Hungary, since he did not know if Wallenberg could be trusted. In early August 1944, however, Kalman Lauer received instructions from Boehm which he passed on almost verbatim to Wallenberg in Budapest. Boehm strongly recommends that Wallenberg hire a number of people for his organization, [Lauer writes,] and explains that Boehm would be

*"very grateful if these people would via the extended circle of friends let him [Boehm] know about the [verbatim: shaping] state of things."*

Raoul Wallenberg is to pass the information on to Stockholm via Lauer. Not only Boehm is interested, but also

*"the Swedish friends in the Per A. [sic; Anger] circle would be glad to receive these personal messages."*

This appears to be a not so subtle hints to various intelligence groups in Stockholm, including the British, as well as Per Anger's role in these affairs. All these connections make it quite understandable why both U.S. and Swedish Intelligence were so eager to locate Raoul Wallenberg's papers when he disappeared.

Exactly how these Allied/Swedish intelligence operations affected Raoul Wallenberg's activities in Budapest and Soviet perceptions of them remains only partially understood. Soviet interrogation records, including interrogations of some of Raoul Wallenberg's fellow prisoners who had been arrested in Eastern Europe show that the Soviets were attempting to obtain a fuller picture of Allied activities in Hungary.

It may be important to distinguish what the Wallenberg mission was in its conception and what it developed into once Raoul Wallenberg was in Budapest. The key goal of the Hungarian resistance and the Allies obviously was to bring an end to the war as the most effective means to stop the slaughter. In secret discussions the Allied representatives had repeatedly held out the idea to Hungary that resisting Nazi Germany, as well as a strong position on the Jewish question, could pave the way to a separate peace agreement. Raoul Wallenberg communicates about this, however, not directly with Olsen [or with Boehm], but indirectly through Kalman Lauer.

This indicates that Raoul Wallenberg had only very limited direct communications with Olsen, if any. Nevertheless, practically all his contacts - with people from the Hungarian underground like Count Bethlen, Jewish resistance organization like the Joint, as well as Allied Intelligence representatives and German Nazi officials - could have directly or indirectly linked Wallenberg with several of the separate initiatives in the fall of 1944. The question is to what degree exactly the separate peace issue and other Intelligence issues figured in these exchanges and if these contacts served indeed primarily the facilitation of Jewish rescue. An additional question remains whether or not the search for a separate peace in any way constituted a formal part of Wallenberg's assignment that so far has not been disclosed; and if so, what instructions he received and from whom.

An invitation list to a cocktail party at Raoul Wallenberg's apartment on 2 December, 1943 shows that he was associating with individuals deeply involved in separate peace discussions, such as the Hungarian Minister in Stockholm, Antal Ullein Revicky. Just the day before he attended Raoul Wallenberg's gathering, Ullein-Revicky had met with representatives of U.S. Intelligence, including Taylor Cole. The invitation list further includes members of the most immediate Wallenberg family and business circles, such as Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg - who had close connections to a number of Ullein-Revicky's key British contacts - and Bo Andren, a Swedish businessman with close ties to the British Legation.

Taylor Cole writes that altogether very little came of US intelligence efforts in Hungary because

*"our [U.S.] State Department was being excessively careful not to raise Stalin's suspicions of separate peace negotiations with the Nazis or, in particular, with Nazi satellites in Eastern Europe."*

The British were less shy in their attempts and the Soviets, at any rate, were not convinced. An excerpt from the memoirs of V. Roshin alias Razin, a Soviet 'rezident' at the Soviet Legation in Stockholm during the 1940's illustrates how the humanitarian mission to Budapest looked in Soviet eyes:

*"In general, during the years of the war various separate peace negotiations took place in Sweden. It seems that secret consultations between the World Zionist Organizations and American Zionist Centers on one side, and representatives of Fascist Germany on the other side, about bringing wealthy Jews to Sweden, is the most interesting."*

Without mentioning names directly, Razin defines the various humanitarian activities of the period as acts of conspiracy by Western Powers and Nazi Germany aimed directly against Soviet interests. As UD archivist Goeran Rydeberg points out in his report on possible areas of future research in the Raoul Wallenberg case, Soviet agents over the years had collected information that Sweden, and especially the Wallenberg family, had actively supported separate peace talks between Germany and Britain, with the complete defeat or ultimate destruction of the Soviet Union as its ultimate aim.

Against this background, separate peace initiatives which promised rescue of Jews in return for hard currency or war materials "for use at the Eastern Front" were especially problematic. Raoul Wallenberg's elaborate plans for postwar restitution of Jewish ownership would only have further enhanced that impression. A former Hungarian AVO/AVH official, Karoly Remenyi, has stated that in Hungarian Intelligence circles it was understood that Raoul Wallenberg had

*"an intelligence assignment about the future of Hungary."*

Interestingly, the early instructions from Stockholm [Cabinet] to the Swedish Legation, Budapest specifically names possible postwar aid initiatives for Hungary as one part of the "special assignment" [specialuppdrag] for Raoul Wallenberg.

*"The American Embassy also pays great attention to this question,"*

the text continues.

Raoul Wallenberg's contacts and deals with German and Hungarian Nazis, especially Himmler's Special Representative Kurt Becher and possibly SS Chief Walter Schellenberg would have been also weighed against him in Soviet eyes. According to Wallenberg's colleague Lars Berg

*"Wallenberg received considerable support from the wealthy industrial family Weiss in Budapest. ... Even Himmler's Special Representative and controller of the Weiss Family apparently helped Raoul Wallenberg in critical situations."*

While Eichmann and his cohorts methodically sent thousands of people to their deaths, Becher with equal effectiveness ransacked Hungary's material treasures. His true forte was blackmail. By the end of 1944 he was looking for ways to transfer himself and his Hungarian loot to a safe haven abroad. At the same time, with the defeat of the Nazi Germany key economic assets in Hungary were threatening to fall into Soviet hands or were to be sabotaged by fleeing German troops. So the doors for negotiations were open.

Historians like Bernt Schiller and Yehuda Bauer have chronicled the negotiations for Jewish lives in exchange for war materials and hopes for a separate peace. Many questions remain as to how many of these deals were struck, the parties involved and what other concessions might have been rendered. The various links between the neutral countries and their bankers, Hungarian and German industrialists, Nazi officials, the Jewish underground and competing Allied interests in Europe remain among the least explored and most controversial subjects of the post-war era.

The Norwegian historian Tore Pryser has pointed out that Iver Olsen's rescue operations in the Baltic countries may have involved individuals who cooperated with Swedish and German Nazis in establishing secret anti-Soviet organizations. This may have laid the groundwork for post-war Swedish-US-British cooperation and espionage missions in the Baltic countries. The Russians, surely aware of all these things, would probably not have bothered to draw too subtle distinctions as to how Raoul Wallenberg fit into the general equation.

One big problem is the lack of available documentation, not only in Eastern European and German archives, but also those in Sweden. Much of the Swedish material appears to have been lost or destroyed. As the Eliasson Commission discovered, in the Swedish Military Intelligence archives [MUST], for example, no papers concerning the activities of British Intelligence in Sweden are available at all for the years 1943-1954, for example. At the same time, despite its far reaching efforts, the Commission's claim that it has studied all currently available documents of interest concerning these matters is highly questionable. Too many relevant collections that have not been thoroughly examined remain in various Swedish archives, including MUST [Swedish Military Intelligence and Foreign Intelligence, as well as respective successor organizations], FRA [Swedish Signal Intelligence] and the Swedish Foreign Office, including intelligence as well as political and commercial records. Goeran Rydeberg's report also makes it clear that there remain many open sources which have so far been underutilized, such as the decoded Soviet cable traffic, VENONA.

#### **d. Lack of Swedish-American coordination**

If Swedish officials had doubts as to the aim and scope of American involvement in the Budapest mission, one wonders why they did not seek clarification from their American counterparts. Instead, it took a full six years before Sweden placed an official request for U.S. assistance with the Wallenberg investigation. Even more disturbing is that in 1956 Swedish Prime Minister Erlander aired some of these uncertainties in front of Soviet officials. During his official state visit to Moscow Erlander informed Soviet Prime Minister Krushchev that

*"Wallenberg was on a mission in Budapest which we believe was based on saving lives."*

This unfortunate formulation cast doubt not only on Raoul Wallenberg's status as an official Swedish representative, but directly questioned the legitimacy of his mission.

Over the years, Sweden and the United States kept each other informed on the Wallenberg matter and records in both countries show that there was a steady exchange of information back and forth. There is no evidence, however, of a joint approach or a coordinated policy in the Raoul Wallenberg case. In the 1950's and 60's the U.S. considered the Wallenberg case mostly an important public relations tool in the Cold War. When Swedish Foreign Minister Oesten Unden informed the Americans on 8 February, 1957, that he was ready to accept the Soviet version of Raoul Wallenberg's fate, an unnamed CIA official responded immediately. In a strongly worded cable addressed to his superiors he argues that

*"the Swedish government if so inclined should not be allowed to gloss over [the] Wallenberg affair" and "permit [the] Soviets [to] get away with [the] ridiculous claim*

*[that it is] all Abakumov's fault."*

In light of the 1956 squashed uprising in Hungary, it would be absolutely necessary to

*"... counteract [the] Soviet coexistence drive ... [and] awaken [the] Swedish public opinion to [the] Soviet threat ..."*

The real practical aim, however, appears to have been the elimination of Swedish opposition to an unnamed American project, and Swedish behavior in the Wallenberg case would serve as a tool for the U.S. to apply the necessary pressure. The relevant portions remain censored. American officials claim that the material which stays classified in U.S. archives concerning the Wallenberg case remains secret largely because it would reveal sensitive issues concerning U.S./Swedish bilateral relations.

The complex postwar U.S./Swedish relationship, embedded in the politically volatile environment of the Cold War, is perhaps a major reason for the U.S.'s lack of engagement in the Wallenberg question after 1945. Of prime concern for the two countries would be the revelation of details about joint intelligence projects [which also often involved the British,] in full breach of Swedish neutrality. Secret agreements ranged from the very basic, like sharing of information obtained by Swedish Intelligence personnel assigned to official Red Cross missions in the aftermath of WWII, to the highly sophisticated, like secret provisions for U.S. forces to use Swedish military bases in case of a Soviet attack, joint intelligence missions into the Baltic countries and U.S. assistance with collection of signal intelligence, for example in the DC-3 program.

Equally sensitive would be information of coordination of activities in other areas, such as economic matters and post-war political developments in Europe. Any information the U.S. may have possessed concerning internal Swedish affairs that would have been relevant for the Wallenberg investigation, such as information about the Wallenberg family or the attitudes of Swedish politicians, would have been evaluated in terms of these larger interests. Both countries have to the right to keep any type of documentation they deem sensitive classified in each other's archives.

Through the years some American officials like John Pehle cautioned that direct U.S. intervention on Wallenberg's behalf could possibly be misunderstood by the Soviet Union and would ultimately prove "counterproductive" It remains a fact, however, that Wallenberg's mission was part of an American program, sponsored by a U.S. agency, with American funds. Secondly, the inherent imbalance in the Swedish-Soviet relationship - Sweden's main fear was Russia, whereas Russia's first concern was the U.S. - would have made the U.S. Sweden's principle partner in the Wallenberg question. As the only other global superpower in the postwar years the U.S. clearly took the easy way out.

This assessment holds true even though American offers of assistance to Sweden in the Wallenberg question were repeatedly rejected through the years. It began with Staffan Soederblom's refusal of U.S. help in 1945. In 1965, Sweden's former U.S. Ambassador Hitchens-Bergstroem pointedly told State Department officials that

*"Sweden wants the US out of the [Wallenberg] affair."*

Yet, in 1980 US State Department and CIA records show that Sweden [through Lars Ake Nilsson] asked for and received US help in the Wallenberg case. The US went on to share certain aspects of its intelligence information with Sweden, some of which was based on still secretive satellite technology. But somehow neither country ever attempted to build a broader coalition in the Wallenberg question. By 1992 Sweden once again asked the US to tone down its efforts. An internal State Department e-mail message from February 10, 1992 whose subject line reads "Swedes Happy w/ cooperation," states

*"the Swedish government has asked the U.S. to ease up on inquiries about Wallenberg, since the Swedes are satisfied with the Russian government's cooperation in the joint Swedish/Russian Working Group."*

This perception lingered on the American side at least until the year 2000, when on two separate occasions American officials were surprised by Swedish requests to the U.S. State Department since they had been under the impression that

*"Sweden did not wish any American assistance in the Wallenberg case."*

Swedish Ambassador Rolf Ekeus immediately tried to correct this notion by pointing out that Sweden certainly wished for American help, although of course in coordination with Swedish efforts. In general, Sweden has made it clear that it considers itself in charge of the Wallenberg case, and that other countries are to defer in their own activities in the question to Sweden.

## 2. The Wallenbergs

### a. Curious passivity

While Raoul Wallenberg received little active help from his own government or his de-facto American employer, one would expect that the Wallenberg family would have been eager to fill the void. If anyone could have forced the Swedish government to take a more activist position, it would have been Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg. However, for sixty years the Wallenberg Family has veiled itself in Garbo-like silence about its own role in the affair. The response of the Wallenberg family to Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance deserves attention because of the prominent role the family held in 1945, both in the area of economy and finance as well as in the political arena. At the time of Raoul Wallenberg's arrest Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg were among the most influential decision makers in Sweden, despite the problems they faced resulting from investigations into their economic dealings with Nazi Germany. They clearly had the power to set the Swedish agenda in this case.

It is difficult to overestimate Wallenberg influence. In 1943 Enskilda Banken alone held resources of \$647, 794,917 and by 1947 Wallenberg firms world wide employed 150,000 workers. In 1999 the ranks had swelled to 600,000 and Wallenberg business assets were valued at roughly 900 billion Swedish Kronor - about \$90 billion. By acquisition of a large number of the all important A and [the less important] B or voting shares in a company, the Family could exert control even if its nominal ownership percentage in a particular enterprise was negligible. In addition, many companies were governed by Wallenberg proxies. As for the Russians, they were certainly well acquainted with the Wallenbergs: During the war, Wallenberg firms had been the main supplier of ballbearings to the Soviet Union and in late 1944 Marcus Wallenberg was instrumental in bringing about the Soviet-Finnish Armistice Agreement.

There is no documentary or other evidence that the Wallenberg brothers ever signaled to the Swedish government or to the Russians that Raoul Wallenberg's return was a key priority. No documentation exists that would show what consultations if any took place between the Foreign Office and Wallenberg Family representatives regarding efforts to win Raoul Wallenberg's release. Due to the fact that Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance, as a member of one of the most powerful families in Sweden, had a potentially serious impact on Swedish-Soviet relations, it appears unlikely that the Foreign Office would settle on a course of action concerning Raoul Wallenberg before previously sounding out the Wallenberg Family, or at least attempting to do so.

The memoirs and diaries of leading Swedish politicians like Oesten Unden or Tage Erlander show no evidence of any exchanges. However, Arne Lundberg has reported that in 1951, when he formally took over the Raoul Wallenberg case, one of the first things he did was to meet with Marcus Wallenberg. According to Lundberg, Marcus was quite blunt in his assessment that he thought for sure that Raoul Wallenberg was dead. The chapter in the Eliasson report which discusses the role of the Wallenberg family unfortunately fails to shed any new light on these issues.

The question of why the Wallenberg Family apparently chose not to negotiate on Raoul Wallenberg's behalf is an important one and deserves further scrutiny. Among other things, it might help clarify the Foreign Office's behavior in the question. The question is all the more interesting because the Wallenbergs have a long history of intervention on behalf of their relatives and associates. During WWII they negotiated on behalf of seven employees of the ASEA concern who had been arrested by the Gestapo in Poland for aiding the Polish underground. In the time from 1942-44 ASEA's representatives, on instructions from Marcus and Jacob, conducted talks with German authorities in Berlin. Walter Schellenberg intervened in the matter as a favor to Jacob Wallenberg. Schellenberg also came to the aid of Jacob Wallenberg's brother in law, Count Ferdinand Arco-Valley, who had been arrested by the Gestapo in 1942 and again in 1944.

### b. Distant relation?

Over the years the Wallenberg Family has shown a marked tendency to distance itself from Raoul Wallenberg. Due to the early death of his father and his grandfather Gustav Wallenberg in 1937, Raoul Wallenberg's position in the family was somewhat unclear. He had, however, much more contact than has been previously acknowledged. Jacob Wallenberg's name appears as a reference in the application for Raoul Wallenberg's Kabinettspass in 1941 - a special passport which indicated that its bearer was traveling on official business for the Swedish state - as well as for his diplomatic passport in 1941. Jacob Wallenberg's approval was requested and obtained before Raoul Wallenberg agreed to go to Budapest. In addition, Raoul Wallenberg is careful to list Jacob's name separately in his 19 June, 1944 letter of resignation from commercial activities during the duration of the Budapest employment.

Raoul Wallenberg's firm "Mellaneuropeiska" was founded in July 1941 and even though it belonged nominally to Swedish shipping magnate Sven Salen, it operated completely within the Wallenberg business sphere. In September 1940 Jacob Wallenberg had received a request for help through Per Jacobsson, head of the Bank of International Settlements [BIS], from Jewish businessmen in Hungary who were worried about future restrictions of their activities, after a steady tightening of the Race Laws. They were looking to Swedish businessmen for

*"the purpose of 'aryanization' of their businesses."*

Should Jacob be interested, Per Jacobsson explained, he should send a representative to Budapest. It is possible that Jacobsson's approach to Jacob and the deteriorating conditions in Hungary were the driving force behind MEROPA's creation. Attached to the letter Jacob had received was a card by Hungarian businessmen Leopold Aschner of TUNGSRAM. Most of Raoul Wallenberg's closest aides in 1944 would come from the managerial ranks of just this firm.

There are some indications that Raoul Wallenberg may have been working for Jacob Wallenberg in some capacity before 1941. On 27 September, 1939 Raoul Wallenberg had written to Jacob saying that

*"at our last meeting you told me that the war would perhaps lead to a number of problems and that you possibly would want to use me for their solution."*

After this, Raoul Wallenberg's letters asking for employment with the Wallenbergs cease. Documents released by the Wallenberg Family archive show that Raoul Wallenberg had regular meetings at Enskilda Banken since 1938. Most of them are fit in between the dates of Raoul Wallenberg's military service and his travel abroad. This travel appears to have been related to a variety of issues, including his work later with MEROPA but may have also been in connection with Wallenberg business. Kalman Lauer, Raoul Wallenberg's business partner, in his private papers goes so far as to say that Raoul Wallenberg considered Jacob Wallenberg his "idol" and that he even at times had worked for Jacob as Private Secretary. A former Wallenberg employee has stated that Raoul Wallenberg had traveled repeatedly to Estonia during the 1940's on Jacob Wallenberg's behalf.

The Wallenberg family as such, including Marcus Wallenberg, was very well connected in Hungary and a number of his longstanding business acquaintances are listed among Raoul Wallenberg's contacts in Budapest. As Raoul Wallenberg's private papers show, his contacts with the Wallenberg family also extended into the social sphere. His already mentioned invitation list for a cocktail party in December, 1943 includes members of the immediate Wallenberg Family and business circle, such as Jacob and Marcus, his uncle Axel Wallenberg, his aunt Ebba Bonde, and the head of Investor, Count 'Ibo'Douglas.

For reasons that remain unexplained, after Raoul Wallenberg disappeared all these connections were de-emphasized and in some cases were even deliberately hidden. This fact is all the more disturbing since, spoken or unspoken, Raoul Wallenberg's efforts in Hungary served to improve the tarnished Wallenberg Family image, and may have been in part designed to directly compensate for Wallenberg Family economic support of Hitler Germany. It is therefore of some importance to determine how involved Raoul Wallenberg may have been with Wallenberg affairs. Was Raoul Wallenberg a trusted confidante who carried out special assignments of varying importance, perhaps under cover of a rather innocuous business like MEROPA, which provided him with a pretext for access and travel? And was his mission to Budapest in some form a natural progression of his earlier contacts? Or was Raoul Wallenberg indeed kept on the periphery of the Wallenberg sphere, and the Budapest mission offered the long hoped for opportunity to prove himself?

Whatever Marcus and Jacob's personal attitudes may have been towards their [second] cousin, they do not appear to have taken any serious action on his behalf. Personal matters, including personal tragedies, have always taken a backseat in Wallenberg affairs. Carl Frostell, Jacob Wallenberg's Private Secretary, experienced this firsthand when in 1974 Jacob was informed that his nephew, Marc Jr, tragically had taken his own life. In his memoirs Frostell writes:

*"Jacob's comment about the suicide shocked me. He said: 'That was weak' The emotional life of the Wallenbergs is difficult to comprehend."*

Frostell goes on to say that Jacob was of course deeply affected by his nephew's death. Nevertheless, he chose the example to illustrate that next to a great sense of humor and true generosity Jacob Wallenberg could exhibit an "emotionally cold, categorical hardness."

### c. Wallenberg business interests in Hungary



It would be important to know if the family's apparent decision not to actively pursue the question of Raoul Wallenberg's fate was based on information they had received through private or semi-private channels, which convinced them that Raoul Wallenberg was dead. Perhaps their apparent lack of initiative was due to a sober risk/benefit analysis, or as the Swedish Security Police official Danielsson put it quite succinctly that from the Wallenbergs' perspective

*"...a campaign against 'Big Brother' [the Soviet Union] would not benefit business."*

The Wallenberg family as well as many of Raoul Wallenberg's business colleagues had extensive interests in Eastern Europe. According to British Intelligence documentation Marcus Wallenberg had explored post-war development opportunities in the Soviet Union and its satellites well before the end of the war. Already in February 1945, Marcus contacted the Soviet Ambassador Alexandra Kollontai about the pursuit of Swedish business interests in Poland. In his memoirs former Soviet Intelligence official Pavel Sudoplatov alludes to a number of wartime business deals between the Soviet Union and the Wallenberg Family - like the sale of ballbearings for platinum that may have been highly sensitive and so far remain little explored. He appears to have obtained some of his information from the Wallenberg Family file in Soviet Intelligence Archives. So far, no foreign researchers have been allowed to study this material.

The Eliasson Commission raises the important question of Soviet perceptions of the Wallenberg Family at the time of Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance. It can at best be described as ambivalent. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia from 1951 lists the Wallenberg Family as

*"active supporters of German fascism and wicked enemies of the working class".*

The Eliasson Commission also cites a memorandum from the head of the First [later the Fifth] European [Scandinavia] Department, Sysoyev to Deputy Foreign Minister Dekanosov from February 1944, which compiled information about the Wallenberg Family. In his memo Sysoyev stated that the Wallenbergs were not *"favorably inclined"* towards the Soviet Union but due to the size and power of the Soviet Union, Wallenberg business was paying attention. Sysoyev also stresses the contacts with the Soviet Trade Delegation in Stockholm of

*"a few of their family members."*

As Kalman Lauer's letters show, in 1944 Raoul Wallenberg was among these family members who made regular visits to the Trade Delegation. In 1944/5 he was, therefore no stranger to the Russians, at least not to the Soviet officials in Stockholm. In fact, according to Lauer, the Soviet Legation

*"was informed about his mission which enjoyed their greatest sympathies"*

A letter from Alexandra Kollontai to Dekanosov from 29 January, 1945 outlines the discussions she had with Marcus Wallenberg and a number of other bankers about

*"wider commercial operations with the Soviet Union",*

including the granting and repayment conditions of credits. The letter is sent to Dekanosov together with the earlier material compiled by Sysoyev which shows that at this point in time the activities of the Wallenberg family are certainly of great interest to him. Kollontai's letter also underscores the central role Marcus Wallenberg played in the trade negotiations.

Records in the Swedish Foreign Ministry archives show that in 1944 Wallenberg firms and their representatives made at least one controversial deal with Nazi occupied Hungary which later led to Russian protests and threat of legal action. Trade between Sweden and Hungary had essentially come to a standstill following the German occupation in March 1944. In the summer of 1944 a number of Hungarian businessmen sent a formal appeal to the Swedish government to resume trade. The signatories to the letter included both TUNGSRAM and SKF Budapest.

A few months later, in September 1944, SKF [headquarters] Joenskoeping suddenly decided to sell its inventories in Europe, including that of SKF Budapest, to Germany, and sent instructions [via the Swedish Foreign Office] to have the full supply of ball bearings shipped on to Schweinfurt. The U.S. in 1944 had steadily increased pressure on Sweden to cease all ball bearing exports to Germany. In Allied opinion Swedish shipments of critical war materials had enabled Germany to prolong the war. Despite an agreement for the U.S. to compensate Sweden for lost income by purchasing some of the ballbearing production for 1943 - worth about \$8,000,000 - Sweden only reluctantly met U.S. demands. The U.S. in turn was hesitant to publicly rebuke Sweden for each new violation following the general agreement that had been reached, but did so occasionally. The conflict festered well into the spring of 1945.

It does not appear that Raoul Wallenberg had any role in these events but that the transaction was handled instead by SKF's director in Budapest, Ferencz Pirkner. Wallenberg's last name alone, however, would have been enough to link him to the matter in Soviet eyes. Aside from official Wallenberg Bank representatives the Wallenberg Family dealt closely with a



number of associated businessmen in Budapest in 1944, including for some time their "*confidential man*" Lennart Larsson and his son, Lennart Thomas Johan Larsson. The Larssons appear to have acted as intermediary for several Hungarian and Swedish businesses. Both Larssons knew Kalman Lauer and Raoul Wallenberg quite well and had contact with them throughout the Budapest mission.

The German wish to resume trade relations between Hungary and Sweden also led to an offer, however, that may well have directly or indirectly involved Raoul Wallenberg. In mid-August 1944 the German Kommerzienrat Edmund von Pirkner of the Budapest firm Pirkner & Zettner had traveled to Stockholm and relayed a deal offered directly by Edmund Veessenmayer, the SS 'Reichsverweser' [Envoy Plenipotentiary] in Hungary: If Sweden were to provide certain trade goods for Hungary, he would permit a number of Jews [picked by Pirkner] to leave Hungary by special train to Germany, if they were allowed entry into Sweden. The Swedish Foreign Office documentation shows that the issue was immediately discussed with the Hungarian Legation in Stockholm [von Nagy] which declared itself in favor of the proposal. The people to be saved were, according to notations on the top of the document, "*better people*" [Baettre Folk], meaning higher educated, prominent and/or rich individuals. The notes, initialed by [Head of the Legal Department] Goesta Engzell, show that the Swedish Legation in Budapest was notified by telephone on September 7, 1944.

It is not clear if the transfer of this group of people to Sweden ever came about or if this offer was in any way related to SKF's transfer of its Budapest inventory. Wartime business can be a double-edged sword and the Wallenberg Family as well as their business partners may have been hesitant to press Raoul Wallenberg's case too strongly for fear that some of their more questionable activities would have received closer scrutiny or because they stood to lose important postwar economic opportunities.

#### d. Wallenberg interests and their political effects

How much Swedish business interests and to a large extent Wallenberg Family interests may have influenced political decision making in the Raoul Wallenberg case is an important question. With the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe Swedish businesses suffered great financial losses and faced the threat of nationalization. Some of these were to be offset by compensation agreements and later by at least partial repatriation of Swedish assets. But for Swedish political and business leaders in 1945 the primary focus was the quick normalization of political and economic relations with Hungary and by extension with the Soviet Union. This issue is a recurring theme in the communications between the Swedish Legation, Moscow and the Foreign Office in Stockholm. Wallenberg firms feature prominently throughout these exchanges, especially the interests of the Swedish Match concern.

Former Swedish Match director in Zagreb Yngve Ekmark immediately discussed the issue with Swedish Minister Soederblom when he and the other members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest traveled through Moscow on April 13, 1945. A few months later, in October 1945, the Swedish Match representative for Budapest, Bertil Hallstroem [then stationed in Prague], sent an urgent message to the Foreign Office and his firm's headquarters in Joensuu to insist that any decision to normalize relations should include an agreement of "*reciprocity*" to ensure that

*"the Swedish interests in Hungary, especially those of Swedish Match, are protected and respected."*

Soviet officials were applying pressure to replace the management of both Swedish Match and SKF in Budapest with their own personnel. SKF's director in Prague, Stenberg, warns about this in November, 1945:

*"SKF's Purchasing Director [in Hungary]... was to be tried in court, because right before the end of the war a number of ball bearings had been handed over to the [Faschist]government at the time."*

The Eliasson Commission argues that although Staffan Soederblom in Moscow had received instructions from the Swedish Foreign Office concerning the promotion of Swedish-Hungarian trade relations, including the protection of Swedish assets, Soederblom was eager to transfer all responsibility for such discussions to official Swedish representatives in Budapest. According to the Eliasson Report, the issue of postwar trade relations, therefore, only had a negligible influence on Soederblom's behavior and Swedish decision making in the Wallenberg case in general.

Such a conclusion, however, is far too general. Although in late 1945 Soederblom encountered difficulties in pursuing the issue in Moscow and as a result referred the matter back to Stockholm [and to the Swedish Legations in Rumania and Hungary], this does not mean that the larger implications of the subject did not interest him or that the matter itself lacked relevance. On the contrary, the issue of improved Eastern European economic and trade relations and, by extension, a positive development of Swedish-Soviet contacts was very much on his mind - and that of the Soviets as well. Soederblom stressed the point in his communications with Stockholm, including a letter to Rolf Sohlman on August 10, 1945:

*"It was with considerable interest that I heard about (Mikhail) Nikitin's [Soviet Embassy, Stockholm] remark to you that on the Soviet side one would be interested in Swedish trade relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary. As you know, I have for a long time urged such a development, based on remarks by (Deputy Foreign Minister) Losovsky and (Deputy Foreign Minister) Vishinsky."*

Socio-economic strategies to counter growing ideological tensions between the former Allies became increasingly important and, as Soederblom recognized, the need to develop such strategies offered important opportunities for neutral countries like Sweden. Economic issues as such began to take an increased role in larger Security Policy considerations. There are strong indications that such ideas had an effect on the parallel negotiations in the Raoul Wallenberg question, on both the Russian and the Swedish side. During his conversation with Abramov on 6 March, 1946 - ostensibly about the case of Swedish journalist af Sandeberg and related issues - Soederblom takes the opportunity to remind Abramov of a previous Soviet note about the Swedish-Russian Agreement from 1941 regarding Soviet compensation for lost Swedish business in the Baltic countries. As was clear all along, the planned Swedish-Russian Credit and Trade Agreement was to cover a large part or all of Soviet concessions to Sweden on this point.

As for the Russians, the Eliasson Commission emphasizes at the same time the Soviet leadership appeared eager to improve its relations with Sweden and to conclude the Credit and Trade Agreement. According to the Commission, this was evidenced by the fact that despite repeated Swedish inquiries about Wallenberg in Moscow and growing criticism in the Swedish press and the Swedish Parliament, the Soviet Ambassador to Stockholm, Ilya Tchernichev, in his reports home to Moscow states that the Wallenberg case had had no ill effects on overall Swedish-Soviet relations.

There is also another aspect to consider: Due to the unique set-up of the Swedish economic system, ties between government and business are extremely close. In the postwar years, Swedish business and political interests were therefore in many instances almost indistinguishable, as a handful of families and their extended members held key positions. Numerous Foreign Ministry and government officials routinely ended up on the boards of directors of leading Swedish companies after retirement.

Taken together, all these factors may well have worked to Raoul Wallenberg's disadvantage when in fact the opposite should have been the case. The same people who wielded the most influence and should have been Raoul Wallenberg's greatest supporters, also were precisely the ones who not only crafted Swedish post-war [economic] policy, but who also may have had important personal interests at stake.

A P.M. from November 1945, signed by Rolf Sohlman and addressed to highlevel Swedish economic experts, including Dag Hammarskjöld, Gunnar Myrdal and Swedish Riksbank Chief Ivar Rooth, forwards a proposal for a Hungarian reconstruction plan which, according to the members of a private Hungarian business delegation visiting Sweden at the time, should be handled by a new company. This new company was to hold a sharecapital valued at \$50 million. The business delegation included representatives from leading Hungarian enterprises with Swedish ties and included men like Hugo Wohl and Vilmos Forgacs, who had been among Raoul Wallenberg's closest aides.

#### **Wallenberg intelligence connections**

Aside from economic influence, the Wallenbergs may have also provided useful services in intelligence matters, both to Sweden and indirectly to the British and the United States. Swedish Foreign Office documents include an account from a witness who claims that the Swedish Secret Police [sic], in close cooperation with the Swedish Foreign Office, in the 1940's and 50's ran an intelligence network in Eastern Europe, which focused mainly on economic and industrial espionage. The central office for the group dealing with Poland and East Germany was supposedly found in Berlin,

*"camouflaged under the local office of the Ericsson firm."*

Forty-five men had been allegedly trained in Joenskoeping and then had been sent abroad for espionage purposes. Joenskoeping was the headquarters of the Swedish Match concern and L.M. Ericsson was of course Wallenberg controlled. One interesting question is whether or not such practices were in place during the time Raoul Wallenberg was in Budapest.

The question of what connections or contacts Raoul Wallenberg may have had to Swedish Intelligence, as well as who handled Swedish Intelligence contacts for the Swedish Legation in Budapest after the departure of Military Attache Harry Wester in October 1944 needs to be studied further.

The Eliasson Commission states that its review of Swedish Intelligence archives has shown no evidence that Raoul Wallenberg had any direct links to Swedish Intelligence ties. It can, however, not exclude that certain informal ties existed and that, for example, any information Wallenberg might have possessed or collected could have been reported indirectly, through his family. Carl Bonde, the head of Swedish Counterintelligence in Stockholm in 1944, had been directly involved in Allied intelligence activities in Hungary. He was a stepson of Ebba Bonde. Jacob and Marcus Wallenberg's sister, who was herself active during the war in humanitarian and intelligence activities. Raoul Wallenberg had frequent contact with her in Stockholm. Another sister, Sonja Wallenberg, was married to Carl Bjoernstierna, the head of Swedish Foreign Intelligence until the early 1940's.

Raoul Wallenberg's activities before 1944 also deserve closer scrutiny than they have received so far. As Austrian author Rudolph Philipp indicates in his book on Raoul Wallenberg from 1947, Wallenberg during this time traveled regularly throughout Europe. Raoul Wallenberg's travel in 1942 was conducted with a passport sponsored by Jacob Wallenberg. It also apparently had the official backing of the Swedish state - selling Swedish Ardenner horses for the government's Horse Export Commission to companies in Vichy, France in exchange for various merchandise, including much needed rubber goods. The following year, however, the Foreign Office refused extension of his Kabinettspass. Wallenberg had explained that he intended to travel to Eastern Europe as well as Argentina to purchase foodstuffs. The rejected application carries the notation "Doubtful!" across the top. Why did the Foreign Office find such a trip suspicious considering it had supported Wallenberg's travels just the year before and his trip appears to have been completely in line with MEROPA's stated business?

G-Section, the predecessor of C-byran, relied heavily on information received from Swedish businessmen returning from their trips abroad. Per Jacobsson, the head of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) and close acquaintance of Jakob Wallenberg, worked as an agent for Swedish Intelligence throughout the war. Also, the head of Swedish C-byran Helmut Ternberg apparently maintained close ties to the Wallenbergs, as did his successors. Raoul Wallenberg's known association with individuals involved in separate peace talks in Stockholm and his alleged travel to the Baltic countries in connection with Wallenberg business - and what the Russians knew about it - needs to be examined further as well. Stockholm during the war was a very small town and people had contact through numerous personal and professional ties. If Raoul Wallenberg, however, worked in some confidential capacity for Jacob or Marcus Wallenberg before 1944, it would raise questions about additional, possibly hidden aspects of the humanitarian mission to Budapest. It could also perhaps explain the passivity of the Wallenberg Family. Depending on the degree and the nature of Raoul Wallenberg's involvement in Wallenberg Family affairs, the question that arises is whether or not the Family's silence in the case was due to a wish to protect him, or due to concern over potentially compounding problems at a time when the Wallenbergs were already under Allied investigation.

There have been some suggestions that the Wallenbergs could not pursue a vigorous campaign for Raoul Wallenberg's release because of reduced Wallenberg influence and reputation in the aftermath of the Bosch affair, resulting in postwar US pressures on the family to abandon business ties with the Soviet Union. Some type of "gentlemen's agreement" appears to have been struck by the two parties: Despite the U.S. blacklisting of the Wallenberg brothers and earlier orders to freeze their U.S. assets, by 1946 U.S. and British efforts to investigate the Wallenberg family's activity of cloaking important business assets for Nazi Germany cooled considerably when it became apparent that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were headed on a confrontational course. Records of the time show that U.S. officials were increasingly concerned over Soviet influence in Sweden and as a result they pursued a much more lenient line of inquiry regarding Enskilda Banken's war time activities.

The Swedish government by no means fully approved of all Wallenberg Family behavior. This was especially true in the Bosch affair, when it became clear that the Wallenberg brothers had not only deceived American officials but also Swedish representatives. In addition, by mid-1945 the internal political climate in Sweden had shifted towards a more radical social-democratic position, led by the new Foreign Minister Oesten Unden. These combined factors certainly weakened the position of a family that so fully embodied the capitalist ethos. Despite these problems, the political clout of the family was never truly in question. While the Wallenbergs faced serious challenges in those years - including the closing of their direct channel to Moscow with the recall of Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm, Alexandra Kollontai, in March 1945 and the loss of reputation in certain U.S. government and business circles - they were hardly powerless and could have easily made their wishes known. In fact, as Ulf Olsson stresses in his biography of Marcus Wallenberg, the Wallenberg network of influential contacts not only remained intact, but actually deepened:

*"Friendships with colleagues in New York financial circles ... were not influenced so easily by political issues. One of the lasting gains of the [Wallenberg] efforts during the war years was [Marcus Wallenberg's] functioning on the highest peak of not only of Swedish but also international politics. For Marcus Wallenberg the view had expanded."*

There are no signs that the Wallenberg brothers ever seriously attempted to overcome any of the hurdles that did exist or to rally others with influence in the Soviet sphere to act on behalf of their cousin. There exists no documentary evidence that the U.S. government actively opposed efforts by the Swedish government to pursue the question of Raoul Wallenberg's fate with the Russians or that it made the abandonment of the search for Raoul Wallenberg a requirement for its decision to finally settle

its formal inquiry into Wallenberg businesses in 1950. Questions do remain about the Soviet perception of the Wallenberg Family and the full reasons behind Raoul Wallenberg's arrest. The possibility cannot be excluded that Raoul Wallenberg was to serve as some form of insurance or pressure vis a vis the Swedish government and/or the Wallenberg Family. Access to relevant documentation in Russian archives is therefore a key priority. The Swedish Foreign Office to this day has never made a serious attempt to subject the family's behavior in the Raoul Wallenberg affair to formal scrutiny.

#### f. Signs of doubts

In an interview with the Austrian magazine "Profil" in 2002 the current Marcus Wallenberg defends his family's behavior in the Raoul Wallenberg case:

*"what has been rumored publicly and that what I have heard in my family make two very different pictures. ...My ancestors certainly supported the many initiatives on Raoul Wallenberg's behalf. More, than it would appear openly."*

If that is indeed so, then very little is known about such efforts. One of these initiatives may have been Jacob Wallenberg's attempt in 1954 - in the wake of Stalin's death and new witness testimonies - to contact high-ranking Soviet officials through business intermediaries in Eastern Europe, with the help of a representative of the Swedish Defense Staff. According to these intermediaries the Wallenberg family was willing to "make large sacrifices" for valid information. How far did these contacts go and how did this affect parallel initiatives? And why was this initiative not coordinated with the Swedish Foreign Office? When asked to provide further detail, the Wallenberg archive refused comment and stated that it had no information in the matter.

Aside from the many interesting aspects of this initiative, it is worth noting that the attempt was apparently made by Jacob Wallenberg. According to Carl Frostell, as a direct fallout of the Bosch affair relations between Marcus and Jacob were tense for years and they were not on speaking terms. This dissension was carefully hidden from the public. Were there perhaps also differing views on how to handle the inquiry into Raoul Wallenberg's fate?

Interestingly, the new Wallenberg generation does not accept the current Russian explanation of Raoul Wallenberg's fate. In the Profile interview Marcus Wallenberg expressed himself this way:

*"The number of different versions [of his fate] makes me very skeptical. I do not believe, that the truth has come out yet."*

Wallenberg, however, gives no indication that the Wallenberg Family is inclined to actively try to solve the mystery. The Wallenberg archives remain effectively closed to outside researchers, with the exception of a few handpicked individuals.

### 3. Russia

#### a. The Soviet legacy

With little meaningful outside pressure and tough Cold War realities weakening the few efforts that were made on Raoul Wallenberg's behalf, Russia had no incentive to give up its secret. Even the demise of the Soviet Union has done little to unlock the vault. The formation of the joint Swedish-Russian Working Group in the fall of 1991 had been a promising sign of possible cooperation, and hopes were particularly high when Russia handed over a number of important documents in the case. But things quickly stalled and the flow of material slowed to a trickle. The uncertain political climate after the August 1991 putsch proved too difficult an obstacle. Twelve years of adjustment and transformation of the Soviet state have done little to change that. The current political situation is still not conducive to greater openness or reckoning with the past.

Especially for a case where the central question of responsibility involves the Russian Security Services. In a recent interview Russian President Vladimir Putin made clear his views that he regards the Security Services largely as an unwilling tool of the former Soviet leadership, rather than as an active co-conspirator who cemented their power. Under his presidency the Security Services have undergone a rigorous process of consolidation and have been given once again a central role in Russian government affairs.

While Putin may not allow a resolution of the Wallenberg case on either tactical or perhaps ideological grounds, there are also strong historical obstacles. Russia lost 20 million people during WWII and about 60 million perished since the Revolution in 1917. Any individual fate pales before these numbers. While some Russian officials privately have expressed understanding for Raoul Wallenberg's family's quest, they have consciously blocked the inquiry at serious junctures. In their view one man's fate does not outweigh a nation's political interests, nor does it matter more than one's own relatives.

#### **b. The current Russian view**

The official Russian position today insists that Raoul Wallenberg was killed in 1947 without offering any documentary or other evidence in support of this claim. While some additional documents may still be found in the future, Russian officials argue, they would cast no light on the question of Wallenberg's fate. The key documents, the argument goes, were destroyed a long time ago. Instead, the circumstantial evidence in the case is presumably so strong that it allows no other conclusion that Raoul Wallenberg was executed. Among the chief reasons they cite Raoul Wallenberg's presumed lack of usefulness for Stalin once Sweden showed no interest in his return, as well as the absence of any documentation indicating Wallenberg's presence in the Soviet system after July 1947. The Eliasson Report rejects this position as unacceptable, arguing that in no official investigation, criminal or historical, can absence of documentation ever constitute acceptable proof. This all the more so when by Russia's own acknowledgement additional critical documentation exists in the case that was not made available to the Swedish side.

While the Report acknowledges the possibility of Raoul Wallenberg's death in 1947, it stresses that the current evidence does not exclude the possibility of Wallenberg having lived some time beyond 1947, especially if his identity was hidden. The Commission is scathing in its criticism of the poor quality of the official Russian Working Group report from 2001 and stops just short of accusing the Russians of stonewalling. Poorly written, argued and annotated, the main intention of the report, in the words of the Commission,

*"appears designed to transfer as much blame to Swedish authorities for Raoul Wallenberg's alleged death in Soviet captivity,"*

The Eliasson Commission rightly emphasizes ultimate Russian responsibility for a solution and issues only very indirect criticism of the Swedish role in the official Swedish-Russian Working Group. Circumstances were undeniably difficult and especially in the early years important progress was made. Swedish officials were constantly forced to maneuver a fine line between open confrontation and eliciting meaningful cooperation and concessions. Overall, however, the Swedish side placed a heavy emphasis on diplomatic discussions and adhered - on orders from above? - to an extremely narrow research focus. When access to critical documentation was denied, Sweden often did not effectively protest this failure. Simply put, Russian non-compliance faced few if any negative repercussions.

As a result, the work rarely met the generally accepted standards of a scientific, historical inquiry. For the first seven years of the Working Group's existence the Swedish side only rarely insisted on full and direct access to documentation, settling instead into a slow moving question/answer format with the Russian side. Swedish representatives frequently appeared more interested in avoiding the various pitfalls of the case than mounting a determined, multileveled quest for the truth. Numerous independent experts argued for years for direct access to records and a systematic framework of analysis, before those in charge reluctantly agreed. The Swedish side also never conducted a systematic study and analysis of the Russian documents it did obtain or of all the oral testimonies it collected. Potentially important background issues of the Raoul Wallenberg case, such as his contacts and activities in Hungary, for example, or the role of the Wallenberg Family were almost completely ignored. No historians served on the Swedish side of the Commission.

#### **c. Early definitions**

The key question for the early Russian definition of the Raoul Wallenberg case is: How did Stalin assess the situation,

especially after his disastrous meeting with Staffan Soederblom in June 1946, when the Swedish Minister informed the Soviet leader that he personally thought Raoul Wallenberg was dead? Did Stalin want to rid himself of the Wallenberg problem as soon as possible or did he feel there was time, especially since the Swedes had made it clear that they had little interest in Wallenberg? The interrogation registers of Lubianka and Lefortovo show that Wallenberg was only rarely interrogated, which is an indication that the decisive investigative phase of his case had not yet started. Many prisoners were incarcerated for years before the intensive investigative phase of their case began. Most foreign diplomats were sentenced only in 1948 or even later. Wallenberg had been in contact with various intelligence and political groups, and he undoubtedly possessed valuable information. Soviet interrogators could have learned some of this information from his cellmates but it would have been far from exhaustive knowledge.

So Stalin may not have been in a terrible hurry. Stalin's growing anti-semitism and general anti-western paranoia after 1945 would certainly not have helped Wallenberg's case. However, even if Wallenberg refused to cooperate, there may have been good arguments for keeping him alive. 1947 would certainly have been very early to give up on him entirely. The interview with former members of the Soviet Intelligence Services yield a common impression of Wallenberg's case - that it was special, complicated and in many ways political. As late as 1951 the files of two of his fellow prisoners - Gustav Richter and Grossheim-Krisko - include statements that their ill treatment in captivity was in part due to their association with an "especially important prisoner," almost certainly a reference to Raoul Wallenberg. The full reasons and especially Soviet reasoning behind Wallenberg's arrest are only partially understood. Stalin may have wanted to use Raoul Wallenberg as an instrument of pressure to obtain important concessions from the West.

The Swedish-Russian Credit Agreement was signed in 1946 without Russia having to produce any obvious trump card. Yet Wallenberg's usefulness would not necessarily have ended. The continued uncertainty about his being alive or dead may have been utility enough. In any case, usefulness in the Soviet system appears to have been a relative concept and at times defied common logic. A good example is the case of Boris Menshagin, a former mayor of Smolensk and an unwitting witness to the Katyn Forest massacre. Menshagin's imprisonment bore little obvious utility, yet Stalin kept him alive for years. Menshagin's case also illustrates that strict isolation of prisoners was not only theoretically possible but was practical reality in the Soviet prison system. Menshagin spent the first six years of his twenty-five year sentence in complete isolation in Lubianka prison

As Wallenberg's interrogation schedules show, Soviet investigators definitely used his statements to probe political events in Hungary, possibly including Allied plans for the future. Former Hungarian Prime Minister Istvan Bethlen was questioned on 28 April, 1945, the same day as Wallenberg. And on 17 July 1947 Vilmos Langfelder, Gerit van der Waals - who had links to British Intelligence - and Raoul Wallenberg were questioned simultaneously, although in separate rooms. Individuals closely linked to van der Waals' activities in Budapest, such as Karl Schandl, Tibor Clement and Laszlo Pap, were sentenced to long prison terms as British spies in 1950.

The last known date for Raoul Wallenberg's presence in the Soviet prison system is March 11, 1947, when he was called for an interrogation in Lubianka prison. All experts agree that Wallenberg's fate was decided around that time, during the spring and summer of 1947. The critical information is surely to be found in the letter Soviet State Minister of Security, Viktor Abakumov, wrote to Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov dated July 17, 1947. The content of this letter has never been released. As for Wallenberg's fate, there exist only two possibilities - Raoul Wallenberg lived and became a secret prisoner, or he died, either through execution or torture. Raoul Wallenberg's name and that of his colleague Vilmos Langfelder are blacked out in the Lubianka and Lefortovo prison registers for 1947. But as American Wallenberg expert Susan E. Mesinaï has pointed out, the censoring/purging of names does not automatically mean the prisoner in question has died. For the year 1947 the names of only two other prisoners, Pietro Aladjan-Aladjani and Sandor Katona, were stricken from the records. Aladjan-Aladjani, for example, was not executed, but instead he was placed in strict isolation and later released to the Vatican. Katona's fate remains unclear - the Russian side has so far not made his records available.

In addition, Aladjan-Aladjani was made a so-called [sentenced] numbered prisoner on June 28, 1947. The possibility therefore cannot be excluded that around the same time Raoul Wallenberg and Vilmos Langfelder too were isolated within the Soviet prison system and that their identities were hidden in some form, either by assigning them a different name or registering them under a number. In her official report to the Swedish-Russian Working Group in 2001 Mesinaï shows that the chronological numbering of secret prisoners in the late 1940' and early 1950's includes obvious gaps. In fact, for the critical time 1947/48 three numbers remain unidentified. It is possible that one of these numbers was assigned to Raoul Wallenberg or Langfelder after July 1947. So far, the Russian side has not revealed the identity of these unknown prisoners, despite repeated inquiries.

Even in Stalin's time foreign prisoners were not simply randomly shot or poisoned. In fact, the death penalty was not in force in July 1947 and was only reinstated in January 1951. Execution was also the last stage of a highly bureaucratic process. If Wallenberg was indeed executed, there should be *some* administrative evidence for this crime. For an execution to take place, a prisoner needed to be formally charged with a crime and sentenced. Experts agree that an 'illegal' shooting of Raoul Wallenberg in 1947 would have been very unlikely. This leaves death by poison - through methods developed in Grigory Maironovsky's infamous laboratory - or through torture, as part of the investigative process. According to experts on the workings of the Soviet Security Services' bureaucracy considerable administrative hurdles stood in the way of sending a

prisoner to Maironovsky, but this last possibility cannot be completely excluded. The question is, however, if Raoul Wallenberg really died due to such a cause in 1947, why can this truth not be revealed today?

Aside from the possibility of Raoul Wallenberg's death in 1947 or his isolation in Vladimir prison, Wallenberg may have simply remained a secret prisoner under investigation in Moscow. Another option might have been to place him in a situation that would have made survival almost impossible. Wallenberg could have been isolated away from Moscow, either in a secret psychiatric hospital facility like Kazan or Sukhanovo, for example, or - less likely - in the so-called Special Camp system in the Eastern regions of the Soviet Union. Established in early 1948, special camps housed important political prisoners, many from Eastern European countries. Even though some foreign prisoners were being repatriated as early as 1947, most of the prisoner population in special camps was not scheduled to return home any time soon. Plus, the daily routine inside these special camps was strictly regulated and extended even to limiting conversations among inmates. Some special camps also included special subsections within the camp structure to further isolate certain prisoners. Such a place would then have offered a fairly good form of isolation for a prisoner like Wallenberg.

The Russian side argues that as a prerequisite for sending Wallenberg outside of Moscow, he would have to have been formally charged with a crime and sentenced by applicable Soviet authority. There is no indication in the currently available records that such a formal charge or sentence were ever issued. This question, however, deserves further attention. Since no information is available about the handling of Wallenberg's case after March 1947, no final conclusions can be drawn nor can it be excluded that Wallenberg was strictly isolated while under extended investigation.

### 3. Different possibilities

While Russia now fervently stresses 1947, over the years one could detect a certain ambiguity in the Russian position. The vague language of the Gromyko memorandum from 1957 is the most well-known example. Why the Russian did not present a more convincing document than the Smoltsov note at that time remains a central mystery in the case. It's vagueness remains the Achilles' heel in the Russian argument that Wallenberg died in 1947. More information about both the genesis and the origin of the Smoltsov note must be presented before doubts are laid to rest. It still remains unclear, for example exactly where the document was found. The Swedish Working Group report from January 2001 states that despite forensic tests which do not contradict the potential authenticity of the document, it cannot exclude the possibility that the note was after all a forgery.

Even if it is authentic, testimonies by former Soviet officials raise questions about its possible meaning. A former Soviet Intelligence official who claims that he had access to Wallenberg documentation in the early 1950's has stated that the Smoltsov note had been discovered in a special file which had been created at the time of Wallenberg's death. Another official, a former employee of the First Main Directorate MGB, Fifth Department [Scandinavia] by the name of Stepanov confirmed the existence of such a special file, the so-called "Lefortovo File", but indicated that it in late 1950 included a separate collection of documents. According to Stepanov, this "Lefortovo file" included a note which created the impression that Wallenberg was dead. The full documentation, however, supposedly showed that Wallenberg had lived beyond 1947 and that he had been held captive under a different name for some time. In Stepanov's account Wallenberg had been held in isolation in several different prisons and an attempt at Soviet [agent] recruitment had been made in 1950, at a special MGB facility in Moscow. Wallenberg's fate after 1953 was unknown.

If there really was a special file, i.e. "Lefortovo File", that contained a note that Raoul Wallenberg had died in 1947, this may have been the Smoltsov note from 17 July, 1947 or a similar note to that effect. It raises the question whether or not this special file was the one used in preparation of the Gromyko memorandum from 1957. It remains unclear what documentation exactly Soviet officials relied on in 1956-57 when the memorandum was drafted. Foreign Minister Molotov at least had some direct knowledge of the events on 17 July, 1947, because MGB Minister Abakumov had personally informed him about developments in the Wallenberg case on that very date. Did Soviet officials in 1956 then find the Smoltsov note in the "Lefortovo file" [or other files] or did they construct it on the basis of the information contained in the material and/or Molotov's knowledge, and made the date retroactively fit Abakumov's notification to Molotov from 1947?

Russian officials have always maintained that the Smoltsov note is authentic, if not in fact, [meaning cause of death by heartattack,] then in spirit, [meaning Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947 or sometime around then.] In her analysis of Russian documents in 1997 Swedish historian Helene Carlbaeck concludes that Abakumov's letter to Molotov from 17 July, 1947

*"strongly increased the validity of the Smoltsov note.*

If indeed authentic, a question nevertheless remains, based on the currently available documentation, whether or not the [Smoltsov] note about Raoul Wallenberg's alleged death in 1947 could have been conceived as part of an effort to create a false set of documents, a false trace, with the intention of hiding Wallenberg's fate and/or his identity from certain individuals in the Soviet administration at that time. The circumstances of Wallenberg's death or disappearance were apparently a matter



of great sensitivity and it is known that as late as 1954 even high ranking Soviet officials were not fully briefed. The effort might have been abandoned at some point, yet the documentation survived. The issue attains further significance due to the many unresolved questions concerning the employment status of the physician A.L. Smoltsov in the summer of 1947. Full documentation on this issue needs to be presented by the Russian side.

If two former Soviet Intelligence officials indeed had access to Wallenberg's case file in the archives of the First Main Directorate of MGB [later KGB], there may be a chance that other individuals with similar access in other years may still be alive and could testify about what they saw. Further research will have to clarify the contradictions contained in their statements.

The Soviet leadership's wish to steer guilt away from themselves and to implicate Abakumov and Smoltsov, both of whom were dead by 1957, may account for some of the vague aspects of the Soviet pronouncements. The Swedish Working Group Report states that by the Russians' own acknowledgment the Gromyko Memorandum was not supposed to reflect the full truth - it was just to be "a half-truth that would do." The possibility exists that even if Wallenberg had lived beyond 1947, Soviet control or knowledge of the matter was such that Soviet officials felt reasonably sure that at that moment - in 1956/57 - Raoul Wallenberg was dead. But if that was so, the question remains why they did not choose to convey this fact - if it indeed was fact - more forcefully.

Both Russian and Swedish experts have argued that after a few years Raoul Wallenberg was simply not "exchangeable" because of the sensitive information he would have acquired during his Soviet imprisonment. Beyond that, releasing Wallenberg after years of denying any knowledge about him would have constituted an enormous embarrassment for the Soviet Union and an immense propaganda coup for the West. There would have been little or no chance for Soviet officials to "save face." Yet, it is equally questionable whether or not a deal could not have been struck if the right offer had come along.

Interestingly, even after the Wallenberg case had not been officially raised by Sweden for fifteen years, the documentation shows that the Russian side, at least in private conversation, did not categorically insist that Raoul Wallenberg was definitely dead in 1947. A good example is the discussion between a Swedish official [Jan Lundvik] and his unidentified Soviet contact in 1979, immediately after the Swedish side had reopened the case. In his assessment of the meeting Lundvik wrote:

*"The official position that the case is once and for all closed and that no new information can appear because Raoul Wallenberg died in 1947 was not expressed. .. In fact he [the contact] admitted implicitly that there could in fact come information of such a type that it may cast new light on the case."*

What then prevents Russia from telling the truth? There are four basic possibilities why Russia insists on 1947:

**1. Nobody knows the truth.** Therefore, the case is indeed purely circumstantial. Russian officials argue that the level of internal secrecy within the Security Services remains so high, that those few individuals who know what happened to Raoul Wallenberg either still refuse to speak or are now dead. Any documentation that does exist is supposedly incomplete and does not shed light on Wallenberg's ultimate fate. High-level institutional knowledge, however, was available until very recently and to some degree remains available today. Anastas Mikoyan survived until 1978. Sergei Kartashov, [Head of the Fourth Department, Third Main Directorate, MGB in 1947] died only in 1979. Other top members of the Soviet hierarchy lived well into the 1980's and 1990's. Vyacheslav Molotov was still alive in 1986 and Georgi Malenkov lived until 1988. Viktor Abakumov's Deputy, Nikolai Selivanovsky, died as recently as 1997. Yevgeni Pitovranov, the Head of the Second Main Directorate MGB, was alive until 1999, Danil Kopelyanski [interrogator with the Third Directorate, Fourth Department is still living, his colleague Solovov died only recently.

**2. Full knowledge of Wallenberg's death in 1947 exists, but documentation is withheld by an extremely small circle at the top.** Such a scenario is possible, but it raises questions as to why officials would not reveal details if they have already publicly pondered death by poison and have admitted to Wallenberg's execution by shooting [Yakovlev]. There may be a reluctance to release the documentation if the cause of death was gruesome or if it compromises still living officials who either dealt with the case directly or in its aftermath. In addition, it may prove impossible to strictly separate and keep separate the facts of Wallenberg's fate from other aspects of his case, i.e. reasons of his arrest, etc. The culture of the Security Services may well present an insurmountable obstacle, such as an ingrained unwillingness to acknowledge guilt or to provide essential details to the public. A stalemate then may seem to be the preferable solution.

**3. Wallenberg lived beyond 1947, but not for long.** Wallenberg died but later than claimed by the Russians. The Russian side has steadily retrenched in their position on Raoul Wallenberg's fate. It has moved from complete denial of Wallenberg's presence in the Soviet Union [1945-1957], to claim of death in 1947 by heart attack [Smoltsov], to death by Execution [Yakovlev]. Further adjustments or corrections about Raoul Wallenberg's supposed death, either about the cause or date of death would have serious repercussions for Russia; and particularly so if he was held beyond the deaths of both Stalin and Beria in 1953 and he then died or was executed. So, it may not be considered advantageous to admit to the later death date. Again, only a few people know the facts. This could be a plausible alternative to 1947, especially since some former Soviet



officials themselves have raised this possibility.

**4. Wallenberg lived beyond 1947 and for a considerable time.** A less likely scenario, but based on the current evidence it cannot be dismissed. If in fact true, Wallenberg's survival could not be revealed because it would cast all involved in a very negative light.

**d. More relevant records have to exist**

The possibility that Raoul Wallenberg's fate is *not* known is minimal. So is the chance that all critical documentation has been destroyed. There are strong indications that at least part of Raoul Wallenberg's personal file is available in Moscow. This idea appears to be supported by some of the items among Wallenberg's personal belongings which were returned to his family in October 1989. These consisted, among other things, of large amounts of foreign currencies, his diplomatic passport and his prisoner registration card. Russian claims that these items were discovered by chance in a sealed packet found on a shelf in the FSB archives seem hardly credible. Under the extremely strict Soviet bureaucratic rules items such as Wallenberg's passport should under normal circumstances have been kept as part of his personal and/or his investigative file. Critical records of his fellow prisoners that have so far not been shown to researchers also appear to exist.

It is also almost impossible for a prisoner to be lost in the Soviet system, at least not for extended periods of time. A special Commission after Stalin's death, headed by Anastas Mikoyan, made a thorough appraisal of all prisoners in Soviet prisons and camps, foreigners and secret prisoners included. MVD [Ministry of Interior] headquarters in Moscow also conducted strict regular inspections and reviews of all facilities, especially of those prison and camp departments which dealt with secret documentation and/or prisoners. This took place in close cooperation with MGB/KGB which oversaw a number of special prisons and camps.

There are plenty of indications that the relevant documentation exists. Declassification of official secrets in Russia is, by Russian archivists' own admission, in a deplorable state. Anatoly Prokopienko, former head of the Special Archives, has repeatedly gone on record to say that the current failure to solve the Wallenberg case is due to a lack of political will, not lack of documentation. Other leading experts, like Nikita Petrov of 'Memorial', agree with this assessment. It is clear that all critical decisions concerning important foreign prisoners were not made by Stalin alone but were a matter of approval in some form for the Politburo. According to Petrov, Abakumov should have formally reported to Stalin about his actions concerning Raoul Wallenberg and such a report should have been given in writing.

In his memoirs Vadim Bakatin who headed the KGB for four short months in 1991, expresses his surprise how many Politburo decisions were taken in the Wallenberg case and how little documentation was found which would explain the genesis of these decisions. It is precisely this type of documentation which currently remains inaccessible. Ocobye Papki, the special papers of the 'Instantsi,' i.e. the Central Committee and the Politburo [especially for the years 1946/47] - open only up to 1934; Stalin's personal papers - only partially released; records of Foreign and Military Intelligence - most have remained completely closed. In addition, no access currently exists to critical correspondence records of MGB/KGB with the Soviet leadership, records of the Soviet 'rezidentura' in Stockholm for pertinent years, records of the Soviet side of the Allied Control Council, Hungary or Rumania and its communications with Moscow - the list goes on.

That highly relevant information existed at least into the mid-1950's is made clear by a remarkable document from the Russian Foreign Ministry collection. The document refers to a letter from a man called "Shiryagin" who apparently in April 1956 possessed important information about Raoul Wallenberg's fate. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered the letter significant enough to forward it to the Committee of State Security [KGB] with the following comment and a direct request to silence Shiryagin:

*"The Foreign Ministry received a letter written probably by I.S. Shiryagin who lives in the village of Vodenino, Charkov region, which contains some information about the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg. Probably Comrade Shiryagin, having a sincere motive to help search for Wallenberg, will reveal the content of his letters to other people and finally the Swedish Embassy would hear about the matter. Probably you will come to the conclusion that it will be necessary to advise Shiryagin - in a very careful manner - through your channels not to spread the news about Wallenberg."*

### e. A possible watershed

A rather interesting exchange between an unidentified Russian journalist and Colonel Vladimir Konstantinovich Vinogradov, head of the FSB archives, during the presentation of the Russian Working Group Report at a press conference in Moscow on 16 January, 2001 provides a strong hint that officials know more than they have said and that there may be strong internal factors at play which have so far prevented a full disclosure of Raoul Wallenberg's fate:

Question: *It is common knowledge that the Soviet leadership distorted the truth intentionally. ... When did it happen that the Soviet or Russian leadership decided sincerely to find out the truth? Was it in 1985 or 1989?*

Vinogradov: *It's an interesting question, but you should address it to the government. You always put me in a tight spot. I have to express my position as a citizen. ...*

Question: *I am asking your personal opinion*

Vinogradov: *... You know that there are always secrets in a family. Some things can be said, and some cannot be said. When we read the cases, I wish I never read them. These are rather moral and ethical questions. But sometimes they go beyond political considerations, like, for example Russian-Swedish relations. ... "*

If former Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, for example, intentionally misrepresented the truth in 1989 - when he invited Raoul Wallenberg's immediate family to Moscow where they were presented with his personal belongings - then President Putin could be placed in the unenviable position of exposing a number of former Soviet officials such as Gorbachev or people like former Soviet Premier and Head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, to public embarrassment. In the case of Gorbachev and others it could even lead to possible legal prosecution - however theoretical that possibility may be. In a certain sense, Gorbachev's half-truths may have complicated Putin's position considerably. The arrest of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet in London some years ago has significantly and permanently changed the legal landscape in international human rights cases. So has the issue of government compensation for victims of slave labor in Nazi Germany. It is clear that the concept of restitution can be transferred to Russia. In more than one sense, the truth about Raoul Wallenberg's fate could prove to be a watershed event for Russia. Putin so far has not touched the issue of Soviet era crimes. He has publicly condemned them, yet one of Putin's first acts after he came to power was to lay a wreath at Yuri Andropov's grave. The symbolic meaning of that gesture was understood by every Russian watching on TV.

## IV. DEEPER PROBLEMS

### 1. The Limits of the Eliasson Report

#### a. Question of motives and limited areas of inquiry

The Eliasson report states that due to time restrictions it had to leave out of its evaluation five relevant areas of inquiry, among them important questions about Raoul Wallenberg's activities in Budapest, those of the Swedish Legation, Swedish handling of witness testimonies in the case, as well as the fate of other Swedish citizens in Soviet captivity. The report provides some indication that the activities of the Swedish Legation - especially its representation of various foreign interests, its secret support of Allied Intelligence and unresolved questions about unofficial contacts with Hungarian and German Nazi authorities - and the Swedish Red Cross especially deserve closer scrutiny. The release of excerpts from the interrogation protocols of Hermann Grosheim-Krisko, a German/Russian businessman of dubious reputation, in 1991 offered confirmation that the Soviets suspected the Swedish Legation personnel of both pro Nazi and anti-Soviet activities.

Newly discovered documentation raises questions about the work as well as the attitude of the Swedish Legation personnel and the strains that this may have caused among the staff. According to numerous witnesses, tensions between Valdemar Langlet, the official Swedish Red Cross representative, and Wallenberg ran especially high. The two repeatedly clashed over funding and competency issues. This notion is confirmed by a memorandum from 1962, which recounts a conversation between Swedish professor Nanna Svartz and Hungarian physician Professor Ruszniak [sic]. Svartz writes that Ruszniak had known Wallenberg personally and that he, according to his account, had had frequent contact with him in 1944. Svartz reports that according to Ruszniak it was well known that in his own Legation

*"Wallenberg faced great difficulties from different quarters ... especially from Valdemar Langlet."*

Of considerable importance is the question of why Swedish officials never formally debriefed the returning Swedish Legation and Red Cross members. Interestingly enough, the Soviet protocols of interrogations conducted with the Swedish Legation staff in Hungary and Rumania also have never been presented. It would be of some interest to know how exactly Wallenberg's colleagues portrayed his activities for the Russians. Another intriguing question is why Lars Berg was allowed to leave when he, like Raoul Wallenberg, was clearly suspected of collaboration with the Germans.

Important questions also remain concerning the issue of Raoul Wallenberg's diplomatic status. What exactly was his status in the eyes of both the Swedish and Soviet governments, specifically at the time of Wallenberg's arrest in January 1945? Inexplicably, the Swedish Minister Ivar Danielsson handed over official authority to Mikhail Kutusov-Tolstoy, making him, a 'foreigner' [a White-Russian national], and not Raoul Wallenberg the official Swedish representative in Pest. To make matters worse, even though Raoul Wallenberg apparently had explicitly requested permission from his superior Danielsson to contact the Russian troops in Pest, Danielsson claimed as early as April 1945 that Wallenberg had left without seeking prior authorization for such a contact.

Raoul Wallenberg had been included in the official list handed over by Staffan Soederblom to Soviet authorities in December 1944, requesting Soviet protection of official Swedish Legation Staff. And when Danielsson authorized Wallenberg to contact Soviet troops he obviously asked him to do so in official [Swedish] capacity. Yet in the aftermath of Wallenberg's disappearance Danielsson repeatedly went out of his way to stress that Wallenberg had not been official Swedish Charge d'Affaire when the Soviets marched in to Budapest, clearly so, precisely at the most critical time, Raoul Wallenberg's status was left completely undefined. Goeran Rydberg goes so far to say that this uncertainty, both about Wallenberg's original responsibility or authority and the work that had been carried out, as well the lack of coordination with the rest of the Swedish Legation and with the authorities in Stockholm, now in January 1945 left the members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest open to "blackmail." If there were fears of Soviet aggression, Rydberg writes, it would conceivably have led to a wish to distance the Swedish personnel from Wallenberg's activities.

Oddly enough, it was Staffan Soederblom who in the first weeks after Wallenberg's disappearance not only recognized the danger of Wallenberg's situation but who urged the Swedish Foreign Office to take action on his behalf. The tone of his early communications with Stockholm is businesslike and shows traces of true concern. February 8, 1945:

*"Question whether Wallenberg .. - who is registered as Secretary of Legation ... ought to get instructions concerning his status."*

And later:

*"My thought .... was that Wallenberg is instructed to take up contact with the new Hungarian government ... in his capacity as official representative... Some information of this kind seems even more suitable since Wallenberg probably has not gotten the least sign of life from home."*

Soederblom's attitude toward Wallenberg, however, undergoes a visibly strong shift one day after his meeting with Ivar Danielsson and the other members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest on April 13, 1945 in Moscow. Whereas before Soederblom's tone had been sober

*- "Wallenberg disappeared since January 17 when he intended to depart by car" - ,*

on April 14, he now suddenly claims that

*"Wallenberg snuck on his own initiative over to the Russian lines,"*

implying strong personal disapproval and even inappropriateness of Wallenberg's behavior.

Why such sudden hostility towards Wallenberg? Why did Danielsson portray Wallenberg's behavior in such a negative light,

since he himself had given Wallenberg permission to contact the Russian troops? And why was this impression never corrected once the members of the Swedish Legation returned home to Sweden?

Other important questions remain. One day after the Soviet controlled Hungarian radio had announced on March 8, 1945 that Raoul Wallenberg had been killed on his way to Debrecen, Ivar Danielsson on 9 March requested a meeting with the highest Soviet representative in Hungary, General Pavlov to discuss issues concerning the conduct of the Swedish Legation during the previous months. No records of these discussions have been made available. On that same day, Margareta Bauer prepared a formal statement concerning the handling of Russian records at the Swedish Legation, Budapest. The issue appears to have been of some concern.

During the half-day stay in Moscow on 14 April, 1945, Danielsson and Soederblom conferred for some time in private. Topics covered, among other things, were the violence and destructive behavior of the Soviet occupation troops, the work of the Swedish Red Cross [and the problem of Valdemar Langlet's activities], the interests of Swedish businesses, Raoul Wallenberg's activities and disappearance, as well as the issue of valuables the Swedish Legation had stored on prominent Hungarians' behalf. This last point in particular Soederblom stresses repeatedly and he also several time emphatically urges Stockholm

*"to thoroughly analyze all information the Swedish Legation members have available."*  
before he takes further steps with Soviet authorities.

In an interview Per Anger recalls that a visibly agitated Soederblom, with a reference to the Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries, admonished him

*"Remember, when you get home to Sweden, not a bad word about the Russians."*

When Soederblom returned to Stockholm for consultations in November 1945, neither he nor Ivar Danielsson met with Raoul Wallenberg's parents Maj and Fredrik von Dardel, despite their repeated requests. Soederblom made it clear that his conclusion that Raoul Wallenberg had died was based on information he had received from the returning members of the Swedish Legation, Budapest.

The issue of what exactly transpired in Budapest, during and immediately after the humanitarian mission, the personal attitude of the Swedish Legation members towards Raoul Wallenberg and the information they provided to the Russians need to be examined in depth. Equally critical is it to determine the possible motives behind the Swedish government's inclination to accept Raoul Wallenberg's death and who or what considerations may have influenced that decision. Even when word came in the fall of 1945 from a well-placed Hungarian source - the Hungarian National Bank President Takaczky who served at the will of the Soviet occupation power - that Wallenberg had been arrested by Soviet forces, the Foreign Office apparently already had accepted the inevitability of Wallenberg's demise and conveyed this conviction to U.S. officials. The last line of a telegram from the State Department, addressed to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and signed by the U.S. Undersecretary of State, Dean Acheson, explains that

*"the [Swedish] FONOFF [Foreign Office] feels that even if the info is true [about Wallenberg's arrest], the Soviets will never produce Wallenberg alive."*

Aside from the understandable limitations of the scope of its research and for all its detail, the Eliasson Report is quiet on several other critical points. One is not only the possible motives behind Swedish behavior, but also the larger implications of this behavior. For example, one should ask what the consequences for the Raoul Wallenberg case would have been, if certain high-ranking members of the Foreign Office sympathized with the Soviet Union, or perhaps even did the Soviets' bidding. Surely, there would have been very little incentive to drive the search for Raoul Wallenberg energetically. What about the curious passivity of the Wallenberg family? Did it set the tone for UD's actions in the case? And what would Raoul Wallenberg have reported on his return to Sweden? That the Russians had ample reasons to be concerned about releasing Wallenberg is clear, but were there also problematic issues resulting from Swedish activities - such as Wallenberg business, for example, or the activities of the Swedish Legation/Red Cross in terms of representation of foreign interests and/or ties to various intelligence circles - that can account for the general lack of enthusiasm in Sweden to actively pursue his return? These potential problems of the past would cast a long shadow, reaching well into the present.

#### **b. Need for a more specific analysis of the historical context**

Closely related to this is the second problem: The Commission Report evaluates the Wallenberg case primarily against the larger background of Swedish-Soviet relations, meaning Sweden's general security and economic policy considerations of the Cold War period. The Eliasson Report, however does not focus on the ebb and flow of events within this larger framework or how specific events affected the handling of Wallenberg case as such. This is a critical omission, since the Wallenberg case -

as the Commission recognizes but does not outline in detail - did not take place in isolation. Two main aspects characterized Sweden's behavior: Fear of its neighbor to the East and need for accommodation. These were met by a policy that combined a strategy of deterrence - by making it clear that in case of an attack Sweden would hold out long enough until it received help from Western powers - and "*bridge building*" between the superpowers, which later turned into a policy of assuring the Soviet Union of Sweden's commitment to neutrality. By focusing purely on the larger picture, however, the Eliasson Commission neglects the subtlety of the situation.

A mere month after the Gromyko memorandum, on 5 March, 1957 came the formal Soviet complaint over years of Swedish espionage [in conjunction with American and British efforts] in the Baltic countries. Despite its clear guilt, Sweden denied all knowledge. Aside from the obvious intention of wishing to discredit Sweden, the timing of the revelation that the Soviets had penetrated the Allied/Swedish network for the past seven years raised several questions. Rolf Sohlman, the Swedish Ambassador in Moscow suggested that "*as odd as it may appear*" there were in fact signs that the Soviet action

*"was designed as a gesture to Sweden to improve relations."*

In light of a number of internal and external pressures, like the worldwide condemnation the Soviets had received for the brutal squashing of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, there were strong signs that overall Soviet policy was designed to reach out to Sweden in the hope that it would continue its official Neutrality Policy.

Leaving aside for a moment the question whether or not Sohlman's assessment of the Soviet action is valid, it is clear that both Sohlman and Uden at this moment define Raoul Wallenberg and the other arrested Swedish agents as the cost Sweden has to incur for detente and not as the price it could possibly exact from the Soviets in return for Swedish assurances of continued adherence to its Neutrality position.

In this connection, Soviet attempts from 1956-57 to conduct unofficial talks in the Raoul Wallenberg case between the Finnish diplomat Ake Frey and Soviet official Pavel Erzine and later Viktor Vladimirov also deserve further scrutiny. During these discussions the Swedes not only for the first time received Soviet confirmation [although unofficially] that Wallenberg had indeed been held prisoner in the Soviet Union, they also received a hint that Wallenberg's background was of some interest to the Russians. On 20 December, 1956, towards the end of a two-year exchange, Vladimirov asks Ake Frey whether it would be possible to discuss "*off the record*" a Russian draft answer before the Soviets present the official answer in the Wallenberg case. Vladimirov adds somewhat cryptically that

*"humanitarian aspects do not have much meaning in Moscow."*

That Wallenberg belonged to a well known family was "*more to the point.*"

However, on 18 January, 1957 the head of the Swedish Foreign Ministry's Political Department at the time, Sverker Astroem, informs Frey that from the Swedish side it would hardly be possible to conduct secret discussions. Eighteen days later, on 6 February, 1957, the Soviets Deputy Foreign Minister presents the Soviet claim that Wallenberg had died in 1947.

Some years later Ake Frey explained that in his mind the negotiations in 1955-57 had been serious but that the Chief of the Political Department of the Finnish Foreign Ministry, Enckell, had suddenly ordered him to break off contact. Enckell apparently acted in close coordination with the Swedish Foreign Ministry. The Frey-Vladimirov contacts were conducted parallel to official preparations of the Gromyko memorandum. In an interview with the Swedish-Russian Working Group Viktor Vladimirov explained that the Soviet leadership wanted to find out exactly what information the Swedish government possessed in 1956.

If Molotov and Serov had clear information about Raoul Wallenberg's death in 1947, such efforts would seem somewhat excessive, especially since the Soviet side should have had a fairly clear idea about the state of Swedish knowledge in the Wallenberg affair from a variety of sources. It is possible that the discussions with Sweden served purely as a distraction and delay tactic before the official Soviet response was to be presented. Ake Frey repeatedly reported his impression that at the time of the discussions Raoul Wallenberg appeared to be dead. Nevertheless, it should be of some interest to determine how much the Gromyko Memorandum is a reflection of the failure of these Russian contacts. In other words, it will have to be determined if it would have been possible to gain further concessions from the Russians in light of their wish for improved relations with Sweden than were reached during those years.

Instead of pursuing the problem from all possible angles, Swedish officials slowly stripped the Raoul Wallenberg case of all relevant complexities and interrelated aspects. In fact, Sweden chose to handle all major Cold War cases - such as the disappearance of a DC-3 spy plane with a eight-men crew in 1952 over the Baltic Sea or the arrest as a Russian spy of Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Wennerstroem in 1963 - in perfect isolation from each other. Stig Wennerstroem operated as a Russian agent for almost two decades and he apparently did not act alone. His betrayal of the DC-3 cost the lives of nine men, yet he has been allowed to live out his life in comfort and security in his own country. If he had help, as has been alleged, those who supported him were most likely just as well positioned in Swedish society as Wennerstroem himself. The full impact of his activities and those of his potential helpers on the Swedish government's handling of various Cold War issues

remains essentially unexplored.

The important question is: Were these cases handled separately to increase chances of a resolution or mainly to prevent "cross contamination," to avoid one issue dredging up related problems in another case? Even when the Russians tried to link them, as happened on at least one occasion in the Wallenberg and Wennerstroem case, Swedish officials did not react.

### c. Focus only on early years

The third problem is that, as already mentioned earlier, the Eliasson Report focuses on the early events in the Raoul Wallenberg case. It is vital that the behavior in later years be subjected to the same scrutiny. It has to be determined how detrimental Swedish Minister Staffan Soederblom's behavior in 1945/46 really was. In other words, one cannot simply assume that there was no chance to rescue Raoul Wallenberg after 1947. The question posed by the Eliasson Commission for the time 1945-47 - What did Swedish officials really know and when did they know it? - is just as relevant for the following decades. Were Swedish officials truly safeguarding "a higher good" [viktigare vaerden], that is the national security of the many, as Oesten Unden claimed in 1957, or were they primarily protecting the special interests of a few? Why, for example, are there essentially no records from the Swedish Foreign Intelligence Service in this case? Even if it was beyond its scope to provide operational advice or intelligence, one would expect it to have provided some type of evaluation in the question. If not, then this lack of referral or exchange between Swedish agencies raises questions about how seriously the case was pursued in later years.

An archivist once told me that

*"the problem with the Wallenberg case in Russia is that everything is closed; and in Sweden, that everything is open."*

He was making an oblique reference to Sweden's 'principle of openness' [Offentlighetsprinzipen] which makes it very difficult to keep information secret by placing very severe restrictions on both the length of time and the reasons for which documents may be classified. This has had the unintended effect that officials who may feel very strongly that certain documents should stay secret, see no other option but to take them out of circulation. There are several instances, where former officials handed back documentation they had removed from Swedish archives during their service. So, aside from unknown diaries and memoirs one cannot discount that here and there additional information remains locked away in private attics or basements.

### d. No systematic analysis

Out of this grows the fourth problem, namely that the Eliasson Commission does not thoroughly examine how much attitudes and assumptions guided Swedish behavior, especially in later years. Many officials were inclined to believe and not afraid to say so in private conversations that Raoul Wallenberg had died in 1947 and that any further search was futile. Most officials met the continued insistence of Wallenberg's relatives to pursue the truth with thinly veiled impatience and downright irritation. Far from a source of pride, for many officials the case became simply a cause for embarrassment. Quite a few let this personal belief influence their official handling of the case. This tendency was so strong that it persisted even when new information was presented. As a result, important details were lost or simply ignored. Ambassador Krister Wickman's statement in 1972 in Vienna summarized official UD policy for that time:

*"For us, the Wallenberg case is a closed chapter."*

Subconsciously or intentionally - nowhere did assumptions have such a devastating effect as in the handling of witness testimonies. The report states that an effective system of evaluation for testimonies has been in place since 1951 [when Otto Danielsson joined the case]. This is simply not true. One just has to read through the UD materials to ascertain that witness interviews were far from uniform or systematic. Neither was analysis or follow-up of the gathered information. Instead both were often haphazard and incomplete. There are countless examples of testimonies whose most critical points were not adequately followed up despite compelling reasons to pursue the leads they provided. In many cases the witnesses themselves were disparaged. It should be stressed that the problem was never with the rank and file. Many worked diligently for years to record and pursue any trace of information about Raoul Wallenberg. The problem is that Sweden's present-day view and political definition of the Raoul Wallenberg problem is in its essence not very different from Oesten Unden's definition of

#### e. Consequences of the failure to conduct a systematic analysis

Most importantly, officials failed to acknowledge the larger complexities of the problems posed by the Wallenberg inquiry. Instead of systematically registering, analyzing and crosschecking all details, Swedish officials often handled each witness testimony on its own terms. As a result, they routinely ignored statements which did not fit their expectations. For example, no less than 38 individuals reported having contact or hearing of Raoul Wallenberg in Lubianka or Lefortovo prison in the years after 1947. Many of these testimonies were dismissed outright because it was assumed that Raoul Wallenberg died in July 1947 and that the accounts echoed Wallenberg's earlier stay in these prisons. Or it was believed that the prisoner in question was simply another Swede. There were in fact several hundred of them held captive in the Soviet Union through the years.

Not all of these men have been fully identified. In the case of Swedish espionage missions to the Baltic countries in the late 1940's it is not known how many Swedes or individuals working in official Swedish capacity ended up in Soviet captivity. Questions also persist as to missing individuals from Swedish Red Cross or other missions in Eastern Europe after WWII. For almost sixty years the Swedish government has not had a comprehensive list/database of all Swedish citizens and other Scandinavians held in Soviet captivity - it is finally now in the process of constructing one.

Swedish nationals were even reportedly held in Vladimir prison. A witness stated that in the early 1950's he met a Swedish man named "Eriksson" who, together with two colleagues, had been officially associated with the Red Cross in Eastern Europe in the mid 1940's. A similar encounter with a "*Swedish diplomat*" arrested in Eastern Europe in 1945 was related by German prisoner of war, Theodor von Dufving. Based on their very similar case profile, these men could have easily been mistaken for Raoul Wallenberg throughout Soviet camps and prisons. Establishing their full identity and formal tracking when and where these men were encountered, on the other hand, would have made the evaluation of witness testimonies and with that the whole Raoul Wallenberg inquiry much more efficient. Instead, confusion was allowed to reign. What resulted was the wholesale dismissal of testimonies as "unreliable" which might have yielded very useful information, if a larger framework of analysis had been employed.

A sophisticated computer study by American researchers Marvin Makinen and Ari Kaplan shows how important a systematic analysis of witness testimonies is. If Raoul Wallenberg did survive after 1947, there are only a few places where he could have been held as a prisoner, like for example Vladimir prison. Thanks to highly specialized software which enabled them to recreate the full occupancy of each prison cell in various years, Makinen and Kaplan were able to identify those cells which presumably held strictly isolated prisoners at particular times. A cell will appear "empty" if the prisoner's registration card has been removed and his name can therefore not be entered into the database. Makinen and Kaplan's analysis coincides in a number of cases with testimonies from witnesses who report hearing of Wallenberg in Vladimir. One of the witnesses even identified Raoul Wallenberg's photograph. The Russian side has to now show who - if not Raoul Wallenberg - these prisoners were.

The studies by Makinen/Kaplan and Mesinai also underscore the importance of so called "secondary" documentation such as transport records and medical files where entries are much harder to eradicate. Contrary to Russian claims, these files have not been thoroughly studied. The advantage of such research is that it leads to concrete questions which the Russian side can and will have to answer.

Unfortunately, the tendency to judge new information in accordance with old assumptions is alive and well. Official Swedish efforts to follow up these findings have been excruciatingly slow. The prisoners may not have been Raoul Wallenberg but the matter deserves to be checked since the Makinen/Kaplan/Mesinai results are among the most concrete leads to emerge in over fifty years of research. The Foreign Office spent approximately \$200,000 on the Makinen/Kaplan project alone. It knew in advance that the study would yield a certain set of questions, questions about seemingly "empty" cells and who may have occupied them. That meaningful follow-up was possible was one of the underlying premises of the research. Yet virtually nothing has been done to bring about Phase 2 [identification of isolated prisoners] of the project. Concrete questions emerge, but they are not pursued because no one pushes hard enough for answers. As a result, focus gets diverted back to more general research.

## 2. Current Definitions

### a. Sweden Today

One who is not surprised by these problems is British historian Tsering Shakya who has encountered similar problems in his research of the complex history of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. His conclusion is that people in general prefer simple solutions:

*"...[People] simply don't want complexities to interfere with their firmly held beliefs."*

And while the reduction of complex events may seem harmless, it in fact is not. As Shakya sees it, the failure to pay attention to details leads directly to a more serious problem, what he calls *"the denial of history,"*

*"a process,"* he says, *"which necessarily entails the negation of responsibility."*

In short, the willingness or unwillingness to address the details of a problem says a lot about the intentions of the investigator. And this has been the crux of the problem for both Sweden and Russia from the very beginning of the Wallenberg case.

Many officials in the Swedish Foreign Ministry feel strongly that they have not received adequate credit for their efforts. And this is partially true. Most governments, the United States foremost, did far less than Sweden for their own countrymen missing abroad, most notably the American POWs missing from the Vietnam and Korea conflicts. But Sweden continues to have a hard time convincing anyone that it is pursuing the Wallenberg question because it really wants to and not because it feels it has to.

A major role of the Swedish Foreign Office is to both guard and define Swedish national interests. As a result, Foreign Ministry officials in charge of the Wallenberg case were facing a task which on several levels posed a serious conflict of interests. In other words, the Swedish-Russian Working Group in its basic set-up was clearly not the best vehicle to handle the assigned task of clarifying Raoul Wallenberg's fate. The Group was accountable only to itself, since there was no independent oversight outside of the Swedish Foreign Ministry. More importantly, the overall approach was once again too reactive, too ponderous, too "proper" to bring about the desired result. The lessons are that diplomats should be allowed to do what they do best - mediate and negotiate. The current state of affairs, with researchers carrying out the research while diplomats smooth the way with Russian authorities is a much more productive arrangement.

Nevertheless, the overall trend is definitely positive, and the Eliasson Commission is only one example. In January 2001 Swedish Prime Minister Goeran Persson took the unprecedented step of formally apologizing to Raoul Wallenberg's family for the country's early handling of his case. Persson is representative of a new generation and a new thinking in Sweden and in that role he has accomplished a great deal. The Swedish government is the major sponsor of its highly regarded "Living History" [Levande Historia] Project which emphasizes the teaching of history in Swedish schools, with a particular emphasis on the history of the Holocaust. "Living History" supports a host of associated projects designed to build tolerance and reduce prejudice in Sweden's increasingly multicultural society. Since 1999 Sweden has sponsored and hosted three international conferences devoted to Holocaust and Genocide studies and it has set aside official research funding for a range of historical investigations, including the Raoul Wallenberg case.

Goeran Persson's apology for Sweden's handling of the Wallenberg case was clearly heartfelt. Yet, it may have also been triggered at least in part by tactical considerations, if not in Persson's mind, then in the minds of some of his advisors. Persson for some reason did not make his apology to Raoul Wallenberg's family in person, but conveyed it instead by telephone, even though both of Wallenberg's siblings were in Stockholm at the time. And while the work of the Eliasson Commission is both welcome and impressive, it stops far short of a complete analysis of the Wallenberg problem. In fact, in some areas it has barely begun to scratch the surface. Most importantly, despite the Commission's strong condemnation of the Russian conduct in the Wallenberg investigation, neither the Swedish Foreign Ministry nor the Prime Minister have forcefully insisted on full access to the withheld documentation.

### b. The Neutrality Dilemma



Despite the progress in recent years, there are other signs that the old pragmatist attitude remains firmly in place in Sweden. How else to explain the fact that the selection of Norwegian Historian Hans Fredrik Dahl in 2001 as a member of the Eliasson Commission did not raise any eyebrows or questions whatsoever, either from the Swedish government, the press or his fellow historians? Dahl was a vocal defender of British historian David Irving in 1996, arguing for Irving's right to be heard as "a competent historian." He stuck to his position even when Irving was convicted in a British court for denial of the Holocaust in March 2000. Only when the historian Richard J. Evans published a highly critical evaluation of Irving's work in the aftermath of the trial, did Dahl change his position. On 13 July 2001, he publicly apologized in a column in the Norwegian daily 'Dagbladet.'

It is a legitimate question whether Dahl's selection was appropriate given the topic of research - the fate of one of the few heroic public figures of the Holocaust. Regardless of the final assessment - Dahl by all accounts provided an interesting analysis of the media's role in the Raoul Wallenberg case - this issue should have prompted a lively discussion in Sweden. Dahl is a representative of the so-called postmodern, 'objectivist' approach to historical review whose proponents argue for an interpretation of history based purely on what they consider to be historical facts. Consequently, this view assigns only a limited role to moral criteria in the evaluation of historical events. This view has gained more prominence in recent years, as a reaction to what many historians consider an exaggerated emphasis on moral questions in historical analysis.

Interestingly, the current Swedish neutrality debate runs very much in this vein. In the question over 'legality' vs 'morality' of Sweden's neutrality policy during WWII a rather popular compromise position has appeared that strongly echoes the objectivist creed. This position acknowledges Sweden's missteps early in the war, but insists that these were fully atoned for later on by the Swedish government's support for various humanitarian actions, like the 'White Busses' of Count Bernadotte and Raoul Wallenberg's humanitarian mission. Former Ambassador Krister Wahlbaeck, the current head of the Reference Group on Wallenberg Research is a proponent of this view:

*"... Was this humanitarian role sufficient to compensate for the moral ambiguities inherent in a position of neutrality during World War II? Yes, in my view it was."*

In this so-called standard interpretation of Swedish neutrality Raoul Wallenberg becomes representative of larger Swedish attitudes, not the exception to the rule that he appears to have been. Others, like Swedish journalist Niklas Ekdal, strongly reject Wahlbaeck's interpretation:

*"Sweden's concessions to Germany in World War II were so troubling, that they had to be balanced by mythology."*

To paraphrase Paul Levine who shares some of Ekdal's concerns: What is troubling is not simply the fact that Sweden maintained economic relations with Nazi Germany - such a blanket condemnation does not do justice to the complex reality Sweden faced in WWII. What is of concern is that by providing critical war materials, such as ballbearings, and other assistance - as in permitting German troop transfers through Swedish territory in 1941 or aiding the German takeover of the Norwegian firm Norsk Hydro, - Sweden willfully accepted the risk and perhaps even strengthened the possibility of a German victory. Sweden's position is especially questionable after 1942, when the Germany's decisive defeat at Stalingrad diminished the threat of an invasion and when incontrovertible evidence of masskillings of Jews emerged.

There are also other, associated dangers with this position: By focusing attention predominantly on the bright spots in Swedish behavior, the standard view on neutrality draws a benevolent veil over past deeds, including war profiteering, the harboring of war criminals, the ready accommodation of various questionable economic and political alliances which covered the full ideological spectrum from left to right. In doing so, it discourages a thorough inquiry into the causes of such actions and with it prevents the learning from history. In short, no particularly strong impetus to solve the deeper questions of thorny issues like the Raoul Wallenberg case follows.

The unique political and economic conditions of the Cold War have enabled Sweden to keep the veil tightly shut around the Wallenberg question. The U.S., the Wallenberg Family and most of all Russia had their respective reasons not to lift it. Swedish neutrality and the basic characteristics of the capitalist economy - the exchange of goods and services is, after all, primarily driven by utility, not by moral or ideological considerations - further enhanced this fact. In short, for all involved the gains made possible by neutrality outweighed any of the much smaller benefits that could have been potentially incurred by taking action to clarify Raoul Wallenberg's fate.

Just a few months ago, in April 2004, the editors of the respected Stockholm daily *Svenska Dagbladet* seized upon this problem when they issued a sharp critique of the Swedish government's past and current failures in the DC-3 investigation. Their main criticism focused on the fact that Sweden has continually failed in its responsibility to those who served on the country's behalf and who were lost in the course of this service, all because Sweden had to maintain the illusion of its neutrality. In the case of the DC-3, Swedish officials quickly declared the crew dead, then for years deceived the public about the true nature of the plane's mission. Only in the early 1990s the government acknowledged that the DC-3 had been involved in intelligence gathering activities.

"Lie was added to lie"

the editors write and go on to call some of today's Swedish government representatives to task for clinging to the

*"myth of neutrality policy in which the DC-3 should not exist. ...It can be suspected that the government wants to forget the DC-3 and its crew. In the same way as in the Raoul Wallenberg case one wants to leave the problem behind and move on."*

With the declining relevance of neutrality following the break-up of the Soviet Union, Sweden has been quick to carve out a new role for itself. It now defines itself as the primary facilitator of European integration. Sweden has focused its efforts on Russia and Russia in turn relies heavily on Sweden to plead its cause with its European neighbors. For the sake of this mutual agenda, old and new conflicts have been pushed into the background, such as human rights violation in Chechnya and the increasing curtailing of civil liberties in Russian society. As both sides realize, and have realized for sixty years: While the truth ultimately cannot be denied, it can surely be delayed. The rationale is simple: Who knows what the world will look like in ten, fifteen, twenty years from now?

The full facts about the Raoul Wallenberg and other cases may by then barely cause a ripple. But the Wallenberg case was never just about the fate of one man. That would be an insult to the millions of people who perished or who languish today in the similar conditions. The threads of the Wallenberg case reach deep into the recesses of the past and run together at the most critical junctures of post war politics. Illuminating these hidden connections and motivations will be an essential task if one wants to draw any meaningful lessons from this tragedy. The question of how one balances the rights of the individual vs. the interests of the state is as current today as it ever was. For this debate alone historic truth is critical and a democratic society has to vigorously insist on full disclosure. One can only hope that this will be one of the lasting legacies of this case.

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### Archive List and Abbreviations

|        |                                                                                                                                                                                             |
|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ECR    | Eliasson Commission Report                                                                                                                                                                  |
| DOJ    | U.S. Department of Justice                                                                                                                                                                  |
| FSB    | Federal Security Service [Russia], since 1995                                                                                                                                               |
| GARF   | Russian State Archive of the Russian Federation. Moscow, Russia.                                                                                                                            |
| KGB    | Committee for State Security                                                                                                                                                                |
| MGB    | Ministry for State Security                                                                                                                                                                 |
| MID    | Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive. Moscow, Russia.                                                                                                                                |
| MVD    | Ministry of the Interior                                                                                                                                                                    |
| NARA   | National Archives and Records Administration. College Park, Maryland USA.                                                                                                                   |
| PRO    | Public Records Office, London, England.                                                                                                                                                     |
| PRV    | Patent -och Registreringsverket. Patent and Trademark Office. Sundsvall, Sweden.                                                                                                            |
| RA     | Riksarkivet. National Archives. Stockholm, Sweden.                                                                                                                                          |
| RWD    | Raoul Wallenberg Dossier in the Swedish Foreign Ministry Archive                                                                                                                            |
| SAEPO  | Säkerhetspolisen Arkiv. Archives of the Swedish Security Police. Stockholm, Sweden.                                                                                                         |
| SEHFBF | Stiftelsen för Ekonomisk Historisk Forskning inom Bank och Företagande. The Foundation for Economic History Research within Banking and Enterprise. [Wallenberg Archive.] Stockholm, Sweden |
| SVR    | Foreign Intelligence Service [Russia]                                                                                                                                                       |
| SWR    | Swedish Working Group Report, January 2001                                                                                                                                                  |

### ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Articles of Incorporation of Special Metall Foereningen, the company Raoul Wallenberg founded with Erich Philippi in September 1939 [to illustrate some of Raoul Wallenberg's activities before 1944]
2. Picture of Carl-Fredrik Palmstierna
3. P.M. by William Owen from April 1954
4. Picture of Sverker Astroem
5. Picture of Sven Salen and Jacob Wallenberg
6. Picture of R. Taylor Cole, Carl Bonde and or Helmut Ternberg
7. Raoul Wallenberg's invitation list to a cocktail party at his apartment on 2 December, 1943.
8. U.S. State Department internal e-mail message from February 7, 1992
9. Telegram from SKF headquarters in Joenskoeping to SKF Budapest via Swedish Foreign Office, ordering sale of ballbearing inventory to Germany, September 1944.
10. Letter from Erik Bjoerkman to Swedish Foreign Office, informing officials of Veessenmayer's offer to allow a number of Jews to leave Budapest in exchange for a number of trade goods between Hungary and Sweden, August 1944.
11. Internal report from SAEPO detailing attempts by Jacob Wallenberg to contact Soviet officials via business contacts in Eastern Europe to inquire about Raoul Wallenberg, 1954.
12. Blacked out register entries from Lubianka prison detailing possessions of prisoners. Entries show that aside from Raoul Wallenberg, names of Sandor Katona and Pietro Aladjani-Aladjani were also censored. 1947
13. Pictures of Molotov, Selivanovsky or Mikoyan
14. Letter by Gribanov to KGB, detailing letter by Shiryagin. 1956
15. Picture of Rolf Sohlman, Ake Frey and Pavel Erzine
16. Cell plan of Vladimir prison and/or picture of Larina.
17. Picture of Goeran Persson
18. Poem by Lars Berg, written after the members of the Swedish Legation Budapest returned home to Stockholm in April 1945.

Copies of all documents mentioned in the text are available by request.

Genève 7 september 2004

(EC)

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Raoul Wallenberg - Diskussioner i Budapest

Brevsamtitt  
2004-09-16

Bröder,

(Amb Harald Hamrin, UD/EC)

Tack för brev av den 30 augusti.  
Jag har för avsikt att komma till  
Budapest den 26 september, eftersom  
jag tror att diskussionerna där kan bli  
intressanta.

Jag förutsätter emellertid att UD  
står för mina kostnader för resa och  
uppehälle och ber dig kontrollera att  
så är fallet.

Med vänlig hälsning

Guy Dardel

(Prof Guy von Dardel, Genève)

661



Wilhelm Agrell  
<Wilhelm.Agrell@fpi.lu.se>

2004-09-09 21:08

Till: [goran.rydeberg@foreign.ministry.se](mailto:goran.rydeberg@foreign.ministry.se)  
Kopia:  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: amerikanska och brittiska dokument

Göran,

Jag återkommer till det ärende som jag hemsökte Dig för i våras strax innan jag reste till Washington för att gå igenom valda delar av OSS-arkivet. Det handlar alltså om de dokument som UD fått från amerikanska och brittiska myndigheter och som Wallenberg-utredningen haft tillgång till och i stora stycken citerar eller refererar till. Ett stort kvarstående problem är att jag inte kunde återfinna en stor del av dokumenten i det material som togs (eller snarare rullades) upp ur arkivet. Rent konkret handlar detta i första hand om vissa dokument ur War Refugee Boards arkiv. På sid 104 i utredningen omnämns således rapporten "Operations of the War refugee Board from Sweden" från 1944 med källhänvisningen P 2 EuI 17/2 1994. En rad andra WRB-dokument har samma källangivelse, men på sid 122 nämns dokumentet "Summary of steps taken by the war Refugee Board with respect to the jews of Hungary" med akthänvisning P 2 EuI, 15/4 1998:4. Till detta kommer brittiska FO-dokument som bla. har akthänvisningen P 2 EuI, 3/1 1997.

Jag har kontrollerat med Riksarkivet men enligt deras arkivförteckning förefaller det inte som om detta amerikanska och brittiska material finns i utredningens arkiv. Men någonstans måste ju rimligen dokumenten finnas. Har Du möjlighet att hjälpa mig med att få klarhet i detta? Det vore till stor hjälp.

med bästa hälsningar

Wilhelm

Wilhelm Agrell  
Forskningspolitiska institutet (FPI)  
Ideon Alfa 1, Scheelevägen 15 B, SE-223 63 Lund  
Tel: 046-222 4618 , Fax: 046-14 69 86  
E-post: [Wilhelm.Agrell@fpi.lu.se](mailto:Wilhelm.Agrell@fpi.lu.se)

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ARK

Besvarat via e-post ✓

04-09-10 samt med  
separat bilaga från  
Wallenberg-dossiererna  
per post

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2004/47450

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ARK

Göran Rydeberg

Till: Wilhelm Agrell <Wilhelm.Agrell@fpi.lu.se>

2004-09-10 14:31

Kopia:

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Fax till:

Ärende: Ang: amerikanska och brittiska dokument

Wilhelm,

Jag har gjort en genomgång av materialet och passar på att postledes översända det odaterade (avsänt 9 okt 1944) och osignerade dokumentet "Summary of steps taken by the war Refugee Board with respect to the jews of Hungary" P 2 EuI, 15/4 1998:4. I övrigt har jag inte funnit de efterfrågade dokumenten, men noterar att det som bilagor finns en mycket stor mängd handlingar som bilagor översända från USA i februari 1994. Likaså finns som bilagor vid UD ett antal dokument som departementet erhöll i början av januari 1997. Jag kan naturligtvis inte garantera att just de efterfrågade handlingarna återfinns här, men det ska definitivt finnas sådana möjligheter.

Trevlig helg!

Göran

Svar till frågan  
från 04-09-09 ✓  
Svar expat via  
e-post  
/cyz



REGERINGSKANSLIET

ARKIV EX 04/49367  
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2004-09-16

(EC)

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Östeuropa och Centralasien  
Ambassadör Harald Hamrin  
Telefon 08-405 33 43  
E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

Professor Guy von Dardel  
6 A Chemin Adolph Pasteur  
CH-1209 Genève  
SCHWEIZ

Raoul Wallenberg

Broder!

Tack för brev av den 7 september!

Jag vill med detta bekräfta att UD betalar Din flygbiljett Genève-Budapest. Dock är vi tacksamma om Du kommer till Budapest redan på lördagen, då flygkostnaderna i det fallet blir betydligt lägre.

Första programpunkt är f.ö. redan söndag e.m. kl. 15.30. Då startar bussrundturen till "svenskplatserna" i Budapest från Raoul Wallenberg Guest House. Rundturen följs av middag på Collegium Budapest (18.30) och visning av en ännu inte färdig arbetskopia av en kommande TV-film om Raoul Wallenberg (20.00-21.30).

Måndag morgon: först avtäckning av en minnesplakett i den nya RW-skolan (9.15), därefter ceremoni i Stadshuset (11.00), lunch i Stadshuset (12.00) och öppnande av seminariet (13.00). Det slutgiltiga seminarieprogrammet är ännu inte klart, varför jag inte nu kan sända Dig det.

Rum finns reserverat för Dig på Raoul Wallenberg Guest House, där de svenska deltagarna i symposiet kommer att bo. Var vänlig meddela Din ankomsttid till Tuende Szabolcs på Collegium Budapest ([tunde@colbud.hu](mailto:tunde@colbud.hu) eller tel. +36 1 224 8315) så att vaktmästaren kan vara på plats och öppna. Adress till RW Guest House: Szabó Ilonka 7 på Buda-sidan.

Med bästa hälsningar

Harald Hamrin

Harald Hamrin

20/9

Regar, rik 23/9-04  
Geneve 19 okt. 2004  
19 sept

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(EC)

RW - Symposium i Budapest 26/9

Broder, (Harald Hamrin)

Tyvärr är jag förhindrad att  
komma till symposiet i Budapest  
den 26 september 2004.

Tack för inbjudan!

Med vänlig hälsning

Guy van Dorstel

Guy van Dorstel  
Geneve

[a.g.]  
VH

Göran Rydeberg

2004-10-06 10:02

Till: Wilhelm Agrell <Wilhelm.Agrell@fpi.lu.se>  
Kopia: goran.rydeberg@foreign.ministry.se  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: (Ang: tack för senast)

Wilhelm,

Jag har gått igenom P2 Eu1-dossieren volymnr 144 och funnit att dokumentet från 1996-10-21 innehåller all annan korrespondens (det från 11-05 innehåller vad jag anser inget av större intresse).

Här tror jag att Du finner allt kring Knights undersökningar.

MVH

Göran

Wilhelm Agrell <Wilhelm.Agrell@fpi.lu.se>

Wilhelm Agrell  
<Wilhelm.Agrell@fpi.lu.se>

2004-10-04 10:44

Till: goran.rydeberg@foreign.ministry.se  
Kopia:  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: (tack för senast)

INK. UTRIKESDEP.  
DNR 2004/52708  
2004-10-05  
04  
Avd. P 2 Maj Eu 1

Göran,

Tack för senast. Mitt besöket på UD blev mer framgångsrikt än vad det först såg ut. På dokumentationscentret suckade de och drog fram en vagn med pärmar av vilka den första visade sig innehålla just de handlingar jag efterfrågat från Foreign Office. Det är en skrivelse från Dag Hartelius i London 1997-01-03 ink UD 97-01-09. I denna skrivelse hänvisas dock till en genomgång av material i brittiska arkiv som genomförts av en viss Robin Knight och som förmodligen kommunicerats tidigare. I ingressen till brevet från Londonambassaden nämns ett antal tidigare skrivelser av vilka det finns skäl att tro att någon kan innehålla uppgifter om Knights genomgång (och ev. rapporten som sådan i bilaga). Referensen till tidigare korrespondens lyder som följande: Skr 139A 1995-08-25, hbr Hartelius-Magnusson 1996-05-09, hbr Nilsson-Hallqvist 1996-10-21 och 1996-11-05 samt elpost Magnusson-Hartelius 1996-12-19.

Har Du möjlighet att vid tillfälle kolla dessa skrivelser och vilken av dem som nämner eller innehåller en rapport om Knightleys arkivgenomgång?

med bästa hälsningar

Wilhelm

Wilhelm Agrell  
Forskningspolitiska institutet (FPI)  
Ideon Alfa 1, Scheelevägen 15 B, SE-223 63 Lund  
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REGERINGSKANSLIET

2004-12-01

**Utrikesdepartementet**

*Enheten för Östeuropa och Centralasien  
Ambassador Harald Hamrin  
Telefon +46-(0)8-405 3343  
E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se*

Mr. Max Grunberg  
Raoul Wallenberg Honorary Citizen  
Committee  
P.O.Box 38  
Ra'anana 43100  
Israel

Dear Mr. Grunberg,

thank you for your kind letter of November 7, 2004.

In your letter you raise several questions and I shall try to respond to them to the best of my ability. But let me say, at the outset, that it seems to me that there is some misunderstanding between us as to what you and we – i.e. The Raoul Wallenberg Honorary Citizen Committee and the Swedish Foreign Ministry or the Swedish Government - can and should do.

As far as the Missing In Action Appeal is concerned we have contributed to the financing of the Appeal and I have also informed you that we are prepared, through our Embassies, to facilitate the spreading of information about the Appeal. We would, however, not want to involve other parties, such as the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the handling of the Appeal by, as you write in your letter, coordinating the distribution of the Appeal between the Israeli Foreign Ministry, the Swedish Foreign Ministry and your Committee. The Appeal remains your responsibility.

Regarding the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the "disappearance" of Raoul Wallenberg we are planning a similar ceremony in January of next year as the one that was held in 1995. Exactly what kind of a ceremony this will be is still the subject of discussion within the Swedish Government offices and with the Wallenberg family. I shall be happy to keep you informed of the outcome of these discussions. In any case, we are thinking of a solemn ceremony worthy of the work done by Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest. I

*Copy. 1/12-04 m. flyg*

2004-1

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
do not think that this would be an appropriate occasion for launching the Appeal.

As to your question about the nomination procedure for the Illis Quorum medal, there is no formal nomination procedure at all. The initiative as a matter of fact always comes from the Government itself or from an individual member of the Cabinet.

Finally, concerning the establishment of a Raoul Wallenberg Heritage Center, it goes without saying that the Swedish Government would be more than happy to see the establishment of such a center. But in this case, as in the case of various other Raoul Wallenberg Associations or Documentation Centers and specific events around the world, we have taken the position, that these should be established or carried out at the initiative of individual persons or organisations. The Swedish Government's involvement in the Raoul Wallenberg case is of a somewhat different nature and concerns - in addition to our endeavours to spread knowledge about Raoul Wallenberg, his activities and his fate - also our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union/Russia.

As an example of a recent Raoul Wallenberg related initiative, I can mention the seminar in Budapest in September of this year with the participation of Swedish and Hungarian historians. The seminar was organized by the Swedish Institute of International Relations, in cooperation with the Hungarian Holocaust Documentation Center, not by the Swedish Government - although, of course, I personally participated as a representative of the Swedish Government.


Yours sincerely,



Harald Hamrin

01 ✓  
2005-10-17/UD-EC/Hamrin  
Brevsvar 050117

Simlångsdalen den 1 december 2004



Ärade Harald!

Vid ett möte i dag med chefen för Judiska Museet i Stockholm, Yvonne Jacobsson, föreslog hon att jag skulle sända bifogade CD med informationsbrochyr.

I hela mitt liv har Raoul Wallenberg varit en förebild för mig och en dröm har varit att få skriva några sånger till honom. När jag nu åtnjuter epitetet "en av Sveriges Radio P4: s mest spelade artister" tänkte jag att det var dags att förverkliga drömmen. Därför samlade jag Ulf Lundells trogne följeslagare och gitarrist, Janne Bark, och Gyllene Tiders Mats "MP" Persson för att producera och spela in dessa sånger. Utgivningen kommer att ske den 17 januari 2005.

Till min stora glädje har sångerna och häftet fallit Fru Nina Lagergren i smaken och onsdagen den 8 december skall jag träffa henne för att gå genom vissa justeringar. Bifogade häfte och CD är endast "mock-up" och några ändringar (av bl.a. tryckfel) skall göras innan det går i tryck och press under mellandagarna.

The Raoul Wallenberg Committé of USA har beslutat att sångerna och häftet skall distribueras till lärare i amerikanska skolor genom deras projekt "A Study of Heroes".

Naturligtvis gör jag detta helt utan vinstintresse. Mitt mål är att med mina kontakter och kunskaper inom underhållningens värld få försöka återgälda ett halmstrå till Raoul Wallenbergs stora gåva. För varje dag som går blir det än viktigare att sprida information kring honom.

Enligt mina erfarenheter är just kombinationen populärmusik och skriftlig information mycket uppskattat (tidigare har jag gjort liknande verk om bl.a. drottning Ulrika Eleonora d.ä. fredsinsats under Danska kriget 1675-1680).

Mina förhoppningar är att genom UD finna en bas för vidare samarbete för att sprida och hedra minnet av Raoul Wallenbergs gärning.

Med vänligaste hälsningar

Ben Olander

Leco Music Division  
310 38 Simlångsdalen  
035 - 16 03 50  
035 - 594 00 (hemtelefon)  
070 - 533 52 70  
www.ben-olander.com

2004-11-11 ✓  
Hbr Hamrin-Strander/C

RECHTS- UND KONSULARSEKTION

→ HH.

Bundesministerium

für auswärtige Angelegenheiten

GZ. 55537/0001e-IV.1/2004

An die  
Botschaft von Schweden  
Obere Donaustraße 49-51  
1025 Wien

|                |       |          |
|----------------|-------|----------|
| INK. AMB. WIEN |       |          |
| D.Nr. 12/83    |       |          |
| 2004-09-28     |       |          |
| AVD. P         | GR. 2 | MAL R.W. |

|                  |       |        |
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| INK. UTRIKESDEP. |       |        |
| D.Nr. 04/52827   |       |        |
| 2004-10-06       |       |        |
| AVD. P           | GR. 2 | MAL EU |

Skizze från ukrainisk medborgare  
Wallenberg

### Verbalnote

2004-09-28 Dnr 82-P 2  
Överlämnas av ambassaden i Wien  
till UD-EC (H. Magnusson) f kdm  
och ev. åtgärd.

Veronika Bard-Bringeus

Das Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten entbietet der Botschaft von Schweden seine Empfehlungen und beehrt sich, das Schreiben des ukrainischen Staatsbürgers Grigorij Grigorjevitsch Schvets betreffend Raoul Wallenberg, samt einer vom Bundesministerium für Inneres angefertigten Arbeitsübersetzung aus dem Russischen, zu übermitteln.

Das Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten benützt auch diese Gelegenheit, der Botschaft von Schweden die Versicherung seiner ausgezeichneten Hochachtung zu erneuern.

Beilagen

Wien, am 23. September 2004





Министру Внутренних  
Дел.

Австрия. Вена.

От гр. Швец Тригорие  
Тригорьевича, проживающего  
в Украине, Терновицкая  
обл. в гор. Хотине  
по ул. Килича, 94  
6000.

et

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с октября 1960 года по июль  
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контакт с заключенными по имени  
Рауль Волленберг по кличке "Витий".  
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пункт и докладывал: „З/К.  
Валленберг пришел по КТТГ  
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гда не говорил, а мы охрана  
не спрашивали. Срок у него  
был где-то 1972.. или 1973 год.  
Все о чем я пишу это  
правда и прошу об этом пове-  
рить его семье.

Адрес лагеря, где содержатся  
Рауль Валленберг.

Германская обл. СССР

г. Кизел

т/л ВВ 201/1

Мой адрес

6000 Украина, Терновинская  
обл. г. Хотин ул. Клища 94

К семье: Швец Тригорий

*Übersetzung aus dem Russischen*

AZ 428

BMI 36.101/4451-I/5/04

An den

Minister für Inneres – Wien, Österreich

Von: Bürger SCHVETS (Schwetz) Grigorij Grigorjevitsch, wohnhaft in der Ukraine, Gebiet Tschernovtsy, Stadt Chatin 6000, ul. Klitschtscha 94

Ich, SCHVETS (Schwetz) Grigorij Grigorjevitsch, diente von 1960 bis Juni 1965 in einer Militäreinheit zur Bewachung von Häftlingen in Gefangenenlagern. Von 1961 bis 1965 hatte ich direkten Kontakt mit einem Häftling namens Raul WALLENBERG, mit dem Spitznamen „Wille“. Da in unserem Lager Litauer, Letten, Esten, Finnen festgehalten wurden, sagten diese auf Grund eines Kontaktes mit ihm, dass er nicht ihr Landsmann wäre, obwohl er mit ihnen eine gemeinsame Sprache fand und sie ihn achteten. Ab wann er in diesem Lager war, weiß ich nicht, doch erinnere ich mich, dass die Lagerleitung ihn ebenso achtete.

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Alles was ich darüber schreibe, ist wahr und ersuche darüber seine Familie zu benachrichtigen.

Die Adresse des Lagers, wo Raul Wallenberg festgehalten wurde:

UdSSR, Gebiet Perm, Stadt KIZEL, Postfach VV 201/1

Meine Adresse:

Ukraine, Gebiet Tschernovtsy, Stadt Chatin 6000, ul. Klitschtscha 94

SCHVETS (Schwetz) Grigorij



REGERINGSKANSLIET

*Arhive*

(EC)

04/57227

P 2 E<sup>1</sup>

2004-10-25

Utrikesdepartementet

Amb Bengt Lundborg  
Budapest

Enheten för Östeuropa och Centralasien  
Ambassadör Harald Hamrin  
Telefon 08-405 33 43  
E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

Förslag att skapa ett Raoul Wallenberg center i Budapest

Hbrev Lundborg-Hamrin, 2004-07-06

*Brocks*

Jag är skyldig Dig ett svar på Ditt handbrev med förfrågan hur vi ställer oss till inrättandet (och delfinansiering) av ett Raoul Wallenberg center i Budapest. Av skäl som ligger utanför min kontroll har svaret tyvärr dröjt.


Vi är här i Stockholm överens om att vi inte skall gå in i detta projekt. Vi vet ju mycket litet om hur verksamheten konkret är tänkt att läggas upp, ingenting heller om ev. svensk plats i det tänkta centrets styrelse samt, framför allt, kan vi inte binda upp oss för ett långsiktigt ekonomiskt engagemang i centret.

Ev. framtida svenskt stöd till information om Raoul Wallenberg i Ungern bör hellre gå till andra och mera ad hoc-betonade projekt såsom det seminarium som nyligen ordnades i regi av bl.a. Utrikespolitiska Institutet eller informationsdagar i ungerska skolor (detta för tydlighetens skull sagt med reservation för att vi i nuläget inte har några anslag öronmärkta för denna typ av verksamhet).

Mitt svar är förankrat hos kabinetssekreteraren och Ch UD-EC.

*Harald Hamrin*

Harald Hamrin



Postadress  
103 39 Stockholm  
Besöksadress  
Fredsgatan 6

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08-405 10 00  
Telefax  
08-723 11 76

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registrator@foreign.ministry.se  
Telex  
105 90 MINFOR S



REGERINGSKANSLIET

*Minice*

04/57166

*RW - Grunberg*

*P 2 En I*

2004-10-25

*EC*

**Utrikesdepartementet**

*Enheten för Östeuropa och Centralasien  
Ambassador Harald Hamrin  
Telefon 08-405 33 43  
E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se*

Mr. Max Grunberg  
Raoul Wallenberg Honorary Citizen  
Committee  
P.O.Box 38  
Ra'anana 43100  
Israel

Dear Mr. Grunberg,

thank you for your kind letter of August 18, 2004, addressed to Prime Minister Göran Persson. I have been instructed to answer your letter.

Let me first of all assure you, as I have done on previous occasions, that we highly appreciate your endeavours in the case of Raoul Wallenberg. Let me also assure you, as I know Ambassador Robert Rydberg already has told you orally, that we are ready to assist you in spreading information about you forthcoming Appeal.

Turning to the concrete question, contained in your letter, about honouring Raoul Wallenberg and his brother and sister, Prof. Guy von Dardel and Mrs. Nina Lagergren, with the medal of Illis Quorum, let me say the following.

Raoul Wallenberg was honoured in January 1995, 50 years after his arrest, with a solemn ceremony in the Swedish Parliament. We are planning a similar ceremony in January of next year, 60 years after his arrest. Furthermore, the Swedish government, as you know, has set up an annual fund of 750 000 Swedish kronor to support independent research on Raoul Wallenberg. It is our opinion that – in addition to stimulating research on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg - this is a worthy expression of our gratitude for the humanitarian work carried out by him in Budapest in 1944-45. To my knowledge no other Swedish citizen has been honoured in this way in recent years and decades.

*W.1*

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103 39 Stockholm

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08-405 10 00

Telefax  
08-723 11 76

E-post  
registrator@foreign.ministry.se

Telex  
105 90 MINFOR S

*Grp m. post*

*25/10-04/*

2004-10-2

Prof. von Dardel and Mrs. Lagergren have done an immense work over the years to spread knowledge about Raoul Wallenberg's efforts on behalf of Hungarian Jews in the last months of World War II and to seek the full truth about his fate after 1945. Being Raoul Wallenberg's next-of-kin, honouring them with the medal of Illis Quorum would, however, fall outside the field of application of the medal, as it has been established over the years. Other persons, not directly related to Raoul Wallenberg, have of course been honoured with the medal for their work on behalf of Wallenberg's sake. Suffice it to mention the late Ambassador Per Anger, who was honoured in the Spring of 2003 – as well as several non-Swedish citizens, who have been awarded the order of Nordstjärnan.

Expressing once more our gratitude for the work you are doing I am looking forward to hearing soon from you about the progress with your work on the Appeal.

Yours sincerely,



Harald Hamrin

C: Amb. Tel Aviv  
UD-Prot (Borgelid)



REGERINGSKANSLIET

*Arkiverat*

2004/60783  
P 2 EU<sup>1</sup>

2004-11-11



**Utrikesdepartementet**

Enheten för Östeuropa och Centralasien

Ambassadör

Harald Hamrin

Telefon +46-(0)8-405 3343

E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

Ambassadör John-Christer Åhlander  
Ambassaden Kiev

**Grigorij Schvets och Raoul Wallenberg**

1 bil.

*Bror*

Från vår ambassad i Wien har jag fått bif. Verbalnote med bil. i form av brev från en viss Grigorij Schvets.

Brevet hade sänts av Schvets till österrikiska inrikesministeriet. Då man där saknar en Wallenberg-dossier och ärendet gäller en svensk medborgare hade man översänt brevet med tysk översättning till vår ambassad. Österrikiska inrikesministeriet och utrikesministeriet har ingen ytterligare information om Schvets.

Sådana här ärenden dyker alltjämt upp ibland och ger oftast ingen ny information. Dock måste vi följa upp det, desto mera som det tidigare förekommit uppgifter – vilka i och för sig inte heller lett någonstans – om att Raoul Wallenberg setts i läger i Perm-trakten efter den tidpunkt, 17 juli 1947, då han enligt sovjetiska och senare ryska uppgifter avlidit/avrättats.

Jag vill därför be dig att låta någon av dina medarbetare ta sig an ärendet. Ett möte med Schvets borde kunna ordnas om någon från din ambassad har sina vägar förbi Chatin eller Tjernovtsy. Alla detaljer Schvets kan erinra sig är intressanta. Och naturligtvis svar på frågan varför han hör av sig först nu.

Därefter får vi se om det är värt att gå vidare.

*Harald Hamrin*

Harald Hamrin

*Gott med levin 12/11-04*

Postadress  
103 39 Stockholm  
Besöksadress  
Drottninggatan 2

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08-405 10 00  
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08-723 11 76

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Telex  
105 90 MINFOR S

*2*

2004-11-11  
Kbr Hamrin-Skander/C

RECHTS- UND KONSULARSEKTION

→ HH.

Bundesministerium  
für auswärtige Angelegenheiten

GZ. 55537/0001e-IV.1/2004

An die  
Botschaft von Schweden  
Obere Donaustraße 49-51  
1025 Wien

|                |      |         |
|----------------|------|---------|
| INK. AMB. WIEN |      |         |
| D.Nr. 12/83    |      |         |
| 2004-09-28     |      |         |
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| INK. UTRIKESDEP |      |         |
| D.Nr. 04/52827  |      |         |
| 2004-10-06      |      |         |
| AVD. P          | GR 2 | MAAL EU |

Skizze från ukrainsk medborgare  
G Wallenberg

### Verbalnote

2004-09-28 Dnr 82-P 2  
Överlämnas av ambassaden i Wien  
till UD-EC (H. Magnusson) f kdm  
och ev. åtgärd.

Veronika Bard-Brings  
Veronika Bard-Brings

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### Beilagen

Wien, am 23. September 2004





Министру Внутренних

Дел.

Австрия. Вена.

От гр. Швец Тригорие  
Тригорьевича, проживающего  
в Украине, Терновицкая  
обл. в гор. Хотине  
по ул. Клышца, 94  
60000.

et

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1965 г. служил в военной части  
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Адрес лагеря, где содержатся  
Рауль Валленберг.

Германская обл. СССР

г. Кизел

т/л вв 201/1

Мой адрес

6000 Украина, Терновичская  
обл. г. Хотин ул. Клища 94

К семье: Иван Тимоний

*Übersetzung aus dem Russischen*

AZ 428

BMI 36.101/4451-I/5/04

An den

Minister für Inneres – Wien, Österreich

Von: Bürger SCHVETS (Schwetz) Grigorij Grigorjevitsch, wohnhaft in der Ukraine, Gebiet Tschernovtsy, Stadt Chatin 6000, ul. Klitschtscha 94

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Meine Adresse:

Ukraine, Gebiet Tschernovtsy, Stadt Chatin 6000, ul. Klitschtscha 94

SCHVETS (Schwetz) Grigorij

# ***Raoul Wallenberg Honorary Citizen Committee***

P.O. Box 38, Ra'anana 43100, ISRAEL  
Tel.: +(972) 54 953039 Fax: +(972) 9 7749495 E-mail: ygrun@netvision.net.il

7 November 2004

H.E. Harald Hamrin  
Ambassador  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Stockholm  
Sweden

(EC)

|                  |          |            |
|------------------|----------|------------|
| INK. UTRIKESDEP. |          |            |
| D.Nr. 04/61399   |          |            |
| 2004 -11- 17     |          |            |
| AVD.<br>P        | GR.<br>2 | MAL<br>EU1 |

2004-12-01 ✓  
Shu Hamrin - Granberg



Dear Mr. Hamrin,

May I thank you for your letter dated 25 October. I do appreciate that you mentioned in this letter your appreciation for what I am doing on behalf of Raoul and that you are able to assist with the distribution of the Appeal.

In my meeting with Ambassador Rydberg he had already told me that your government is willing to help in the distribution of the Missing In Action Appeal. For your information, I am trying to set up a meeting between Ambassador Rydberg and the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate the distribution of this Appeal.

I was pleased to read that the Swedish parliament will have a ceremony for Raoul on 17<sup>th</sup> January. May I kindly ask you if you would inform me as to what the program will be for this ceremony. To me, it is important that your government come out with a statement that the search for Raoul has to be intensified, as we all know that time is running out.

Do you think that the Swedish parliament may be interested in inviting me to speak on that day, and, in particular, announce the text of the Missing In Action Appeal in public to all members of parliament? If the Swedish parliament would extend to me such a gesture, it would be very much appreciated if they may be able to find funding for the travel costs of such a trip.

With reference to your explanation about honoring Raoul Wallenberg's brother and sister with the medal of Illis Quorum, could I kindly ask you if my interpretation is correct that the nomination for this honor is handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? In case I am not correct, could you then please inform me about the procedure and the office dealing with the nomination for this honor?

In your letter there was no mention about my request if the Swedish government would like to look at the possibility of establishing a Raoul Wallenberg Heritage Center. May I kindly ask you to look into this matter.

*Handwritten signature or mark at the bottom left corner.*

Looking forward to hearing from you.

With best regards,

Max Grunberg

P.S. Please be informed that from 8<sup>th</sup> - 24<sup>th</sup> of November I will be out of the country.

Cc: Prof. Guy von Dardel (brother of Raoul Wallenberg), Switzerland  
Mrs. Nina Lagergren (sister of Raoul Wallenberg), Sweden

Mrs. Nane Annan, (niece of Raoul Wallenberg), United Nations  
Ms. Louise von Dardel, (niece of Raoul Wallenberg), France


H.E. Robert Rydberg, Swedish Ambassador to Israel

**SVERIGES AMBASSAD****Telefax**

1 ( )

2004-11-22

**Bratislava**

*a.a. 2004.11.22*  
*Wille*  

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UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET, dnr 51 ✓

Till: UD/EU (Lindgren)

Kopia: UD/PIK

**Raoul Wallenberg-monument invigt**

(1 bil.)

Torsdagen den 11 november invigdes i Bratislava ett monument till minne av Raoul Wallenberg. Monumentet har tagits fram på initiativ av organisationen Society of Christians and Jews in Slovakia. Inte minst organisationens ordförande, Mrs Stefania Salisova, har varit mycket drivande för att skaffa sponsorer, förhandla med Bratislava stad om en plats för monumentet och allmänt sprida kunskap om Raoul Wallenbergs insatser.

I Slovakien har Raoul Wallenberg uppmärksammats för att ha hjälpt till att rädda slovakiska judar som tog sig till Ungern när den nazistödda Tisoregimen här i Slovakien började deportera judar till koncentrationslägren.

Vid invigningen av monumentet deltog bl.a. talmannen i det slovakiska parlamentet, Slovakiens EU-kommissionär Jan Figel samt en stor del av den diplomatiska kåren. Jag höll ett kort anförande och framförde även the International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation's tack till Society of Christians and Jews in Slovakia.

Översättning av artikel i dagstidningen SME översänds för kännedom.

**JULIN**

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SME Newspaper, 13 November 2004

### Memorial of Raoul Wallenberg

On Thursday a Memorial of Raoul Wallenberg was unveiled on Zamocka Street in Bratislava. Raoul Wallenberg served as a Swedish Diplomat in Budapest during the Second World War.

During his mission he saved lives of many Hungarian but also Slovak Jews and prevented their transportation to concentration camps. He himself ended up in one of the Soviet Gulags. According to available information and memories, Wallenberg's rescue operations took place at the end of the War in different parts of Budapest. The waiting for necessary documents was filled with hope but also fear and tension. The author of the memorial, architect and artist Klement Trizuljak expresses this atmosphere symbolically with windows, behind which the decision of 'being' or 'non-being' was awaited.





REGERINGSKANSLIET

*Arbiva*

*TJÄNSTE 1/3*

2004-11-18

**Utrikesdepartementet**

Ambassadör Robert Rydberg

Amb. Tel Aviv

Enheten för Östeuropa och Centralasien

Ambassadör

Harald Hamrin

Telefon +46-(0)8-405 3343

E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

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| INK. UTRIKESDEP. |       |         |
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| 2004-11-24       |       |         |
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*(EC)*

**Brev från Max Grunberg**

1 bil.

Broder!

Jag sänder dig kopia på brev från Max Grunberg i div. Raoul Wallenbergrelaterade ämnen.

Du står ju som mottagare av en kopia, så kanske har brevet redan nått dig direkt.

Bästa hälsningar

Harald Hamrin

*842 bl 16.01 19/11-04*



B.I. 1  
2/3

# *Raoul Wallenberg Honorary Citizen Committee*

P.O. Box 38, Ra'anana 43100, ISRAEL  
Tel.: +(972) 54 953039 Fax: +(972) 9 7749495 E-mail: ygrun@netvision.net.il

7 November 2004

H.E. Harald Hamrin  
Ambassador  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Stockholm  
Sweden



Dear Mr. Hamrin,

May I thank you for your letter dated 25 October. I do appreciate that you mentioned in this letter your appreciation for what I am doing on behalf of Raoul and that you are able to assist with the distribution of the Appeal.

nej  
In my meeting with Ambassador Rydberg he had already told me that your government is willing to help in the distribution of the Missing In Action Appeal. For your information, I am trying to set up a meeting between Ambassador Rydberg and the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate the distribution of this Appeal.

I was pleased to read that the Swedish parliament will have a ceremony for Raoul on 17<sup>th</sup> January. May I kindly ask you if you would inform me as to what the program will be for this ceremony. To me, it is important that your government come out with a statement that the search for Raoul has to be intensified, as we all know that time is running out.

Do you think that the Swedish parliament may be interested in inviting me to speak on that day, and, in particular, announce the text of the Missing In Action Appeal in public to all members of parliament? If the Swedish parliament would extend to me such a gesture, it would be very much appreciated if they may be able to find funding for the travel costs of such a trip.

With reference to your explanation about honoring Raoul Wallenberg's brother and sister with the medal of Illis Quorum, could I kindly ask you if my interpretation is correct that the nomination for this honor is handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? In case I am not correct, could you then please inform me about the procedure and the office dealing with the nomination for this honor?

In your letter there was no mention about my request if the Swedish government would like to look at the possibility of establishing a Raoul Wallenberg Heritage Center. May I kindly ask you to look into this matter.

Looking forward to hearing from you.

With best regards,

Max Grunberg

P.S. Please be informed that from 8<sup>th</sup> - 24<sup>th</sup> of November I will be out of the country.

Cc: Prof. Guy von Dardel (brother of Raoul Wallenberg), Switzerland  
Mrs. Nina Lagergren (sister of Raoul Wallenberg), Sweden

Mrs. Nane Annan, (niece of Raoul Wallenberg), United Nations  
Ms. Louise von Dardel, (niece of Raoul Wallenberg), France

H.E. Robert Rydberg, Swedish Ambassador to Israel



"Matteo Luigi Napolitano "

Till: "Harald Hamrin"

UP-EC

2004-12-04 08:53/IRIKESDFP.

<harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se>

(EC)

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Vaticano in Ungheria nel 1944

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Gentilissimo Ambasciatore,

In seguito alla nostra conversazione romana, mi pregio di scriverLe come promesso, per informarla sinteticamente su ciò che emerge dai documenti vaticani un merito all'Ungheria per l'anno 1944.

Le sottopongo anzitutto una premessa di ordine generale.

Il 19 febbraio la nunziatura apostolica in Italia contatta la legazione svedese pregando il governo di Stoccolma di far da tramite per l'invio di una somma di 9000 dollari ai bambini finlandesi, per il tramite del nunzio apostolico in Svezia, mons. Ian Erik Mueller. la somma sarà utilizzata per acquistare in Svezia del vestiario che sarà poi inviato al nunzio apostolico in Finlandia, mons. Coblen (ADSS, vol. 10, doc. 72; non vi è traccia della risposta della legazione svedese al Vaticano). Il 25 ottobre 1944 vi è un progetto di passo comune delle potenze neutre in favore degli internati, vecchi, donne e bambini, in Germania (ADSS, vol. 10, doc. 374). Un nuovo passo in favore degli ebrei e neutro fanno il 23 dicembre 1944 (Ivi, doc. 424).

Ecco dunque gli elementi informativi sull'Ungheria e sul ruolo del Vaticano nel 1944:

Il 21 agosto i rappresentanti dei paesi neutri accreditati in Ungheria fanno un passo presso il governo di Budapest in favore degli ebrei ungheresi. Firmano il documento mons. Rotta (Nunzio Apostolico), Carl Ivan Danielsson (Svezia), Carlos de Liz-Teixeira Branquinho (Portogallo), Miguel Sanz-Briz (Spagna), Antoine I. Kilchnann (Svizzera) - ADSS, vol. 10, doc. 308.

Nella seconda metà di gennaio il World Jewish Congress ringrazia il Papa per la protezione sino a quel momento assicurata agli ebrei d'Italia, Slovacchia, Croazia e Ungheria e chiede nuovi interventi (Ivi, doc. 31). Lo stesso fa il Rabbino Capo di Londra Hertz il 22 marzo 1944 (Ivi, doc. 132 e nota 1 a pag. 205).

Il Vaticano riceveva costantemente informazioni dal nunzio apostolico a Budapest. mons. Rotta, informazioni sul trattamento degli ebrei ungheresi, specialmente dopo la caduta del governo Kallay, rimpiazzato il 22 marzo 1944, dal governo Sztojay. Tali informazioni riguardavano specialmente la legislazione antisemita varata nel paese, ormai legato al carro tedesco (Ivi, docc. 125, 153, 172). Alcune informazioni sulla deportazione degli ebrei ungheresi furono ricevuti anche dalla Casa Bianca, che fra l'altro apprezza vivamente l'azione della Santa Sede (Ivi, doc. 196)

Il 23 maggio 1944 il nunzio a Budapest Rotta invia una Nota al Governo e al Presidente ungherese sulla campagna anti-ebraica azziata dopo il marzo 1944 (Ivi doc. 206 e Annessi I e II). Il Vaticano istruisce mons. Rotta di fare anche un passo per istruire i vescovi ungheresi, giudicati dal Vaticano alquanto passivi nell'opporsi alla legislazione antiebraica in vigore nel loro paese (Ivi, doc. 216). E' poi lo stesso Pio XII a rivolgersi a Horthy con una lettera personale del 25 giugno 1944, facendo appello ai suoi sentimenti di umanità per risparmiare nuove malversazioni e nuovi dolori (Ivi, doc. 243)

Nel luglio 1944 il cardinale Primate d'Ungheria Serédi prepara una lettera

pastorale in favore degli ebrei, che però il governo ungherese chiede di ritirare. Il cardinale accetta a patto che cessino le deportazioni e che siano accordate esenzioni in favore degli ebrei battezzati; cosa che Horthy fece il 6 luglio (Ivi, doc. 265).

Il 1° luglio 1944 il Vaticano domanda a Rotta un passo presso il Governo ungherese in favore degli ebrei: Rotta risponde il 17 luglio, assicurandop che il passo è stato fatto. Il Governo accoglie la richiesta di far uscire degli ebrei dal paese, e Rotta prega il Vaticano d' "inviare sollecitamente certificati necessari" (ADSS, vol. 10, nota 6 a pag. 352). Io credo che in questo caso possa esserci stato un impegno congiunto del Vaticano e dei paesi neutri per raccogliere il necessario per la stampa di passaporti da consegnare agli ebrei ungheresi.

A fine luglio 1944 il Vaticano apprende che i passi fatti presso il Reggente Horthy hanno indotto quest'ultimo ad un atteggiamento più fermo sulla questione razziale e ha stimolato l'episcopato ungherese ad intervenire in favore degli ebrei ungheresi (Ivi, doc. 281).

Il 21 agosto 1944 i rappresentanti diplomatici delle potenze neutre accreditati in Ungheria fanno un nuovo passo presso il Governo di Budapest in favore degli ebrei ungheresi. Firmano il passo mons. Rotta (Santa Sede), Carl Ivan Danielsson (Svezia), Carlos de Liz-Branquinhô (Portogallo), Miguel Sanz-Briz (Spagna), Antoine I. Kilchmann (Svizzera). ADSS vol. 10, doc. 308.

Un nuovo passo in favore degli ebrei ungheresi il Vaticano fa il 18 ottobre 1944 (Ivi, doc. 371). Poco prima, il 16 ottobre, il Vaticano ha protestato presso il Governo di Londra per le violenze cui si sono abbandonate in Ungheria le truppe sovietiche e romene (ivi, doc. 356). Il 1° novembre successivo, la Gran Bretagna approva i passi vaticani in favore degli ebrei ungheresi, ma sconsiglia il Vaticano dal dire alcunché in merito alle efferatezze commesse dai sovietici in Ungheria (Ivi, doc. 388).

Il 17 novembre 1944 il nunzio apostolico Rotta e il Ministro di Svezia a Budapest presentano, a nome dei rappresentanti dei paesi neutri in Ungheria, un nuovo passo in favore degli ebrei ungheresi (Ivi, doc. 408 e annesso I).

Questo, gentilissimo ambasciatore, è quanto emerge dai documenti vaticani per il 1944. Sono ovviamente disponibile a offrirLe qualsiasi dettaglio in merito a quanto sopra, o eventualmente ad allargare il campo d'indagine ad altri anni o alla serie documentaria italiana.

Nell'attesa accogla i sensi della mia più alta considerazione.

Suo,

Matteo Luigi Napolitano

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I-00139 Roma  
++39.06.8184905  
++39.333.2144946

[www.uniurb.it/scipol/dmln.htm](http://www.uniurb.it/scipol/dmln.htm)  
[www.diplomatichistory.com](http://www.diplomatichistory.com)  
[www.vaticanfiles.net](http://www.vaticanfiles.net)

2004-12-08

EC

Enheten för Östeuropa och Centralasien  
Ambassadör  
Harald Hamrin  
Telefon +46-(0)8-405 3343  
E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

Delges: Amb. Fredrik Vahlquist (KSA)

Leap. 7/11-05 / LB

### Besök i Rom med anknytning till Raoul Wallenberg

1 bil. (Ink. mail 041204 fr. Napolitano, Rom t. Hamrin, EC)

Den 22 och 23 november 2004 hade jag tre sammanträffanden i Rom och Vatikanen med anknytning till Raoul Wallenberg och dennes räddningsaktioner i Budapest 1944. I två av dessa sammanträffanden deltog ambassadör Fredrik Vahlquist vid Heliga Stolen. Vahlquist förde därvid anteckningar, som citeras nedan.

### Möte med ärkebiskop Gennaro Verolino

I mötet deltog förutom ambassadör Vahlquist även msgr Bernadito Auza i Statssekretariatet.

"Mötet med ärkebiskop Verolino (98), som tjänstgjorde vid Heliga Stolens beskickning i Budapest större delen av Andra världskriget, ägde rum i hans privata bostad i Roms nordvästra utkant.

Enligt msgr Verolino utfärdade beskickningen i Budapest ca 25.000 skyddspass. De färdigtryckta blanketterna fylldes alla i med hjälp av skrivmaskin. Till detta omfattande arbete behövdes 4-5 lokalanställda.

Kommunikationerna mellan Vatikanen och beskickningen skedde per kryptotrafik.

Beskickningen i Budapest hade hela tiden Vatikanens tysta stöd för sina omfattande hjälpinsatser.

Raoul Wallenberg var utan tvekan den drivande kraften i arbetet på att rädda så många människoliv som möjligt. Han försatte sig många gånger i livsfara för att kunna rädda judar.

Feb

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Sista gången Verolino träffade Raoul Wallenberg var strax före julen 1944. När ryktet spreds att den svenska diplomaten RW gripits av ryssarna den 17 januari 1945 sades det att han nog förts till Sibirien. 'Men vi förstod aldrig varför ryssarna arresterat honom.'

Själv lämnade msgr Verolino Budapest våren 1945 och begav sig då till Italien för att senare bli posterad i Prag."

Kommentar: msgr Verolino var vid mitt möte med honom 98 år gammal. Sex årtionden hade förflutit sedan hans vistelse i Budapest och hans sammanträffanden där med Wallenberg. Det var uppenbart att hans minnesbilder av vad han upplevde 1944, av naturliga skäl, var allmänna, vaga och delvis influerade av vad han senare hört och läst om Raoul Wallenberg. Det gäller exempelvis antalet av nuntiaturen utfärdade skyddspass liksom "ryktet" om Wallenbergs arrestering och hans öde därefter. Dock andades hans berättelse genomgående av stor respekt och beundran för Wallenbergs insatser.

#### Möte med fader Marcel Chappin

I mötet deltog förutom ambassadör Vahlquist även msgr Bernadito Auza i Statssekretariatet.

"Chappin har i många år varit involverad i det arkiv- och forskningsprojekt om Vatikanen under Andra världskriget som inleddes 1964 och leddes av fader Blét. Gruppen bestod av fyra personer och avslutade i princip sitt arbete 1984/85. Resultatet av deras mödor har publicerats i 11 böcker om sammanlagt 12 volymer. Vi erbjöds nu ta del av innehållet i dessa.

Normalt går man igenom en påves pontifikat ("regeringstid"). I ovannämnda fall gällde det istället för ovanlighetens skull en genomgång av ett specifikt ämne.

Tre ggr har det under de senaste 20 åren kommit framställningar från Sverige om att få ta del av handlingar i Vatikanarkivet rörande Raoul Wallenberg och Heliga Stolens beskickning i Budapest under Andra Världskriget. Senast gjordes det när Jan Lundvik var ambassadör i Budapest 1994-98. Dessa framställningar har dock alla avvisats med



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hänvisning till att arkiven vad gäller dessa år inte ännu är genomgångna och ordnade.

Fr Chappin framhöll att medan det omfattande och tidsödande arkivarbetet pågick tilläts inte ens en kardinal att få tillgång till handlingar han önskade få ta del. Först när allt arbete var slutfört kunde utomstående få ta del av dem. F n höll man på med Pius XI:s pontifikat, dvs åren 1922-39.

Msgr Rottas och msgr Verolinos omfattande insatser i Budapest för att rädda judar med hjälp av skyddspass och hus som stod under Vatikanens beskydd var inte officiellt sanktionerade av Vatikanen, varför det inte finns något närmare härom på dossier. Pius XII lämnade aldrig skriftliga instruktioner. Men det är väl dokumenterat att Heliga Stolens beskickning i Budapest hade påvens helhjärtade stöd i sina försök att rädda så många judiska människoliv som möjligt undan nazisterna och ungerska pilkorsare.

Totalt utfärdade beskickningen i Budapest fram till oktober 1944 17.000 skyddspass. Även senare utfärdade den sådana skyddspass men antalet är okänt.

Här tillfogade msgr Auza att Heliga Stolens beskickning i Bukarest samtidigt utfärdade 30-35.000 skyddspass."

Kommentar: "Avhemligandet" av dokument från Pius XI:s pontifikat beräknas enligt fader Chappin vara avslutat våren/sommaren 2005. Därefter vidtar samma process vad gäller Pius XII:s pontifikat (1939-58), som naturligtvis är intressant i ett RW-perspektiv. Mycket av det som gäller nuntiaturens i Budapest arbete under 1944 finns publicerat i den ovan av fader Blét offentliggjorda dokumentsamlingen. Vad som i övrigt kan finnas i arkivgömmorna är oklart. – Enligt fader Chappin utfärdade nuntiaturen i Budapest under tiden fram till oktober 1944 17.000 skyddspas och därefter under resten av 1944 ett "okänt" antal skyddspass. Siffran skall jämföras med den ovan av Verolino angivna siffran 25.000. Verolinos uppgift skall dock sannolikt snarare uppfattas som en i efterhand allmänt "accepterad" siffra än en på verklig information baserad kunskap.

2004-12-08

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Möte med professor Matteo Luigi Napolitano

Napolitano är historiker. Han har i sin forskning särskilt sysslat med Vatikanen under Andra världskriget och är väl förtrogen med dokumentläget vad gäller denna period.

I bif. e-mail till mig (bil. 1, 2004-12-04) några veckor efter mitt möte med honom redogör Napolitano för ett antal dokument, som visar på samarbetet mellan nuntiaturen och de neutrala ländernas beskickningar, däribland Sveriges, i Budapest. Bl a visar dessa dokument att fader Chappins bild av Vatikanen som i huvudsak endast "i tysthet" stödjande nuntiaturens räddningsaktioner i Budapest måste nyanseras. Vatikanen och Pius XII personligen var sannolikt mera aktiva än vad fader Chappin framställer dem som. Ett dokument kan möjligen också tydas som att ett organiserat samarbete mellan nuntiaturen och de neutrala beskickningarna förekom vad gäller tryckningen av skyddspass. Här kan möjligen finnas skäl att studera arkivmaterialet närmare i syfte att söka fastställa hur många skyddspass som faktiskt trycktes/utfärdades av de olika ländernas beskickningar, däribland Sveriges, i Budapest.

Napolitano kom även med ett nytt uppslag till arkivstudier gällande material från den s.k. Salòrepubliken. Dokument från denna republiks "utrikesdepartement" har bevarats och förvaras nu "i anslutning till" det italienska utrikesministeriets arkiv. Av formella skäl utgör detta material inte en integrerad del av det italienska UM:s arkiv (Salòrepubliken var 1943-45 en i förhållande till Republiken Italien "främmande - och av Italien inte erkänd - makt".) Men bevarade delar av Salòrepublikens arkiv förvaras alltså, vad gäller det utrikespolitiska materialet, hos det italienska UM. Vad som där kan finnas av intresse beträffande situationen i Ungern 1944 är oklart, men skulle enligt Napolitano kunna vara värt att studera.



Harald Hamrin



# ***Raoul Wallenberg Honorary Citizen Committee***

P.O. Box 38, Ra'anana 43100, ISRAEL

Tel.: +(972) 544 953039 Fax: +(972) 9 7749495 E-mail: max@maxgrunberg.com

15<sup>th</sup> December 2004

H.E. Moshe Katsav  
President of Israel

H.E. Ariel Sharon  
Prime Minister of Israel

H.E. Reuben Rivlin  
Speaker of the Knesset

H.E. Natan Sharansky  
Minister of Diaspora Affairs

H.E. Silvan Shalom  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Isaac Herzog  
Member of Knesset

H.E. Robert Rydberg  
Swedish Ambassador to Israel

H.E. Harald Hamrin  
Ambassador  
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

H.E. Professor Irwin Cotler P.C., M.P.  
Minister of Justice, Canada

Mr. Avner Shalev  
Chairman  
Directorate of Yad Vashem

Dr. Ron Prozer  
Director-General  
Minister of Foreign Affairs



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Your Excellencies,

Over the last few years, discussions and meetings have taken place regarding the Missing in Action Appeal for Mr. Raoul Wallenberg with different Israeli governmental representatives and representatives of the Swedish Embassy in Tel Aviv, including the Ambassador or his representative. A presentation to President Katsav was also made from myself.

I am pleased to inform you that the Israeli and Swedish Ministries of Foreign Affairs have agreed to circulate the Missing in Action Appeal through their network of embassies, as well as our committee will start as of now to circulate the Mission in Action Appeal worldwide.

In a few weeks time, on January the 17<sup>th</sup>, the world will be reminded that it was on this day in 1945 that Raoul Wallenberg disappeared.

*Per Arvidson  
Lette är en general svader.  
Grunberg har skrivit ett brev till ett  
stort antal personer. Jag utvärderade som  
arkiverare på en av ställen bredt  
skattkammaren, men alla andra skattkammaren.  
Lette skickat ett brev till ett stort antal  
en person med en.*

*HARALD HAMRIN UA-EC*

Raoul's parents both died in 1979, brokenhearted, never having been reunited with their beloved son. Raoul's brother, Professor Guy von Dardel, and sister, Mrs. Nina Lagergren tried, unsuccessfully, to pursue justice for their brother for over 50 years. Raoul's brother and sister, both in their eighties, are still pursuing the search for their brother with the assistance of some of their children.

Keeping in mind the years of pain and suffering, in particular by Raoul, but also by his family members, may I ask you to implement the following proposals as soon as possible in order to advance the search for Raoul:

1. The circulation of the Missing in Action Appeal.
2. To present a law to the Knesset, as drafted by MK Isaac Herzog.
3. To formalize an action plan with reference to proposals of the Israeli Government assisting in the worldwide search for Raoul Wallenberg to be presented at a ceremony as being discussed between the Israeli Government, the Knesset and Yad Vashem.
4. In the beginning of 2003, I had a meeting with the High Commissioner of Human Rights, the late Sergio Vieira de Mello. The Swedish Ambassador to Geneva, Mr. Johan Molander, was also present in this meeting. Among the issues discussed in this meeting was the Missing in Action Appeal.

A follow up visit has been discussed with Minister Sharansky, MK Isaac Herzog and the Canadian Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler, being that Raoul Wallenberg is also an Honorary Citizen of Canada. I am grateful to Minister Cotler who offered to speak to Mrs. Louise Arbour, High Commissioner of Human Rights, in order to request such a meeting.

May I request, that if a meeting with the High Commissioner of Human Rights is to take place, that the Israeli Government would consider to include family members of Raoul Wallenberg such as Professor and Mrs. von Dardel, who live in Geneva, Justice and Mrs. Lagergren, who live in Sweden, Louise von Dardel, who lives in France, and some of their other children to join this delegation.


Also, I would like to humbly request to also be included in this delegation in order to advance the Missing in Action Appeal, as discussed in my meeting with the previous High Commissioner of Human Rights. Should you look at my case favorably, I humbly request you to pay for my travel expenses.

For your information, I have received a letter dated December 1<sup>st</sup> 2004 from Ambassador Harald Hamrin of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A copy of the letter is enclosed, as well as a copy of a letter of support from Prime Minister Persson, a letter from the Knesset Parliamentary Committee to Combat Anti-Semitism and Xenophobia, and the Missing in Action Appeal.

(3)

Keeping in mind that Raoul is Israel's First Honorary Citizen and that the Knesset Parliamentary Committee to Combat Anti-Semitism and Xenophobia will assist any person or body involved in the investigation of Raoul's fate, may I humbly ask you all to co-operate in advancing the search of our hero, after all we owe it to Raoul.

Respectfully submitted, I look forward to hearing from you.

  
Max Grunberg

Cc: Professor Guy von Dardel (brother of Raoul Wallenberg), Switzerland  
Mrs. Nina Lagergen (sister of Raoul Wallenberg), Sweden

Ms. Louise von Dardel (niece of Raoul Wallenberg), France  
Mrs. Nane Annan (niece of Raoul Wallenberg), United Nations

Mrs. Vera Golovensky – Senior Advisor for Diaspora Affairs to Minister  
Sharansky

Mr. Nimrod Barkan – Head of the World Jewish Affairs Bureau of the Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem

Mr. Nissam Amdur – Deputy Director, World Jewish Affairs Bureau, Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem

Mr. Yaron Sideman, Counsellor, World Jewish Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem

Mr. Baruch Tenenbaum, founder, The International Raoul Wallenberg  
Foundation

Mr. Elie Yossef

Dr. Jean Kloos-Fishman, chairperson, The Raoul Wallenberg Association of  
Beer-Sheva



(4)

REGERINGSKANSLIET

2004-12-01

## Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Östeuropa och Centralasien  
Ambassador Harald Hamrin  
Telefon +46-(0)8-405 3343  
E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

Mr. Max Grunberg  
Raoul Wallenberg Honorary Citizen  
Committee  
P.O.Box 38  
Ra'anana 43100  
Israel

Dear Mr. Grunberg,

thank you for your kind letter of November 7, 2004.

In your letter you raise several questions and I shall try to respond to them to the best of my ability. But let me say, at the outset, that it seems to me that there is some misunderstanding between us as to what you and we – i.e. The Raoul Wallenberg Honorary Citizen Committee and the Swedish Foreign Ministry or the Swedish Government – can and should do.

As far as the Missing In Action Appeal is concerned we have contributed to the financing of the Appeal and I have also informed you that we are prepared, through our Embassies, to facilitate the spreading of information about the Appeal. We would, however, not want to involve other parties, such as the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the handling of the Appeal by, as you write in your letter, coordinating the distribution of the Appeal between the Israeli Foreign Ministry, the Swedish Foreign Ministry and your Committee. The Appeal remains your responsibility.

Regarding the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the "disappearance" of Raoul Wallenberg we are planning a similar ceremony in January of next year as the one that was held in 1995. Exactly what kind of a ceremony this will be is still the subject of discussion within the Swedish Government offices and with the Wallenberg family. I shall be happy to keep you informed of the outcome of these discussions. In any case, we are thinking of a solemn ceremony worthy of the work done by Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest. I

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103 39 Stockholm  
Besöksadress  
Drottninggatan 2

Telefonväxel  
08-405 10 00  
Telefax  
08-723 11 76

E-post  
registrator@foreign.ministry.se  
Telex  
105 90 MINFOR S



Utrikesdepartementet

2(2)

2004-1

do not think that this would be an appropriate occasion for launching the Appeal.

As to your question about the nomination procedure for the Illis Quorum medal, there is no formal nomination procedure at all. The initiative as a matter of fact always comes from the Government itself or from an individual member of the Cabinet.

Finally, concerning the establishment of a Raoul Wallenberg Heritage Center, it goes without saying that the Swedish Government would be more than happy to see the establishment of such a center. But in this case, as in the case of various other Raoul Wallenberg Associations or Documentation Centers and specific events around the world, we have taken the position, that these should be established or carried out at the initiative of individual persons or organisations. The Swedish Government's involvement in the Raoul Wallenberg case is of a somewhat different nature and concerns - in addition to our endeavours to spread knowledge about Raoul Wallenberg, his activities and his fate - also our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union/Russia.

As an example of a recent Raoul Wallenberg related initiative, I can mention the seminar in Budapest in September of this year with the participation of Swedish and Hungarian historians. The seminar was organized by the Swedish Institute of International Relations, in cooperation with the Hungarian Holocaust Documentation Center, not by the Swedish Government - although, of course, I personally participated as a representative of the Swedish Government.

Yours sincerely,

Harald Hamrin

⑥



PRIME MINISTER

Stockholm, 29 November 2001

Mr Max Grunberg  
Raoul Wallenberg Honorary Citizen Committee  
P.O. Box 38  
Ra'anana 43100  
ISRAEL

Dear Mr Grunberg,

When the Swedish-Russian Working Group presented its findings in January this year it was made very clear that the report could not be regarded as the final word on Raoul Wallenberg's fate. In view of the fact that there is still no definite information as to what happened to Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish Government intends to continue the investigations. I have been assured by President Putin that we can count on the support of the Russian authorities.

In recent months the Swedish Government has appointed two committees to look into the Raoul Wallenberg case. One of them will conduct an inquiry into the ways in which the Swedish authorities, including successive governments, have handled the case. Another committee will assist the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, on the basis of the evidence collected so far, in identifying areas which should be given priority in the continued investigations in Russia and elsewhere. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs retains its operative responsibility for the investigations.

In this context your tireless efforts to promote the search for Raoul Wallenberg are appreciated by the Swedish Government. We regard them as a useful complement to the official investigations, and I want to express our gratitude for the commitment that you have shown to the cause of our heroic compatriot.

Yours sincerely,

Göran Persson

|                         |                  |                     |                     |
|-------------------------|------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Postal address          | Visiting address | Telephone           | Fax                 |
| Prime Minister's office | Rosenbad 4       | 08-405 10 00        | 08-723 11 71        |
| S-103 33 Stockholm      |                  | int +46 8 405 10 00 | int +46 8 723 11 71 |
| SWEDEN                  |                  |                     |                     |

7

Jerusalem, 14 March 1995  
12 Adar 2 5755

**Raoul Wallenberg - Concluding Proposal**

Based on the information that has been accumulated on the disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg, the Parliamentary Committee to Combat Antisemitism and Xenophobia considers that all efforts must be made in order to trace his fate.


The State of Israel and the Jewish people have the moral obligation to search for the Righteous Among the Nations, Raoul Wallenberg, who saved more than 100,000 Jews during the Holocaust.

The Committee will assist any person or body involved in the investigation of Raoul Wallenberg's fate and will be happy to receive any information that might help in advancing this matter.

The Committee will do its best to coordinate investigations made abroad with those in Israel in order to strengthen the efforts and reach concrete results.

The Committee considers the Russian Government as the accountable and the main source for the clarification of Raoul Wallenberg's fate.

(8)

**PUBLIC APPEAL**

to individuals who may have factual  
information about the whereabouts  
of Raoul Wallenberg

**MISSING IN ACTION****Raoul Wallenberg**

Age Progressed Photo  
(courtesy of National Center for Missing and  
Exploited Children - Horace Heafner - USA)

**DETAILS ABOUT RAOUL WALLENBERG:**

Among the few rays of light during the Holocaust/Shoah, were the actions of the "Righteous Among the Nations", men and women who risked their lives to save the lives of Jews from the Nazis and their collaborators.

Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat, was born in 1912 and risked his life to save thousands of Jewish people in Hungary during World War II.

Raoul Wallenberg was therefore officially recognized by "Yad Vashem" in Israel as one of those "Righteous Among the Nations". Raoul Wallenberg is an Honorary Citizen of Israel, United States, Canada and Hungary.

He was detained in Hungary in January 1945 by the Soviet Army and imprisoned in the former Soviet Union.

Raoul Wallenberg's fate since then is unknown.

If you have any information as to the whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg or are able to assist in the search, please contact:

**Raoul Wallenberg Honorary Citizen Committee**  
P.O. Box 38, Ra'anana 43100, ISRAEL  
Tel: +972-544-953039 Fax: +972-9-7749495 E-mail: max@maxgrunberg.com

All information will be forwarded to the brother and sister of Raoul Wallenberg and the Swedish and Israeli Ministries of Foreign Affairs.

**GOAL:**

**To reveal the truth about Raoul Wallenberg and his tragic fate.**

Despite various official declarations and rumors about his fate, the civilized world at large and human rights activists in particular, are determined to find the whereabouts and fate of this great fighter for humanity.

A joint Swedish-Russian Working Group was formed in 1991 with the task of examining evidence from Russian archives and from people who may have knowledge about Raoul Wallenberg's detention in Soviet prisons and camps.

The conclusions of the official Russian and Swedish reports, which were published in January 2001, is that there is still no conclusive evidence in regard to the whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg.

It is hoped that this public appeal will stimulate the quest for Raoul Wallenberg.





SVERIGES AMBASSAD

2004-12-07

EC

Kiev

Ambassadören Harald Hamrin  
UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET  
EC-enheten  
STOCKHOLM

*La.a/tv*

(EC)

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|------------|------|---------|
| INKOM UD   |      |         |
| 2005-02-03 |      |         |
| Avd. P     | Gr 2 | Mål EU' |

**Uppgift om svensk på psykiatrisk klinik i Magadan 1964**

3 bil.

*Brs Se,*

Insänder kopia jämte översättning till svenska av ett brev som inkom till ambassaden den 26 november. Kuvertet har uppgift om avsändare, en M.T.Sidljar från staden Vatutino i Tjerkasi-oblast. Närsluter också kopia av kuvertet.

Uppgifterna i brevet att vederbörande 1964 i Magadan sett en svensk på en psykiatrisk klinik som uppges varit svensk agent leder tankarna till Raoul Wallenberg.

Innan vi överväger någon kontakt med brevskrivaren är jag tacksam om Du ville granska de få uppgifter som ges och sätta dem i relation till andra uppgifter som är kända av departementet.

*Y. Stige*

*John-Christer Åhlander*  
John-Christer Åhlander

Postadress:  
34/33 vul. Ivana Franka  
01901 KIEV

Telefon:  
+380 44 494 42 70  
+380 44 494 42 90 (visum)

E-post:  
ambassaden.kiev@foreign.ministry.se  
ambassaden.kiev-visum@foreign.ministry.se (visum)

Besöksadress:  
34/33 Ivana Franka  
3:e våningen

Telefax:  
+380 44 494 42 71  
+380 44 494 42 92 (visum)

Hemsida:  
<http://www.sweemb.kiev.ua>

Добрий день.  
Вранці я почув  
радіо що у 50 роках в  
Москві пропав воєн  
Тосол. В 1964р. я закін  
чив школу в психіатричній  
лікарні м. Магадан. Я  
говорив російською мовою  
з скандинавським  
діалектом. Я підтверджую  
що він не був психічно  
хворим. Це була абсолютно  
здорова людина. За словами  
лікаря це був шведський  
розвідник. З його поведінки  
було видно що це освічена  
людина. Якаго Бутін  
дозволив я думаю ви  
їого знайдеш. ~~не підписав~~

PAR. and Klev  
2004-11-26

VERA ZILAKOVA  
1960  
JAN 20 1961

I heard on your radio in spring that your Ambassador had disappeared in Moscow in 1950s. In 1964 I saw a man in a mental hospital in Magadan city who spoke Russian with a Scandinavian dialect. I confirm that this man was not mentally ill. He was a very healthy person. According to doctors he was a Swedish secret service agent. You could see from his behavior that he was an educated person. If Putin allows it, I think that you can find him.

B173  
Libr. M. L. S. - Kamm  
2004-12-04

Адреса відправника, індекс 20251  
м. Вошчине  
Горьковської обл.  
Свердлова 4/5  
Сіряєв М. М.



Музей-садиба Юрія Федьковича смт Путила



Адреса одержувача, індекс

Київ  
вул. Івана Франка  
34/33  
Послу.

07060

2005/21807  
PRUCIVEX.7

P 2 EU<sup>1</sup>

REGERINGSKANSLIET  
Utrikesdepartementet

PM

2004-12-08

(EC)

Enheten för Östeuropa och Centralasien  
Ambassadör  
Harald Hamrin  
Telefon +46-(0)8-405 3343  
E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

Delges: Amb. Fredrik Vahlquist (KSA)

Lerp. 7/4-05 / ZB

#### Besök i Rom med anknytning till Raoul Wallenberg

1 bil. (Ink. mail 041204 fr. Napolitano, Rom t. Hamrin, EC)

Den 22 och 23 november 2004 hade jag tre sammanträffanden i Rom och Vatikanen med anknytning till Raoul Wallenberg och dennes räddningsaktioner i Budapest 1944. I två av dessa sammanträffanden deltog ambassadör Fredrik Vahlquist vid Heliga Stolen. Vahlquist förde därvid anteckningar, som citeras nedan.

#### Möte med ärkebiskop Gennaro Verolino

I mötet deltog förutom ambassadör Vahlquist även

"Mötet med ärkebiskop Verolino (98), som tjänstgjorde vid Heliga Stolens beskickning i Budapest större delen av Andra världskriget, ägde rum i hans privata bostad i Roms nordvästra utkant.

Enligt msgr Verolino utfärdade beskickningen i Budapest ca 25.000 skyddspass. De färdigtryckta blanketterna fylldes alla i med hjälp av skrivmaskin. Till detta omfattande arbete behövdes 4-5 lokalanställda.

Kommunikationerna mellan Vatikanen och beskickningen skedde per kryptotrafik.

Beskickningen i Budapest hade hela tiden Vatikanens tysta stöd för sina omfattande hjälpinsatser.

Raoul Wallenberg var utan tvekan den drivande kraften i arbetet på att rädda så många människoliv som möjligt. Han försatte sig många gånger i livsfara för att kunna rädda judar.

2004-12-08

Sista gången Verolino träffade Raoul Wallenberg var strax före julen 1944. När ryktet spreds att den svenska diplomaten RW gripits av ryssarna den 17 januari 1945 sades det att han nog förts till Sibirien. 'Men vi förstod aldrig varför ryssarna arresterat honom.'

Själv lämnade msgr Verolino Budapest våren 1945 och begav sig då till Italien för att senare bli posterad i Prag."

Kommentar: msgr Verolino var vid mitt möte med honom 98 år gammal. Sex årtionden hade förflutit sedan hans vistelse i Budapest och hans sammanträffanden där med Wallenberg. Det var uppenbart att hans minnesbilder av vad han upplevde 1944, av naturliga skäl, var allmänna, vaga och delvis influerade av vad han senare hört och läst om Raoul Wallenberg. Det gäller exempelvis antalet av nuntiatoren utfärdade skyddspass liksom "ryktet" om Wallenbergs arrestering och hans öde därefter. Dock andades hans berättelse genomgående av stor respekt och beundran för Wallenbergs insatser.

#### Möte med

I mötet deltog förutom ambassadör Vahlquist även

har i många år varit involverad i det arkiv- och forskningsprojekt om Vatikanen under Andra världskriget som inleddes 1964 och leddes av fader Blét. Gruppen bestod av fyra personer och avslutade i princip sitt arbete 1984/85. Resultatet av deras mödor har publicerats i 11 böcker om sammanlagt 12 volymer. Vi erbjöds nu ta del av innehållet i dessa.

Normalt går man igenom en påves pontifikat ("regeringstid"). I ovannämnda fall gällde det istället för ovanlighetens skull en genomgång av ett specifikt ämne.

Tre ggr har det under de senaste 20 åren kommit framställningar från Sverige om att få ta del av handlingar i Vatikanarkivet rörande Raoul Wallenberg och Heliga Stolens beskickning i Budapest under Andra Världskriget. Senast gjordes det när Jan Lundvik var ambassadör i Budapest 1994-98. Dessa framställningar har dock alla avvisats med

2004-12-08

hänvisning till att arkiven vad gäller dessa år inte ännu är genomgångna och ordnade.

framhöll att medan det omfattande och tidsödande arkivarbetet pågick tilläts inte ens en kardinal att få tillgång till handlingar han önskade få ta del. Först när allt arbete var slutfört kunde utomstående få ta del av dem. En höll man på med Pius XI:s pontifikat, dvs åren 1922-39.

Msgr Rottas och msgr Verolinos omfattande insatser i Budapest för att rädda judar med hjälp av skyddspass och hus som stod under Vatikanens beskydd var inte officiellt sanktionerade av Vatikanen, varför det inte finns något närmare härom på dossier. Pius XII lämnade aldrig skriftliga instruktioner. Men det är väl dokumenterat att Heliga Stolens beskickning i Budapest hade påvens helhjärtade stöd i sina försök att rädda så många judiska människoliv som möjligt undan nazisterna och ungerska pilkorsare.

Totalt utfärdade beskickningen i Budapest fram till oktober 1944 17.000 skyddspass. Även senare utfärdade den sådana skyddspass men antalet är okänt.

Här tillfogade att Heliga Stolens beskickning i Bukarest samtidigt utfärdade 30-35.000 skyddspass."

Kommentar: "Avhemligandet" av dokument från Pius XI:s pontifikat beräknas enligt vara avslutat våren/sommaren 2005. Därefter vidtar samma process vad gäller Pius XII:s pontifikat (1939-58), som naturligtvis är intressant i ett RW-perspektiv. Mycket av det som gäller nuntiaturens i Budapest arbete under 1944 finns publicerat i den ovan av fader Blét offentliggjorda dokumentsamlingen. Vad som i övrigt kan finnas i arkivgömmorna är oklart. – Enligt utfärdade nuntiatoren i Budapest under tiden fram till oktober 1944 17.000 skyddspass och därefter under resten av 1944 ett "okänt" antal skyddspass. Siffran skall jämföras med den ovan av Verolino angivna siffran 25.000. Verolinos uppgift skall dock sannolikt snarare uppfattas som en i efterhand allmänt "accepterad" siffra än en på verklig information baserad kunskap.

2004-12-08

Möte med professor Matteo Luigi Napolitano


Napolitano är historiker. Han har i sin forskning särskilt sysslat med Vatikanen under Andra världskriget och är väl förtrogen med dokumentläget vad gäller denna period.

I bif. e-mail till mig (bil. 1, 2004-12-04) några veckor efter mitt möte med honom redogör Napolitano för ett antal dokument, som visar på samarbetet mellan nuntiaturen och de neutrala ländernas beskickningar, däribland Sveriges, i Budapest. Bl a visar dessa dokument att fader

bild av Vatikanen som i huvudsak endast "i tysthet" stödjande nuntiaturens räddningsaktioner i Budapest måste nyanseras. Vatikanen och Pius XII personligen var sannolikt mera aktiva än vad fader

framställer dem som. Ett dokument kan möjligen också tydas som att ett organiserat samarbete mellan nuntiaturen och de neutrala beskickningarna förekom vad gäller tryckningen av skyddspass. Här kan möjligen finnas skäl att studera arkivmaterialet närmare i syfte att söka fastställa hur många skyddspass som faktiskt trycktes/utfärdades av de olika ländernas beskickningar, däribland Sveriges, i Budapest.

Napolitano kom även med ett nytt uppslag till arkivstudier gällande material från den s.k. Salòrepubliken. Dokument från denna republiks "utrikesdepartement" har bevarats och förvaras nu "i anslutning till" det italienska utrikesministeriets arkiv. Av formella skäl utgör detta material inte en integrerad del av det italienska UM:s arkiv (Salòrepubliken var 1943-45 en i förhållande till Republiken Italien "främmande - och av Italien inte erkänd - makt".) Men bevarade delar av Salòrepublikens arkiv förvaras alltså, vad gäller det utrikespolitiska materialet, hos det italienska UM. Vad som där kan finnas av intresse beträffande situationen i Ungern 1944 är oklart, men skulle enligt Napolitano kunna vara värt att studera.



Harald Hamrin



Göran Rydeberg  
2005-01-13 12:04

Till: birstein@pipeline.com  
Kopia:  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: a request

Dear Dr Birstein,

The documents you asked for were released in April and June 1993 by the Russian authorities. All of these documents which we now have access to are collected and given a letter definition. A=From former KGB, B=From the Central Committee, C=From The ministry of Defence, D=From MID, E=From the Presidential Archives and F=misscellania.

These are the documents in according with your requests I will enclose for you. They will arrive in a couple of days.

1. Document C 11
2. C 12
3. C 14
4. D 4
5. D 5
6. D 8
7. D 9

Unfortunately there are not much concerning the Swiss diplomats Feller and Maier in the files of the Foreign Ministry (UD) in Sweden. However if you have not read the book, Tschuy Theo, Charles Lutz und die Juden von Budapest. Zürich 1998 I can strongly recommend it because there you can find a lot of details concerning the diplomats that were caught by the Soviet troops.

Best regards

Göran Rydeberg

----- Vidarebefordrat av Göran Rydeberg/FOREIGN/MINISTRY 2005-01-13 12:04 -----

"Vadim birstein"  
<birstein@pipeline.com>  
2005-01-12 18:06

Till: <goran.rydeberg@foreign.ministry.se>  
Kopia:  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: a request

|                  |       |           |
|------------------|-------|-----------|
| INK. UD          |       |           |
| D.Nr. 2005/2229  |       |           |
| 2005-01-14<br>13 |       |           |
| AVD. P           | GR. 2 | MÅL. Eu 1 |



Dear Mr. Rydeberg:<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" />

All the best wishes for 2005.

Sorry for a new request. I would greatly appreciate receiving copies of the following documents connected with the Wallenberg case:

1. Bulganin's order to arrest Wallenberg dated January 17, 1945;
2. Bulganin's order to arrest Feller and Meier dated January 17, 1945;
3. Zakharov's report to Bulganin on sending Wallenberg to Moscow dated January 25, 1945.

By the way, when did the Russian group released these three documents? And what archive did they come from?

4. A letter of Dr. A. Zehnder to Major General Vikhorev dated November 7, 1945, offering to exchange 6 Soviet

citizens for Feller and Meier;

5. A letter of Dekanozov to Merkulov dated December 4, 1945, regarding Zehnder's offer;
6. A letter of Dekanozov to Abakumov dated January 14, 1946 (informs of Meier and Feller's release);
7. A note of Gavrilov to Kozyrev dated January 31, 1946, on the repatriation of Feller and Meier.
8. Any other available document concerning the arrest and exchange of Feller and Meier (you have already sent me a copy of Abakumov's report to Molotov).

As usual, thank you in advance for your time and help.

Sincerely,

Dr. Vadim Birstein  
331 West 57<sup>th</sup> Street #159  
New York, NY 10019  
USA

2005/3317

P2 Eu<sup>1</sup>

ARK

Göran Rydeberg

2005-01-13 12:04

Till: birstein@pipeline.com

Kopia:

Blank:

Fax till:

Ärende: a request

Dear Dr Birstein,

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Best regards

Göran Rydeberg

ARK

INK. UD

D.Nr.

2005-01-14

# LMD

Leco Music Division

2005-01-17/UD-EC/Hamrin  
Brevsvar 050117

Simlångsdalen den 12 januari 2005

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| BOKFÖRSLAG   |   |    |
| D.Nr 05/280/ |   |    |
| 2005-01-1714 |   |    |
| AVD.         | P | 2  |
|              |   | Eu |

(EC)

Cd:n finns hos  
Harald Hamrin (ud-EC)

Ärade Harald!

Bifogat sänder jag den färdiga Cd:n med informationsbroschyr tillägnad Raoul Wallenberg.

Jag hoppas att min tidigare skrivelse med handgjord "prototyp" nådde fram. Det skickades den 1 december.

Fullständigt medveten om att mitt lilla informationshäfte inte innehåller några som helst banbrytande nyheter kring Raoul Wallenberg, har jag dock tagit mig friheten att samla mina kunskaper och känslor inför det han gjorde i dessa sånger och häfte. Syftet är att väcka intresse hos människor som hittills inte känner till något om Raoul Wallenbergs gärning och öde.


S.k. "release" kommer att ske i "Nyhetsmorgon i TV4" den 17 januari. Till min oerhörda glädje kommer Nina Lagergren också till studion för att hjälpa mig ge mer "tyngd" åt de muntliga diskussionerna i "soffan". Nina kommer också att medverka i ett rikstäckande radioprogram som skall sändas i Radio P4 den 27 januari. Jag är oerhört glad över att Nina och Gunnar Lagergren stött mig och hjälpt till att "styra upp" innehållet i broschyren.

Som jag nämnde tidigare är huvudsyftet med detta verk att väcka intresse för Raoul Wallenberg. Under framträdandet i TV4 kommer Sveriges för närvarande två mest populära (och bästa) gitarrister att ackompanjera mig: Ulf Lundells stjärngitarrist Janne Bark och Gyllene Tiders dito Mats MP Persson. De är producenter för var och en av sångerna.

Redan innan jag givit ut mina sånger och häfte har flera gymnasielärare uppvaktat mig och frågat om de får använda materialet i undervisningen. Det gläder mig naturligtvis mycket eftersom det just var syftet med mitt projekt. Dock är det så att mina resurser börjar bli begränsade eftersom jag hittills med glädje lagt ut c.a. 100 000 kronor för produktionen med en mindre upplaga. Jag har inga som helst vinstintressen i detta utan ser det som mitt sätt att bidra till att visa ungdomar och vuxna hur vi i vår vardag kan förvalta Raoul Wallenbergs stora gåva.

Skälet till att jag skriver till Dig är helt enkelt att jag skulle vilja diskutera hur vi eventuellt skulle kunna samarbeta kring detta framdeles. Jag skulle bli oerhört glad om jag bara kunde få hjälp att få kontakt med någon person som kunde ge mig en uppgift om huruvida detta är ett intressant projekt för regeringen att genom vilket förhindra det som ryms mellan mobbing och folkmord.

Med vänligaste hälsningar



Ben Olander

(EC)

05/2956  
P / 2 En'

Harald Hamrin

2005-01-14 14:25

Till: Max Grunberg <max@maxgrunberg.com>  
Kopia: Robert Rydberg/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: Ang: re: circulation appeal

Dear Mr. Grunberg,

thank you for your kind e-mail with the final version of the Missing in Action Appeal.

As I have told you before we are quite willing to help you with the distribution of the Appeal through Swedish Embassies. Reading the final version of the Appeal I have, however, noticed one problem. As you know, the bilateral working group resulted in two reports. The long Swedish report concluded, as you rightly notice in the Appeal, that "there is still no conclusive evidence in regard to the whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg". That is, however, not the position of the Russian side, which stated in its shorter report that Raoul Wallenberg had "died, or rather perished" on July 17, 1947. The Swedish Government, of course, has not accepted that version as the final word on Raoul Wallenberg. But it would not be correct, in an Appeal distributed through official Swedish channels, to give the impression that the Russian side has accepted the Swedish position as its own. I have, therefore, to ask you to cancel the reference to the Russian position as being identical to the Swedish position.

Sincerely yours,

Harald Hamrin  
Max Grunberg <max@maxgrunberg.com>

Γ a.a.  
H. H.



Max Grunberg  
<max@maxgrunberg.com>  
2005-01-14 06:12

Till: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se  
Kopia: Distributionslista med 2 mottagare  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: re: circulation appeal

Dear Ambassador Hamrin:

With reference to the appeal, may I kindly ask you if you could please inform me, if the Foreign Ministry has already sent it out or when they are plan to circulate this document through it's network of embassies?


Looking forward to hearing from you.

Best regards.



Max Grunberg appeal.pdf

1461



## PUBLIC APPEAL

to individuals who may have factual  
information about the whereabouts  
of Raoul Wallenberg

# MISSING IN ACTION

## Raoul Wallenberg

Age Progressed Photo  
(courtesy of National Center for Missing and  
Exploited Children – Horace Heafner – USA)

### DETAILS ABOUT RAOUL WALLENBERG:

Among the few rays of light during the Holocaust/Shoah, were the actions of the "Righteous Among the Nations", men and women who risked their lives to save the lives of Jews from the Nazis and their collaborators.

Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat, was born in 1912 and risked his life to save thousands of Jewish people in Hungary during World War II.

Raoul Wallenberg was therefore officially recognized by "Yad Vashem" in Israel as one of those "Righteous Among the Nations". Raoul Wallenberg is an Honorary Citizen of Israel, United States, Canada and Hungary.

He was detained in Hungary in January 1945 by the Soviet Army and imprisoned in the former Soviet Union.

Raoul Wallenberg's fate since then is unknown.

If you have any information as to the whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg or are able to assist in the search, please contact:

### GOAL:

**To reveal the truth about Raoul Wallenberg and his tragic fate.**

Despite various official declarations and rumors about his fate, the civilized world at large and human rights activists in particular, are determined to find the whereabouts and fate of this great fighter for humanity.

A joint Swedish-Russian Working Group was formed in 1991 with the task of examining evidence from Russian archives and from people who may have knowledge about Raoul Wallenberg's detention in Soviet prisons and camps.

The conclusions of the official Russian and Swedish reports, which were published in January 2001, is that there is still no conclusive evidence in regard to the whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg.

It is hoped that this public appeal will stimulate the quest for Raoul Wallenberg.

### Raoul Wallenberg Honorary Citizen Committee

P.O. Box 38, Ra'anana 43100, ISRAEL

Tel: +972-544-953039 Fax: +972-9-7749495 E-mail: [max@maxgrunberg.com](mailto:max@maxgrunberg.com)

All information will be forwarded to the brother and sister of Raoul Wallenberg and the Swedish and Israeli Ministries of Foreign Affairs.



REGERINGSKANSLIET

2005-01-17

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Östeuropa och Centralasien  
Ambassadör  
Harald Hamrin  
Telefon +46-(0)8-405 3343  
E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

05/2810  
(EC) P 2 EU'  
LMD  
Ben Olander  
Box 44  
310 38 Simlångsdalen

Raoul Wallenberg

Bäste Ben Olander!

Tack för dina båda brev och de två CD-skivorna du sänt mig, nu senast den slutgiltiga versionen. Jag har lyssnat på musiken och uppskattat den mycket.

Hur mycket jag än skulle vilja det har jag svårt att ge dig ett konkret svar på hur regeringen skulle kunna samarbeta med dig. En tanke vore naturligtvis att CD-skivan spreds till svenska skolor eller att du personligen spelade och sjöng ute på skolorna. Men ett sådant samarbete är i så fall något för utbildningsdepartementet att hantera. Utrikesdepartementet har varken resurser eller kanaler för något sådant. En annan möjlighet, som kanske ligger ännu närmare till hands, är ett samarbete med Forum för Levande Historia med högkvarter i Gamla stan i Stockholm. Chef där är Helene Löow och du får gärna hälsa från mig personligen – men även där gäller att det departement Forum lyder under inte är Utrikesdepartementet utan Utbildnings- (och Kultur-) departementet.

Hör gärna av dig igen om jag kan lägga ett gott ord för dig.

Med vänliga hälsningar

Harald Hamrin

Harald Hamrin

Postadress  
103 39 Stockholm  
Besöksadress  
Drottninggatan 2

Telefonväxel  
08-405 10 00  
Telefax  
08-723 11 76

E-post  
registrator@foreign.ministry.se  
Telex  
105 90 MINFOR S

exp. 050117/jl.

Niklas Wiberg  
2005-01-18 12:00  
UD Budapest(amb)

Till: <sup>EC</sup>Harald Hamrin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK  
Kopia: Distributionslista med 6 mottagare  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: Raoul Wallenberg Commemoration *ungerska*

HBR  
(EC)  
2005-01-18  
DN: 2005/3934  
2005-01-21/18  
AVD  
2  
Eu'

Hej Harald,


Efter två dagar av minnesceremonier och besök av Louise von Dardel kan vi rapportera om ett gott resultat med fina evenemang och god uppslutning. Minneshögtiden 16 jan ägde rum i Holocaust Documentation Center med deltagande av talmannen Katalin Szili och presidenten i högsta domstolen och representanter från bla USA, Ryssland och Tyskland. Efter Szili höll Louise von Dardel ett personligt och uppskattat tal, sång och presentationer av Goldmark-kören och RW-skolan gav en bra inramning. Ceremonin fick bra täckning i ungersk TV och de största dagstidningarna, se bifogad artikel. RW-föreningen hade räknat med att ca. 150 personer skulle delta i Holocaust Documentation Center, men närmare 300 kom!

17 januari ägde rum en lunch rum i residenset med Louise von Dardel som hedersgäst, i övrigt deltog vice-borgmästare, MR-ombudsmannen, repr. från ungerska UM, RW-föreningen och RW-skolan och övriga med anknytning till RW. Dagen avslutade med ceremonier vid tre olika minnesplaketter i Budapest, två för RW och ett för Vilmos Langfelder, där Louise von Dardel, ambassaden och repr. från RW-föreningen deltog. Sammanlagt alltså ett värdigt uppmärksammande av 60-årsdagen.

Jag noterade uttalandet från Freivalds som var väl avvägt och framåtblickande.

Mvh Niklas

----- Forwarded by Niklas Wiberg/FOREIGN/MINISTRY on 2005-01-18 11:40 -----



Judit  
Radnóczy/FOREIGN/MINISTR  
Y

2005-01-17 11:04

To: Distributionlist with 4 recipients

cc:

bcc:

Subject: **article today: Raoul Wallenberg Commemoration**

Dear All,

Please find enclosed the translation of the article in today's Népszabadság.

Judit



RWCommemoration\_160105.doc

a. a.  
*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten mark]*



## Raoul Wallenberg Commemoration

Népszabadság 17 January 2005, p. 8.

[www.nol.hu/cikk/348501/](http://www.nol.hu/cikk/348501/)

**On the occasion of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the abduction of the Swedish diplomat who saved thousands of Jews, a commemorative evening was held at the Holocaust Documentation Centre in Páva utca.**

I am sure Raoul Wallenberg was one of the 36 Righteous Ones, said Katalin Szili, President of Parliament, referring to the Jewish legend, according to which the moral values of the world are guarded by 36 Righteous Men.

Though Wallenberg was aware of the threatening dangers, he took the risk, she added. In Hungary, there were fortunately many more than 36 Righteous Men - human solidarity, religious and political convictions made people help the persecuted. Wallenberg tried to coordinate their work of individuals and small communities. Would the young diplomat have done only as much as his job required him to, he might still be living, as a 92-year-old gentleman, she said.

Katalin Szili is proud that beside the Budapest monument, we also contributed to the Raoul Wallenberg monument in Stockholm, which was made by Lenke Rothman, a Hungarian artist born in Kiskunfélegyháza, and saved from deportation.

On behalf of the Wallenberg family Louise von Dardel delivered a commemorative speech.

[Short biography of Raoul Wallenberg]

Megemlékezés Raoul Wallenbergről

Népszabadság • MTI • 2005. január 17.

**A magyar zsidók ezreit megmentő svéd diplomata, Raoul Wallenberg eltűnésének 60. évfordulója alkalmából emlékestet tartottak vasárnap Budapesten a Páva utcai Holokauszt Dokumentációs Központban.**

- Biztos vagyok abban, hogy Raoul Wallenberg a 36 igazak egyike volt - mondta az ünnepségen *Szili Katalin* házelnök - felidézve azt a zsidó legendát, amely szerint a világ erkölcsi rendjét 36 igaz ember vigyázza.

- Wallenberg, aki - bár tisztában volt a személyét fenyegető veszéllyel - vállalta a kockázatot - emlékezett az Országgyűlés elnöke. Hozzátette: Magyarországon szerencsére jóval több igaz ember volt a legendában szereplő 36-nál: sokan segítettek emberséggel, szolidaritásból, vallási vagy politikai meggyőződésből az üldözötteken. Wallenberg igyekezett integráló szerepet betölteni a segíteni kész egyének és kis csoportok között. - Ha a fiatal diplomata csak annyit tett volna meg, amennyit a beosztása feltétlenül megkíván, akár ma is élhetne, 92 éves szelíd öregúrként" - mondta.

Szili büszke arra, hogy a budapesti mellett - közvetve - Wallenberg stockholmi emlékművéhez is közünk van, hiszen a svéd parlamentben lévő emlékművet egy, a deportálásból Svédországba menekített kiskunfélegyházi születésű képzőművész, *Lenke Rothman* készítette.

A Wallenberg család nevében *Louise von Dardel* asszony emlékezett.

**Raoul Wallenberg** 1912. augusztus 4-én született Stockholmban. Az amerikai Michigan Egyetemen építészetet tanult, 1935-ben egy dél-afrikai svéd cégnél helyezkedett el. Néhány hónappal később egy holland banknál a palesztinai Haifában kezdett dolgozni, s ott került kapcsolatba Németországból menekült zsidókkal. 1942 elején járt először Magyarországon, majd 1944 júliusában a svéd követség titkáráként érkezett vissza. Zsidók ezreit mentette meg hamis útlevelekkel, menlevelekkel. 1945. január 17-én Budapestre Debrecenbe indult, ahová soha nem érkezett meg. A szovjet hatóságok elhurcolták, sorsáró máig nem tudni bizonyosat.

Niklas Wiberg  
2005-01-19 09:41  
UD Budapest(amb)

Till: Distributionslista med 2 mottagare

Harald Hamrin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK01-2119  
j.o.lundvik@telia.com

Kopia:  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: Fw: 2 bilder


HBR

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| INK. UTRAFÖRDEL |    |
| D.Nr. 2005/3936 |    |
| 2005-01-19      |    |
| AVD.            | C. |
| P               | 2  |
| Eu'             |    |

För arkivet.

Mvh Niklas

----- Forwarded by Niklas Wiberg/FOREIGN/MINISTRY on 2005-01-19 09:39 -----



Judit  
Radnóczy/FOREIGN/MINISTR  
Y

2005-01-19 09:14

To: Distributionlist with 2 recipients  
cc:  
bcc:  
Subject: 2 bilder

Hej,

Bifogas bilden och kartan från Népszabadság.  
Judit




Wallenberg utca 0117.bmp ghetto 1944.bmp

Raoul Wallenberg comm. w. 50.  
Angen

D.O.  
HHC





Az egykori budapesti gettó területe



SVERIGES AMBASSAD

2005-01-17

Moskva

Ambassadören Harald Hamrin  
UD-EC

Aambs Ulrik Tideström  
+7 095 937 92 23

2005/3967



|              |         |            |
|--------------|---------|------------|
| INKOM UD     |         |            |
| 2005 -01- 21 |         |            |
| Avd.<br>P    | Gr<br>2 | Mål<br>EU' |

**Vilmos Böhm och fallet Raoul Wallenberg**

3 bilagor (jämte översättningar till svenska)

BÄSTE HARALD,

Jag bifogar här för Din kännedom några handlingar som kan vara av intresse.

I Wilhelm Agrells bok "Venona. Spåren från ett underrättelsekrig" (Historiska Media, 2003) förekommer som bekant vissa uppgifter med koppling till fallet Raoul Wallenberg. Bland annat sägs att ungraren Vilmos Böhm var värvad NKVD-agent under täcknamnet Orestes och lämnade uppgifter rörande Wallenberg till Sovjetunionen.

Ambassaden mottog i höstas en begäran från efterlevande till Vilmos Böhm att kontakta ryska myndigheter för att om möjligt erhålla uppgifter om den sovjetiska säkerhetstjänstens eventuella kontakter med Böhm (bilaga 1). Frågorna framfördes till ryska utrikesministeriet i en note från ambassaden av den 22 oktober 2004 (bilaga 2 med översättning). Ambassaden mottog idag utrikesministeriets svarsnote av den 13 januari 2005 (bilaga 3 med översättning), där ministeriet meddelar att ryska kompetenta myndigheter inte förfogar över någon information i de frågor som ställts i ambassadens note.

MED VÄNLIGA HÄLSNINGAR, DENNA 60-ÅRS DAG AV RAOUL  
WALLENBERGS ARRESTERING,

Ulrik Tideström

Ulrik Tideström

Postadress:  
Ulitsa Mosfil'movskaja 60  
119 590 Moskva

Telefon:  
(7 095) 937 92 00

E-post:  
ambassaden.moskva@foreign.ministry.se

Besöksadress:  
Ulitsa Mosfil'movskaja 60  
119 590 Moskva

Telefax:  
(7 095) 937 92 02

Hemsida:  
<http://www.sweden.ru>

Till  
ambassadör Sven Hirdman  
eller vederbörande tjänsteman  
Svenska ambassaden  
Moskva, Ryssland

Not 252/04  
2004-10-22

|                  |        |           |
|------------------|--------|-----------|
| INK. AMB. MOSKVA |        |           |
| D.nr. 14/162     |        |           |
| 2004-09-27       |        |           |
| AVD. R           | GR. 18 | MÅL R. W. |

### Ang. begäran om hjälp att få fram material ur ryska arkiv om Vilmos Böhm

Mellan 30.8-1.9 hölls en rättegång i Malmö, där undertecknad, min bror Stefan Böhm och vår kusin Eva Böhm hade stämt historikern Wilhelm Agrell och förlaget Historiska Media i Lund om **skadestånd för förtal av avliden, enligt tryckfrihetsförordningen.**

I Agrells bok "Venona" hade han skrivit ett kapitel (kap. 31) om vår farfar Vilmos Böhm. Han anklagades där på tre huvudsakliga punkter:

- att ha varit sovjetisk, avlönad, värvad agent i Stockholm under kriget, ssk 1942-1945.
- att medvetet ha gått under täcknamnet Orestes som denna agent
- att ha "förrått" Raoul Wallenberg genom att svika sitt förtroende mot honom och lämna ut uppgifter om hans uppdragsgivare till ryssarna, vilket ledde till Wallenbergs gripande.

Agrell friades av en jury på nio personer, som inte betraktade detta som förtal, då de menade att Agrell hade skälig grund till dessa hypoteser genom sin forskning. De gick alltså emot vår sida som hävdade att det inte fanns tillräcklig saklig grund för att komma med dessa mycket allvarliga anklagelser. **Agrell frikändes alltså från förtal.** (Dom 04-09-10, Mål nr T 7273-03, Malmö Tingsrätt, avd 3, rotel 31)

Vi kan inte överklaga då en friande dom från en jury inte kan överklagas. Vi kan däremot leta vidare efter bevis för vår sak för att få resning. Framför allt vore dokument från ryska arkiv en möjlig väg för oss.

Vi är alla tre svenska medborgare:

Stefan Böhm, 420915-1010, Rörstrandsgatan 22, 113 40 Stockholm  
Tomas Böhm, 450420-1056, Tomtebgatan 17, 113 39 Stockholm  
Eva Böhm, 470702-9320, Allévägen 75, 192 76 Sollentuna

Vår farfar **Vilmos Böhm, 1880-1949**, var politisk flykting från Ungern, Österrike och Tjeckoslovakien som levde i Sverige 1938-1949.

Han deltog som försvarsminister och ÖB i den ungerska revolutionsregeringen 1918 som socialdemokrat.

Han fick politisk asyl i Österrike 1919 efter Horthyregimens maktövertagande i Ungern.

Han flydde till Tjeckoslovakien 1934 efter att Dolfuss-regimen förbjöd socialdemokratisk verksamhet i Österrike.


Slutligen flydde han 1938 till Sverige med hjälp av svenska socialdemokrater. Under senare delen av kriget arbetade han på brittiska ambassadens Press Reading Bureau. Han levde i Sverige fram till sin död 1949. Under 1947-48 var han en kort tid Ungerns minister i Sverige, innan han som socialdemokrat avgick i protest mot den kommunistiska Rakosiregimen, som därefter berövade honom hans ungerska medborgarskap.

Det skulle vara ovärderligt för oss i vår strävan att rentvå vår farfars namn om ambassaden kan hjälpa oss att kontakta vederbörliga ryska myndigheter för att få fram uppgifter om den sovjetiska säkerhetstjänstens eventuella kontakter med Vilmos Böhm. Följande frågor är angelägna att få svar på:

- vem var personen under täcknamn Orestes?
- var Orestes en avlönad, värvad agent eller en ofrivillig "agent in the dark"?
- hade Vilmos Böhm något täcknamn från den sovjetiska säkerhetstjänsten?
- vilka uppgifter om Wallenberg ledde till hans gripande?
- vem "förrådde" Wallenberg, dvs fanns det någon person som gav sådana uppgifter till Sovjet vilket ledde till RW:s gripande januari 1945?
- om dessa frågor inte kan besvaras, kanske de ändå till vissa delar kan besvaras nekande, dvs att Orestes inte var Vilmos Böhm, att Wallenberg inte "förråddes" etc.

Stockholm 13 september 2004

med vänliga hälsningar



Tomas Böhm, leg.läk.  
Tomtebogatan 17  
113 39 Stockholm  
Sverige



SVERIGES AMBASSAD

Посольство Швеции  
Москва

BILAGA 2  
MED ÖVERSÄTTNING

R 18 R. W

10/A  
№ 252/04

Посольство Швеции в Российской Федерации свидетельствует свое уважение Министерству Иностранных Дел Российской Федерации и просит Министерство оказать содействие в следующем вопросе.

В 2003 году шведское издательство "Хистуриска Медиа" выпустило монографию "Венона. Следы шпионских войн", автор которой, шведский историк и писатель Вильгельм Агрель, сообщает ряд сведений, имеющих отношение к делу шведского дипломата Рауля Валленберга. В частности, автор сообщает о том, что венгр Вильмош Бём (Vilmos Böhm), завербованный агент НКВД, действовавший под агентурным именем Орестес, передал в Советский Союз донесение относительно Валленберга.

Потомки Вильмоша Бёма просили Посольство оказать содействие в получении от компетентных ведомств ответа на следующие вопросы, если это возможно:

- Кто работал под агентурным именем Орестес (Orestes)? Если российская сторона не может дать исчерпывающий ответ на этот вопрос, шведская сторона просит сообщить, работал ли под именем Орестес сам Вильмош Бём.
- Кем был Орестес - платным, завербованным агентом или агентом "по незнанию" (agent in the dark)?
- Было ли у Вильмоша Бёма агентурное имя, присвоенное ему советской разведкой?

МИНИСТЕРСТВУ ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ  
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ  
Второму Европейскому департаменту  
г. Москва

EXP. MED CHAUFFEUR

041025

Почтовый адрес:  
Ул. Мосфильмовская 60  
119 590 Москва

Адрес для посещений:  
Ул. Мосфильмовская 60

Телефон:  
(095) 937 92 00  
(502) 937 92 00

Факс:  
(095) 937 92 02  
(095) 937 92 03 (визовый отдел)  
(095) 937 92 04 (торг. отдел)  
(095) 937 92 08 (отдел культуры)

Адрес в Интернете:  
[www.sweden.ru](http://www.sweden.ru)



- Существовало ли лицо, передавшее в Советский Союз донесение, которое привело к аресту Валленберга? Если российская сторона не может дать исчерпывающий ответ на этот вопрос, шведская сторона просит сообщить, соответствует ли действительности информация о том, что кто-то "предал" Валленберга.

Посольство было бы признательно Министерству за передачу вышеперечисленных вопросов в адрес российских компетентных ведомств.

Посольство Швеции пользуется случаем, чтобы возобновить Министерству Иностранных Дел Российской Федерации уверения в своем высоком уважении.

Москва, 22 октября 2004 года.



SVERIGES AMBASSAD  
Moskva  
Christina Johannesson

ÖVERSÄTTNING  
2005-01-17

Översättning från ryska

Till Ryska federationens Utrikesministerium  
Andra europeiska avdelningen  
Moskva

Note nr 252/04

Sveriges ambassad i Ryska federationen betygar Ryska federationens Utrikesministerium sin aktning och ber om Ministeriets bistånd i följande ärende.

I boken "Venona. Spåren från ett underrättelsekrig" av den svenske historikern och författaren Wilhelm Agrell (utgiven av Historiska Media, Sverige, 2003) förekommer vissa uppgifter med koppling till fallet Raoul Wallenberg. Bland annat sägs att ungraren Vilmos Böhm var värvad NKVD-agent under täcknamnet Orestes och lämnade uppgifter rörande Wallenberg till Sovjetunionen.

Efterlevande till Vilmos Böhm har bett ambassaden att med hjälp av berörda myndigheter försöka besvara följande frågor.

- Vem var personen under täcknamn Orestes? Om frågan inte kan besvaras fullständigt kanske det kan anges huruvida just Vilmos Böhm var Orestes eller inte.
- Var Orestes en avlönad, värvad agent eller en omedveten agent ("agent in the dark")?
- Hade Vilmos Böhm något täcknamn från den sovjetiska säkerhetstjänsten?
- Fanns det någon person som gav sådana uppgifter till Sovjetunionen som ledde till Wallenbergs gripande? Om frågan inte kan besvaras fullständigt kanske det kan anges huruvida det alls var någon som "förrådde" Wallenberg.

Ambassaden vore tacksam om Ministeriet kunde vidarebefordra frågorna till berörda ryska myndigheter.

Sveriges ambassad begagnar tillfället att ånyo försäkra Ryska federationens Utrikesministerium om sin utmärkta högaktning.

Moskva den 22 oktober 2004

/stämpel/

UT:

E-post  
Tideström - Tomas Böhm  
050117

|                  |       |        |
|------------------|-------|--------|
| INK. AMB. MOSKVA |       |        |
| D.nr. 11:4/6     |       |        |
| 2005-01-17       |       |        |
| AVD. R           | GR 18 | MA R.W |

№ 181 /2ЕД

Vår begäran om information i Wallenbergsärendet

Министерство Иностранных Дел Российской Федерации свидетельствует свое уважение Посольству Королевства Швеция в Российской Федерации и, ссылаясь на ноту Посольства № 252/04 от 22 октября 2004 года, имеет честь сообщить, что российские компетентные ведомства не располагают информацией по поставленным в упомянутой ноте вопросам.

Министерство пользуется случаем, чтобы возобновить Посольству уверения в своем высоком уважении.



Москва, "13" января 2005 года

ПОСОЛЬСТВУ КОРОЛЕВСТВА ШВЕЦИЯ

г.Москва

SVERIGES AMBASSAD

Moskva

Christina Johannesson

ÖVERSÄTTNING

2005-01-17

Översättning från ryska

Till Sveriges ambassad  
Moskva

Note nr 181/2ED

Ryska federationens Utrikesministerium betygar härmed Sveriges ambassad i Ryska federationen sin aktning och har med hänvisning till ambassadens note nr 252/04 av den 22 oktober 2004 äran meddela att ryska kompetenta myndigheter inte förfogar över någon information i de frågor som ställs i ovan nämnda note.

Ministeriet begagnar tillfället att ånyo försäkra ambassaden om sin utmärkta högaktning.

/stämpel/

Moskva den 13 januari 2005

Harald Hamrin

2005-01-26 10:57

Till: Niklas Wiberg/FOREIGN/MINISTRY  
Kopia: Harald Hamrin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK,  
J.o.lundvik@telia.com, Bengt  
Lundborg/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK, Mats  
Lindström/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK, Kristina  
Eineborg/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK, Gunnar  
Haglund/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK

Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: Ang: Intervju med Mrs. Kubinyi

Niklas!

Tack för ditt-mail och utskrift av intervju med Kubinyi. Jag har också tagit del av Jan Lundviks kommentar.

Jag har inte mycket att tillägga till Jans synpunkter. Vi har en rad sovjetiska dokument, som visar när RW:s arresteringsorder utfärdades, när RW arresterades, när och hur han fördes till Moskva, när han skrevs in på Lubjanja etc. Just dessa dokumentes äkthet har vi ingen anledning att tvivla på. Kontentan av allt detta är att Kubinyis redogörelse inte kan stämma med verkligheten. Jag tycker därför att vi lägger ärendet ad acta.

Mvh Harald Hamrin

PS Jag vill gärna säga att intervjun var mycket skickligt genomförd!  
Niklas Wiberg

Niklas Wiberg

2005-01-24 15:02  
UD Budapest(amb).

Till: Distributionslista med 2 mottagare  
Kopia: Distributionslista med 4 mottagare  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: Intervju med Mrs. Kubinyi

2005 / 7557

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|---------------------|------|--------|
| INKOM UD            |      |        |
| 2005-02-07<br>01-24 |      |        |
| Avd. P              | Gr 2 | Mål EU |

Hej Harald och Jan,

I bilaga återfinns utskriften av den intervju som gjordes här på ambassaden med Istvánné Kubinyi, född 1924, som uppger att hon transporterades med RW under sex dagar till Moskva. Tacksam för era kommentarer om hennes historia. Jag sänder även uppteckningen med kurir. Tacksam om Harald kan delge övriga intressenter och arkivera handlingen.

Mvh Niklas Wiberg  
amb. Budapest



interview\_witness.doc

# Interview

**Subject:** meeting Raoul Wallenberg, spring 1945

**Date:** 17 November 2004

**Venue:** Embassy, Budapest

**Persons Present:**

Witness: Mrs. Istvánné Kubinyi, born November 17, 1924

Address: Szerémi ut 37, 1117 Budapest

Tel: +36-2-042-174

Son-in-law of witness: Mr. Ödön Szép

Niklas Wiberg, first secretary

Judit Radnóczy, interpreter

**Istvánné Kubinyi:**

I was carried off by the Russians 24 February 1945. It was not a Hungarian firm [*sic!*] who took me away, but it was the Russians. Because they thought they caught a big fish because I have been working for a German company [*Mittelmeyer*] for two months [...] I was 19 at that time. [...] Everybody was living in the cellars at that time before the war ended. And I asked where they were about to take me, and they said to Andrassy út 60. But I was taken to Tisza Kálmán tér [*Moszkva tér today*] or Köztársaság tér. [...] And I was placed in a cellar where there were a few people. [...] And we stayed in Budapest for a few days. [...] I was taken to a villa on the hill then. And at the end it turned out that it was not me they wanted. Because I was called Ili at work, and on the second floor, the leader of the espionage office [...] had a mistress called Ibi. [*The two names were mixed up.*]

And then I was taken to Jászkisér [village in central Hungary], and I was locked up in a bathroom together with another woman [...]. After about 5 weeks [*from 24 February*] I was taken to Fót [village about 30 km North-East from Budapest], there was a military airfield there, and I was taken there in the evening, and it was there I met Wallenberg. There it was me, Wallenberg, [...] and an old general from the army of the Tsar, and two colonels from the army of the Tsar, who presumably worked in Pesterzsébet [*a district of Budapest*] as workers. [...] And later I heard there were gossips that Wallenberg was captured by the Germans in January, [...] but this is not true, because I was carried off on 24 February, and it was only 5 weeks later that we went to Moscow.

[...]

And our journey to Moscow took [...] 5 days. First we were taken to Kecskemét, we spent one day there, we were put in a house [...], and then the next day we went to Nyíregyháza. The third day, the general became sick and [...] he was taken to hospital [...] and we waited for two days at the airfield and then he was brought back. [...] This happened in Kiev. The fifth day we were in Gomel, which is a Russian city in Ukraine [*Gomel belongs to Belarus today.*], and the sixth day we arrived in Moscow, and that was the most horrible thing that a black car came, the car for prisoners, and we got in there. It was so small; we were crammed in [...].

And in Kecskemét and Nyíregyháza, we stayed in houses, but later we did not leave the aircraft any more before arriving in Moscow. So I was together with Wallenberg there for a whole week.

[...].

And when we left Fót, and the aircraft took off, Wallenberg told me: "Look around carefully." "Why then?", I asked. We spoke in French. [...] He said: "Because you won't ever see Budapest again. [...] So he probably knew that it was not easy to return home from there." And I replied "That is not like that, I haven't done anything wrong, so I will probably be released in a few weeks when it turns out", and then he said, "You're such a big child".

[...] We had some sort of American stuff, fur, or something we used for blankets, and they gave us tinned food to eat. [...]. The aircraft was also American. [...] Everything was American. [...] But the personnel were Russian.

[...] And on the sixth day we arrived at Ljubjanka, it was a large prison, and we were taken to the cellar to wash ourselves. First I was taken to a room [...], the walls were not flat, it was all covered with leather [...] or rubber. [...] Our clothes were taken away. [...] I did not speak Russian at that time; I did not know whether I would stay here for years or for days, all in all, it was terrible. And then I never saw Wallenberg again.

**After the 6<sup>th</sup> day, you mean.**

Yes.

**When you first met Raoul Wallenberg it was at the airport in Fót?**

Yes.

**[...] did you at that time know who Wallenberg was?**

He told me he worked for the embassy and he saved many Jews and non-Jews too, [...] and we tried to figure out why we got into the same transport. I worked for a German company and Wallenberg ordered things from the company. He had those people hidden in houses, and they fed them somehow, and they bought food for them, and I once heard that he organized to get food for those people he helped and hid. [...] Because he was helping hundreds of people, not one or two.

**Did he present himself by name?**

Yes, yes, yes.

**And who else was there, who was with you during these 6 days? Was it the same persons, or did it change from city to city in the aircraft?**

[Russian soldiers].

**The same soldiers?**

It was such a long time ago, I don't remember..., but probably the same.

**Were there any other Hungarians or foreigners except for the soldiers?**

Only the soldiers.

**So it was you, Wallenberg and Russians.**

3 Russians: The general and the 2 colonels. They were held captive too. [Plus the personnel of the aircraft.]

[...]

**And were you together with Wallenberg during these 6 days all the time?**

Yes, we were sitting next to each other. Because we could talk to each other, but not to the Russians.

**Did you get any opportunities to speak to him what he had been experiencing here in Budapest, about his work and life, during these six days?**

I don't know actually, I don't know what we spoke about, I can't recall it. That he worked for the embassy, and he said he helped many people. [...].

**The Swedish Embassy?**

Yes, the Swedish Embassy, not his own embassy. *[Witness spoke silent here, this remark was not noticed, thus neither clarified.]*

**How did the Russian soldiers treat Raoul Wallenberg?**

No, they were fine, they were not violent, [...] we got food twice a day. We even remarked with Wallenberg that everything was American. [...]

**Have you told anyone from the Swedish authorities or from the embassy or the Hungarian authorities this story before?**

Yes I have been somewhere before, I think I talked to an interpreter, but I don't remember where and who she was. She worked in Sweden I think, and made an interview, I think she came to my place.

**Was she doing Wallenberg-research? Was it in that context?**

Yes, she asked me about Wallenberg, and I think it was some research in Sweden, she worked there...

**So she contacted you for an interview once and then never came back to you.**

No, she did not return.

**And are there any new facts in the story now? Or why is it that you want to tell us this story now, again?**

I don't know. It was his idea...

**Son-in-law of Witness:** It was not my idea [...]. It was the Swedish gentleman I met last summer, the husband of an acquaintance of mine, and he mentioned he would contact the embassy.

[...]

**Witness:** I spent 8 years, 9 months and 9 days in the USSR.

[...]

I stayed in Moscow till about December [1945]. The prison was the best because we were not forced to work and we were allowed to read [there was a library...]. In the labour camp we worked 12 hours every day, and we walked 8-10 km to work.

[...]

In Moscow, I was taken to Beriya [*Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beriya, chief of secret police*].

**Son-in-law of Witness:** Probably, Mr. Wallenberg was also taken to him because he was chief of the counter-espionage service.

[...]

**Witness:** In November I was taken to the labour camp in Vorkuta. [I got very ill there, I spent one year in hospital.] We went out to work until the temperature stayed above -40°C.

**If I get back to the time that you spent together with Raoul Wallenberg, do you remember the**



**date for this when you first met him in Fót?**

It was about 5-6 weeks from 24 February. [...] In April. [...] Or middle of April.

[...]

From Moscow, the trip to Vorkuta took about 2 weeks. Then we went to Mariinsk, it took about 10 days, then we came back to Moscow, and that took about a week. Then I was taken back to Mariinsk. And then I was taken to Taishet, and from there I came home.

[...]

**And the last time you saw Raoul Wallenberg in the Ljubjanka prison was in the morning, or at what time was it?**

After lunch. And then I was put in a small room. [...]

**And in what room, what part of the prison did you see Raoul Wallenberg last?**

When the car stopped in front of the prison. Then and I was taken inside the prison. I have never met him again.

[...]

**Son-in-law of Witness: And what was Wallenberg wearing?**

He was elegant [...], and he did not seem to be sick.

[...]

**During your later imprisonment, did you meet anybody who had been speaking to Raoul Wallenberg?**

Yes [...], I heard someone heard Wallenberg was there and even after 3 years I heard someone spoke to someone who spoke to him, so he must have been there for a couple of years. [...] Many people died there, 150 000 like me were taken away, and only 3850 of us came home.

**Have you read about Raoul Wallenberg, do you know other stories that had been told by him, about his trip for Hungary and how he was captured?**

He told me he was working the embassy and he saved many lives.

**But you haven't heard other stories on how he was taken from Hungary.**

I don't even know how old he was, [...] must have been about 30. He was also captured by the Russians.

**When you met him, did he speak about how he was captured here in Budapest? The way to Fót?**

I don't know, I think he mentioned something about a car, he tried to get in or get out, and it was then ...

**But he didn't say anything where he was captured or what part of Budapest he was working in?**

[...] I think he was captured on the Pest side. [...] He was a nice person, he was calm, he was not the protesting type.

**Do you remember any other things that he told you, that he spoke about during these 6 days, any stories from his life in Hungary or in Sweden?**

It was a long time ago..., I don't remember...

**Is there anything else that you would like to tell us?**

I don't know anything more; we were only together for a week. [...] He did not believe he would ever

be released. I did very much, but he didn't. [...]

[...]

**May I just ask your date of birth also?**

I am 80 today. I was born on 17 November 1924.

[...]

Why can't the Russians say anything more about Wallenberg? They must know more. [...] When I was captured I had my railway card with me. And they gave it back to me when they released me. They must know everything; they were very precise in keeping records... [...] Do they say he died in Ljubjanka? I have been in Ljubjanka, Lefortovskaya, that was a hospital, and also in Krasnaya Presnya [...], so I have been in these 3 prisons in Moscow.

[...]

**Thank you very much for coming here and telling us your story. If you come to think of other small details or stories that Wallenberg has told you, you can just contact the embassy. It is very useful, we appreciate it very much.**

Thank you.



Jan Lundvik  
<j.o.lundvik@telia.com>  
2005-01-24 18:58

Till: niklas.wiberg@FOREIGN.MINISTRY.SE  
Kopia: Distributionslista med 5 mottagare  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: Re: Intervju med Mrs. Kubinyi

Niklas,

Tack för intervjutexten, som passar in i det inte ovanliga mönstret att ett vittne på egna autentiska upplevelser ympar in en uppdiktad eller av andra vittnesmål suggererad RW-figur. Eftersom vi vet att RW registrerades i Lubjanka den 6 februari 1945 kan han inte ha befunnit sig på det flygplan med vilket fru Kubinyi nästan två månader senare fördes till Moskva. Påståendet att hon skulle ha förhörts av ingen mindre än Berija kan också vara ett uttryck för självsuggestionens kraft. Eljest innehåller hennes skildring ingenting som så vitt jag kan bedöma skulle vara helt orimligt, även om man kan tycka det är anmärkningsvärt att en så liten grupp fångar transporteras separat med flyg vid en tid då de sovjetiska transportresurserna var hårt ansträngda. Hennes trovärdighet stärks av uppgiften att hon fördes till Jászkisér, eftersom det är den by nära Malinovskijs högkvarter i Heves, där även schweizarna Feller och Meier hölls fångna före transporten till Moskva.

Tack också för bilder m m från 17 januari.


Hälsningar

Jan

**DAVID MATAS**

BARRISTER &amp; SOLICITOR

✓  
 UA-EC/Hans -  
 2005-01-22  
 breussier  
 HMI J



Laila Freivalds

Minister of Foreign Affairs


Government of Sweden

Stockholm, Sweden

*Raoul Wallenberg*

Dear Minister:

20 January 2005



I am writing to you concerning a matter which has already been raised in discussions with officials at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2004. I suggest that the Government of Sweden request jointly with the Government of Canada amendments to the attached memorandum of understanding between the Office of the Procurator General of the Russian Federation and the Department of Justice of Canada, or a new similar memorandum.

The attached memorandum allows access of Canadian war crimes researchers to Russian archives. The memorandum states "The parties agree to render assistance in arranging ... access to places containing documents...relevant to an investigation" [paragraph II.6(a)]. Investigations are permitted against persons "in Canada or Russia who are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity, as defined in international law, during the German National Socialist (Nazi) period in Europe" [paragraph I.1]. One amendment to the existing memorandum or new memorandum I would propose would allow an expansion of the scope of permitted research to include the investigation into the fate of Raoul Wallenberg.

602-225 VAUGHAN STREET  
 WINNIPEG, MANITOBA  
 R3C 1T7

TEL: (204) 944-1831

FAX: (204) 942-1494

E-MAIL: dmatas@mb.sympatico.ca

I had previously made a suggestion to this effect to then Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Bill Graham, by letters of February 9 and 7, 2003, attached. He responded by letters of November 17, 2003 and May 28, 2004, attached, referring to "Sweden's natural right to take the leadership in this case" and, nonetheless, indicating that he had raised the matter with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov.

The current memorandum has a confidentiality provision [Article 3] which needs changing. It would defeat the purpose of Wallenberg research if the results were to be kept confidential. The memorandum must allow researchers to make public any information they discover on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg.

Nonetheless, Wallenberg information is unlikely to be solely in Wallenberg files. Access to all archives means access to security archives, to KGB archives, to presidential archives. Researchers may well end up having to go through files which contain genuine security information that Russia legitimately could claim should not be made public. An amended confidentiality provision needs to remain to generate confidence that researchers who might stumble across unrelated information in their Wallenberg research will not make this unrelated information public.

I accept the principle that Sweden has a natural right to take leadership in this case. Accordingly, the Canadian Russian memorandum of understanding needs, as I see it, a third substantive change, to add Sweden as a party.


My suggestion originally was directed to the Government of Canada and not the Government of Sweden in light of the present access that Canadian researchers have to Russian archives for war crimes research which, as I understand, Swedish researchers do not. I presumed that it would be easier to reach an agreement with Russia to expand the mandate of workers who presently have access to the archives, who have earned the confidence of Russian officials, than to introduce new workers into those archives. As well, those who already know how the archives are organized because of having worked

in them are bound to be more effective than researchers who are learning the archives for the first time. Nonetheless, on reflection, I accept that it makes sense, in light of both the experience and centrality of Sweden in the investigation into the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, both for Sweden to take the lead in pursuing this request to Russia and to add Swedish designated researchers to the request.

Brian Gorlick, a Canadian lawyer working in Sweden whom I know personally, has already at my suggestion in meetings in Stockholm with your Ambassador Harald Hamrin passed on this proposal informally. I am writing this letter to present this proposal to you formally.

Your anticipated cooperation and attention are appreciated. I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely yours,



David Matas

cc: Hon. Pierre Pettigrew, P.C. M.P.  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Government of Canada

Hon. Irwin Cotler, P.C. M.P. O.C.  
Minister of Justice and Attorney General  
Government of Canada

Hon. Bill Graham  
Minister of Defence

Government of Canada

Lorenz Friedlander

His Excellency

Ambassador of Canada to Sweden

Brian Gorlick

Amb. Harald Hamrin

Government of Sweden

Initialed at Moscow, Russia  
this      day of      , 1993

**MEMORANDUM  
OF  
UNDERSTANDING  
BETWEEN  
THE OFFICE OF  
THE PROCURATOR-GENERAL OF  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
AND  
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OF  
CANADA**

The Office of the Procurator-General of the Russian Federation (herein referred to as "the Russian party").

and

The Department of Justice of Canada (herein referred to as the "Canadian party")  
in a spirit of mutual cooperation and in accordance with their respective laws have  
agreed as follows:

I. The Scope of This Memorandum of Understanding

1. The Canadian party requests the assistance of the Russian party and the Russian party requests the assistance of the Canadian Party and both parties will provide assistance to the other party, for the investigation and commencement of legal proceedings against persons in Canada or Russia who are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity as



defined by international law, during the German National Socialist (Nazi) period in Europe;

II. Pre-trial Investigations

2. In order to obtain assistance in an investigation, the requesting party will transmit to the requested party, requests for assistance which will contain the names and other data of persons in Canada or Russia who are suspected of having committed War Crimes or Crimes Against Humanity, as well as details of the places, dates, and crimes alleged to have been committed by the suspects, if available, and will describe the assistance requested, which assistance may be of the type and nature set out in paragraphs 4 and 5;
3. The parties will keep confidential any information received from or given to the other party, and will not communicate it to the press or to any other country or person without the prior written consent of the other party, subject to either party sharing information with War Crimes Units in other countries on a confidential basis after informing the other party in writing.
4. Upon the request of one party, the requested party will, as expeditiously as possible, take the steps which are required to:
  - a) provide documents or other evidence, including all previous statements made by potential witnesses, and
  - b) identify and locate potential witnesses.

The results of the efforts of the requested party will be transmitted as soon as possible to the requesting party;

5. The requested party will take all necessary measures to assist the representatives of the requesting party to conduct [the following] investigations in Canada or Russia and to interview witnesses in the presence of a representative of the requested party and to obtain from those witnesses, voluntarily signed statements;
6. The parties agree to render assistance in arranging:
  - a) to arrange for access to places containing documents, trial records relevant to an investigation; to take copies of those documents, trial records or other materials and, if necessary, to bring those copies to Canada or Russia. Upon the request of the parties, copies of documents will be certified in such a manner as to be admissible in the courts of either country;
  - b) to attend at sites where the crimes were alleged to have been committed and to photograph the sites or to do such forensic tests at those sites as may be required;
  - c) to perform forensic examinations of documents or other material evidence which have been located;

production in Canada and, as required by Russian law, minutes of the Court sessions will be taken by a clerk of the Russian court;

- g) all court proceedings will be recorded on videotape by Canadian authorities for production in Canada;

#### IV. Final Provisions:

8. The requesting party will bear the following expenses:

- a) such fees and expenses as are normally paid to witnesses;
- b) all costs associated with paragraph 6.

9. For the purpose of carrying out the terms of this agreement the Parties will communicate with each other by mail, facsimile, or other means, and all such communication will be directed as follows:

- a) for the Russian party:

The Procurator-General  
of the Russian Federation  
Kuznetski Most 13/13  
103760, Moscow, Russia  
Facsimile: (095) 292-8848

- b) for the Canadian party:

Director  
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Section  
The Department of Justice of Canada  
239 Wellington Street, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0H8  
Facsimile (613) 952-7370

10. The parties will consult promptly, at the request of either, concerning the interpretation, the application or the implementation of this Memorandum of Understanding either generally or in relation to a particular case.

DONE AT MOSCOW, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THIS      DAY OF      , 1993  
AND AT OTTAWA, ONTARIO, CANADA, THIS      DAY OF      , 1993,  
IN TWO COPIES, EACH IN ENGLISH, FRENCH AND RUSSIAN WITH ALL TEXTS  
HAVING EQUAL VALIDITY.

---

The Office of the Procurator-  
General of the Russian Federation

---

For the Department of Justice of  
Canada

## DAVID MATAS

BARRISTER &amp; SOLICITOR

Honourable Bill Graham, M.P.  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Government of Canada  
House of Commons  
Parliament Buildings  
Ottawa

9 February 2003

Re: Raoul Wallenberg

The purpose of this letter is to follow up on the brief conversation we had in Winnipeg. I had suggested that you approach the Russians about access by Canadian researchers to Russian archives to investigate the fate of Raoul Wallenberg.

As you may know, I wrote a report for the Department of Foreign Affairs, funded by the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, on the fate and whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg. That report, dated September 1998, concluded that the fate of Raoul Wallenberg was unknown but knowable.

The Swedish and Russian governments set up a joint working group in 1991 on Raoul Wallenberg. Each government produced its own report a disgraceful ten years later, in January 2001. The Swedish government report came out with basically the same conclusion I did, but in a much more detailed fashion. They suggested a number of avenues for further investigation.

602-225 VAUGHAN STREET  
WINNIPEG, MANITOBA  
R3C 1T7

TEL: (204) 944-1831

FAX: (204) 942-1494

E-MAIL: dmatas@mb.sympatico.ca

2

The Russian government produced a report that Wallenberg died in 1947. But their report did not say how or where or why he died. As far as the Russians are concerned, the matter is closed. Vyacheslav Turchin, a Foreign Ministry official leading the Russian component of the working group, is quoted by the Associated Press in January 2001 as saying "Everything has been done that could be done to establish the fate of Raoul Wallenberg."

After I completed my report, I made to your predecessor Minister Lloyd Axworthy a request similar to the one I had made to you. He indicated, as you had, support for the proposal. I also contacted a couple of Russian desk officers in Canadian Foreign Affairs on my proposed follow up - Shawn Caza and Mark Opgenorth. As well, last year, at the consultations of Foreign Affairs with non-governmental organizations on the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, I raised this issue with your staff person Amanda Sussman. Everyone agreed, but nothing, as far as I know, has happened.

This inactivity has left me puzzled. It occurred to me that the problem might be uncertainty about how, exactly, to follow through. So, I have put in a grant application to the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development for a second study which would allow me to draw up a proposal that would be as specific as could be. I am attaching that grant application to this letter. However, my ultimate aim is, obviously, not to have a grant application approved, but rather to have the Canadian government approach the Russian government on this matter.

Another possible explanation for Canadian inaction despite the expressions of good will I received was the unwillingness to go it alone. An agreement with Russia on access to archives for Wallenberg research is more likely to happen if Canada approaches Russia jointly with the US and Sweden, rather than on its own.

One reason, if not the main reason, that the Russian Swedish

3

working group took the amazing ten years that it did was the molasses like cooperation of Russian archivists with Swedish researchers. Sweden was, of course, interested in the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, even before the joint working group was established. Sweden has banged on Russian doors now for decades without much success. Those doors might open at least a little more widely if the effort were supported by other countries with a particular interest in Wallenberg's fate.

I have asked colleagues of mine in the non-governmental world in the United States to ask the US government to do much what I have asked you to do - to request that the Russians allow foreign governmental researchers access to their archives. The US is a natural ally in this effort not only because of its historical association with Wallenberg, but also because the US, like Canada, has government researchers in Russian archives today doing war crimes research. Like Canadian war crimes researchers, I expect that US war crimes researchers have the confidence of Russian archivists and the knowledge of the archives that would allow them to do Wallenberg research work.

A third reason that nothing has happened since the release of the Russian and Swedish reports in January 2001 may be Russia's conviction that everything that can be done has been done. Russian government officials do not share the frustration with their archivists that others have.


Here, I suggest, diplomacy has a role to play. Canadians are unlikely to persuade Russians of their inadequacy. But the Canadians, Americans and Swedes together may be able to persuade the Russians to allow us to follow our own investigative techniques to find out for ourselves what the Russians feel that they have already determined.

It was a pleasure to have met with you in Winnipeg, and to have

4

heard you speak five times in the course of one week. I look forward to hearing you speak yet again and, I hope, soon.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'DM' or 'Matas', with a stylized flourish extending to the right.

David Matas



Honourable Bill Graham  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
and International Trade  
Government of Canada

7 June 2003

Dear Minister:

I wish to make a suggestion to help determine the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. The Swedish government released a report in the year 2000 about the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, suggesting further investigation. I wrote an earlier report for the Government of Canada released in 1998 with the same conclusion.

There are several Russian archives closed to outside researchers that are likely to have relevant information about the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. Resolving the Wallenberg riddle means giving independent Wallenberg researchers access to those archives.

What I propose is that Canadians government researchers conduct research in Russian archives and locate and interview Russian witnesses on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, patterned on the research and interviewing currently undertaken by Canadian researchers in Russian archives for the purpose of war crimes prosecution. Canada has negotiated with Russia a Memorandum of Understanding to permit, for Canadian war crimes prosecution, direct Canadian access to archives, firsthand Canadian efforts to locate Russian witnesses, and in person Canadian interviewing of Russian witnesses.

There should be a similar memorandum or an amendment to or interpretation of the existing one so that Canadians can pursue Raoul Wallenberg research directly in Russia. Canada should employ researchers and investigators who have gained experience through the war crimes effort with Russian archives and locating and interviewing of witnesses to conduct research in Russia on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg.

Peter Kremer, a former head of the Canadian War Crimes Unit, wrote "A major step forward in the investigation of the East Bloc and USSR cases was the ability of Justice historians to conduct primary research in all government archives....The assistance and cooperation from central, district and local officials in the former East Bloc countries and republics of the former USSR has generally been excellent." ( John D. McCamus, Report to the Deputy Minister Concerning certain allegations of anti-Semitism, March 1998, pages 147.)

A opportunity for Canadian researchers to conduct primary research on the fate of Wallenberg in all Russian government archives would, I believe, be also, for Wallenberg research a major step forward.

Sincerely yours,  
David Matas

Minister  
of Foreign Affairs



Ministre  
des Affaires étrangères

Ottawa, Canada K1A 0G2

The Honourable L'honorable  
Bill Graham P.C., Q.C., M.P., c.p., c.r., député

NOV 17 2003

Mr. David Matas  
Barrister and Solicitor  
602-225 Vaughan Street  
Winnipeg, Manitoba  
R3C 1T7

Dear Mr. Matas:

Thank you for your letters of February 9 and June 7, 2003, concerning your efforts, and those of other Western researchers, in gaining access to Russian archives to investigate the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. I regret the delay in replying to you.

I certainly see the value of the argument that the Canadian methodology that was developed to deal with war crime investigations could provide additional useful information in investigating the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. It would, however, seem premature to consider a Memorandum of Understanding between Canada and Russia in order to allow direct Canadian access to Russian archives. The Canadian government has been unequivocal about its stake in the Wallenberg case, but it has also taken into account Sweden's natural right to take the leadership in this case as this is more appropriate and likely to be more efficient.

In this respect, our embassy in Stockholm reports the following recent development. For the first time since the disappearance of Raoul Wallenberg in January 1945, the handling of the Wallenberg case has been systematically analysed by a Swedish Commission of inquiry independent of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Commission was chaired by former County Governor Ingemar Eliasson. Its report, *A failure of diplomacy*, was presented to the late Minister for Foreign Affairs Anna Lindh on March 4, 2003. An English summary can be found on the following Web site: <http://www.utrikes.regeringen.se/inenglish/wallenberg.htm>. Canada will carefully consider the Swedish government's response to the Commission's conclusions.

This is not, however, a justification for inaction, and there is no reason not to initiate discussions with the Russian Foreign Ministry. This is why I will present your proposal of Canada-Russia cooperation in this type of research to Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. I have asked my officials to keep the Swedish Foreign Ministry informed of our actions.

...2

Canada

- 2 -

With regard to your proposal for a grant, I have been informed by Mr. Steve Lee, Executive Director of the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, that the Centre was in the process of restructuring over the summer and that it would begin considering projects later this year. I would encourage you to complete the on-line application form on the Centre's Web site ([www.cfp-pec.gc.ca](http://www.cfp-pec.gc.ca)).

I hope that this information is useful to you and thank you again for bringing your concerns to my attention.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Graham", with a stylized, flowing script.

Bill Graham

Minister  
of Foreign Affairs



Ministre  
des Affaires étrangères

Ottawa, Canada K1A 0G2

The Honourable L'honorable  
Bill Graham P.C., Q.C., M.P., c.p., c.r., député

MAY 28 2004

Mr. David Matas  
Barrister and Solicitor  
602-225 Vaughan Street  
Winnipeg, Manitoba  
R3C 1T7

*David*  
Dear Mr. Matas:

Further to my letter of November 17, 2003, in which I informed you that I would present your proposal of Canada-Russia cooperation in the area of archival research to Mr. Igor Ivanov, who was Russia's Foreign Minister at the time, I am pleased to report that Minister Ivanov responded to my request earlier this year.

In his response, Mr. Ivanov recalled that the joint Russian-Swedish working group on Raoul Wallenberg's fate published its findings in January 2001 after studying the material available in various Russian archives, including those of the President of the Russian Federation, the Federal Security Service, and the Ministry of Defence. He indicated that you are nevertheless welcome to access the material available at the Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation. This material has also been reviewed by the Swedish side.

Although I realize that this is not exactly the response that you were looking for, I hope that you will consider this as a step in the right direction.

Sincerely,

*and best personal regards*  
*Bill*

*Hope that this gets us started in the right track.*

Canada



"Vadim birstein"  
 <birstein@pipeline.com>  
 2005-01-25 05:57

Till: <goran.rydeberg@foreign.ministry.se>  
 Kopia:  
 Blank:  
 Fax till:  
 Ärende: *questions*  
*Raoul Wallenberg*

|                  |              |                           |
|------------------|--------------|---------------------------|
| INK. UTRIKESDEP. |              |                           |
| D.Nr. 2005/4658  |              |                           |
| 2005 -01- 25     |              |                           |
| AVD. <i>P</i>    | GR. <i>2</i> | MÅL <i>Eu<sup>1</sup></i> |

Dear Mr. Rydeberg:

<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" />

I just received your package. Apparently, the international mail is working very slow these days. As usual, thank you very much for you time and efforts.

After having reading the materials, I realized that I do not have two more documents:

- 1) Bulganin's order to arrest Feller, Meier, and Spisak and to "send them, as in the case of Wallenberg, to Moscow;."
- 2) A report of Commander of the 151st Rifle Division, Kupriyanov, to the Commander of the 30th Rifle Corps dated January 14, 1945. There are two notes on this report: a) "To Comrades Pavlovsky and Povetkin . . ."; b) a statement that Wallenberg came to the troops by himself.

I would greatly appreciate receiving copies of these two documents too. Were they released by the Russian group in 1993?

Also, I have a series of questions regarding Envoy Spisak you might be able to answer or to forward them to a person who might know the answers.

The "Swedish Report" on Wallenberg (2001) stated: "The Slovak envoy, Spisak, was handed over to Czechoslovakia at their request in February 1947, to stand trial in Prague" (p. 60). Here are my questions:

1. Who was in charge of the Spisak case in Moscow, SMERSH/MGB or the NKVD/MVD (GUPVI)?
2. What was the procedure of handing Spisak over to Czechoslovakia?
3. There should be a trail of documents regarding Spisak (as in the Wallenberg case) – a Czech appeal to the Soviet MID, letters from the MID to the MGB and MVD and back, to the Politburo, the Politburo decision regarding Spisak (or Spisak and other Slovaks like General Catlos), etc. What is known about this paper trail?
4. Was Spisak handed over alone or together with Generals Catlos and Turanec?
5. What is known about the trial of Spisak in Prague, what crime was he charged with and what was the sentence?

I would be extremely grateful to you for answers to these questions.

Thanks again.

Yours sincerely,

*Beskrak via e-post från 1-2  
 e-post 05-01-25  
 Vb till Harald Hamrin  
 för ytterligare handlingar  
 a-a /cyl 1*

Dr. Vadim Birstein  
331 West 57th Street, #159  
New York, NY 10019  
USA

2005/4709

ARK

P 2 EU<sup>1</sup>

Göran Rydeberg

2005-01-25 08:12

Till: "Vadim birstein" <birstein@pipeline.com>  
Kopia: <goran.rydeberg@foreign.ministry.se>  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: Ang: ~~questions~~ *Racul Wallenberg*

Dear Dr Birstein,

I will send you the documents mentioned in your first 2 questions. The first one C 7 was released from the TsAmo (The archives of the Defence ministry) on September 4 1991 while the second C 12 from the same archive became published on April 26 1993.

I have checked other files and books (including my own manuscript) but have not found anything else on Jan Spisak, but unfortunately I have not found anything except the document you will get.

I will pass the questions on to ambassador Harald Hamrin and hopefully he can give you some details on Spisak.

Yours sincerely

Göran Rydeberg

"Vadim birstein" <birstein@pipeline.com>



"Vadim birstein"  
<birstein@pipeline.com>  
2005-01-25 05:57

Till: <goran.rydeberg@foreign.ministry.se>  
Kopia:  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: questions

Dear Mr. Rydeberg:

<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" />

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*Swan till e-post.  
meddelande 05-01-25  
exakt s.d. VB till  
H. Hamrin för ytterligare  
handläggning a.g/ys*

questions:

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I would be extremely grateful to you for answers to these questions.

Thanks again.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Vadim Birstein  
331 West 57th Street, #159  
New York, NY 10019  
USA



Harald Hamrin  
2005-01-25 11:27

Till: [birstein@pipeline.com](mailto:birstein@pipeline.com),  
Kopia:  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: Spisak

2005-7-6/0  
P 2 EU'

(EC)

Dear Dr. Birstein,

Wallenberg

Mr. Goran Rydeberg has forwarded to me your e-mail of 2005-01-25.

Regarding Jan Spisak:

USA

1. The Swedish report of 2001 says (p. 49): "The same day, 17 January, Bulganin issued another arrest warrant. This was for the swiss diplomats Max Meier and Harald Felelr, and the Slovak envoy Jan Spisak. They were to be sent to Moscow 'in the same way as wallenberg', and Smersh was to carry out the order." The same report (p. 62) says: "The Slovak envoy, Spisak, was handed over to Czechoslovakia at their request in February 1947, tyo tsand trial in Prague." The relevant Bulganin document can be found in the repport as App. 8.

2-5. For these questions you would have to contact the pertinent archive(s) in Prague. We have had no reason to look deeper into them.

Sincerely yours,

Harald Hamrin

HAMRIN KA + EC  
2005-01-25  
Sver Lill Tit

Göran Rydeberg  
2005-01-25 08:38

Till: **Harald Hamrin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK**  
Kopia:  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: **Ang: questions**

Godmorgon Harald,

Tacksam om Du har möjlighet att svara på de "blåmarkerade delarna" av Birsteins fråga. Resten har jag ordnat.

MVH

Göran

----- Vidarebefordrat av Göran Rydeberg/FOREIGN/MINISTRY 2005-01-25 08:34 -----

Göran Rydeberg  
2005-01-25 08:24

Till: **"Vadim birstein" <birstein@pipeline.com>**  
Kopia:  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: **Ang: questions**

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Yours sincerely

Göran Rydeberg

"Vadim birstein" <birstein@pipeline.com>



"Vadim birstein"  
<birstein@pipeline.com>  
2005-01-25 05:57

Till: **<goran.rydeberg@foreign.ministry.se>**  
Kopia:  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: **questions**

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I would be extremely grateful to you for answers to these questions.

Thanks again.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Vadim Birstein  
331 West 57th Street, #159  
New York, NY 10019  
USA

exp.   
2005-01-25

Harald Hamrin  
2005-01-31 15:22

Till: Elizabeth Bederoff/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK  
Kopia:  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: Ang: Intervju med Mrs. Kubinyi

Detta är det e-mail som jag sände i pappersform i förra veckan. Wibergs inkommande och mitt utgående mejl hör ihop med intervju som finns nedan i form av attachment och som idag dessutom kommit i pappersform till mig och som jag sänt vidare till dig. Dessutom inkommande mejl från Jan Lundvik, som jag också sände dig i pappersform i förra veckan. Hoppas det blir klart...

Harald

----- Vidarebefordrat av Harald Hamrin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY 2005-01-31 15:19 -----

2005/20052  
(EC) P 2 Eu<sup>1</sup>

Harald Hamrin

2005-01-26 11:08

Till: Niklas Wiberg/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK  
Kopia: amb Budapest  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: Ang: Intervju med Mrs. Kubinyi

Niklas!

Tack för ditt-mail och utskrift av intervju med Kubinyi. Jag har också tagit del av Jan Lundviks kommentar.

Jag har inte mycket att tillägga till Jans synpunkter. Vi har en rad sovjetiska dokument, som visar när RW:s arresteringsorder utfärdades, när RW arresterades, när och hur han fördes till Moskva, när han skrevs in på Lubjanja etc. Just dessa dokumentes äkthet har vi ingen anledning att tvivla på. Kontentan av allt detta är att Kubinyis redogörelse inte kan stämma med verkligheten. Jag tycker därför att vi lägger ärendet ad acta.

Mvh Harald Hamrin

PS Jag vill gärna säga att intervjun var mycket skickligt genomförd!  
Niklas Wiberg

Niklas Wiberg  
2005-01-24 15:02  
UD Budapest(amb)

Till: Distributionslista med 2 mottagare  
Harald Hamrin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK  
j.o.lundvik@telia.com  
Kopia: Distributionslista med 4 mottagare  
Bengt Lundborg/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK  
Mats Lindström/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK  
Kristina Eineborg/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK  
Gunnar Haglund/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: Intervju med Mrs. Kubinyi

Hej Harald och Jan,

I bilaga återfinns utskriften av den intervju som gjordes här på ambassaden med Istvánné Kubinyi, född 1924, som uppger att hon transporterades med RW under sex dagar till Moskva. Tacksam för era kommentarer om hennes historia. Jag sänder även uppteckningen med kurir. Tacksam om Harald kan delge övriga intressenter och arkivera handlingen.

Mvh Niklas Wiberg  
amb. Budapest

24

## Interview

**Subject:** meeting Raoul Wallenberg, spring 1945

**Date:** 17 November 2004

**Venue:** Embassy, Budapest

**Persons Present:**

Witness: Mrs. Istvánné Kubinyi, born November 17, 1924

Address: Szerémi ut 37, 1117 Budapest

Tel: +36-2-042-174

Son-in-law of witness: Mr. Ödön Szép

Niklas Wiberg, first secretary

Judit Radnóczy, interpreter

**Istvánné Kubinyi:**

I was carried off by the Russians 24 February 1945. It was not a Hungarian firm [*sic!*] who took me away, but it was the Russians. Because they thought they caught a big fish because I have been working for a German company [*Mittelmeyer*] for two months [...] I was 19 at that time. [...] Everybody was living in the cellars at that time before the war ended. And I asked where they were about to take me, and they said to Andrassy út 60. But I was taken to Tisza Kálmán tér [*Moszkva tér today*] or Köztársaság tér. [...] And I was placed in a cellar where there were a few people. [...] And we stayed in Budapest for a few days. [...] I was taken to a villa on the hill then. And at the end it turned out that it was not me they wanted. Because I was called Ili at work, and on the second floor, the leader of the espionage office [...] had a mistress called Ibi. [*The two names were mixed up.*]

And then I was taken to Jászakisér [village in central Hungary], and I was locked up in a bathroom together with another woman [...]. After about 5 weeks [*from 24 February*] I was taken to Fót [*village about 30 km North-East from Budapest*], there was a military airfield there, and I was taken there in the evening, and it was there I met Wallenberg. There it was me, Wallenberg, [...] and an old general from the army of the Tsar, and two

colonels from the army of the Tsar, who presumably worked in Pesterzsébet [*a district of Budapest*] as workers. [...] And later I heard there were gossips that Wallenberg was captured by the Germans in January, [...] but this is not true, because I was carried off on 24 February, and it was only 5 weeks later that we went to Moscow.

[...]

And our journey to Moscow took [...] 5 days. First we were taken to Kecskemét, we spent one day there, we were put in a house [...], and then the next day we went to Nyíregyháza. The third day, the general became sick and [...] he was taken to hospital [...] and we waited for two days at the airfield and then he was brought back. [...] This happened in Kiev. The fifth day we were in Gomel, which is a Russian city in Ukraine [*Gomel belongs to Belarus today.*], and the sixth day we arrived in Moscow, and that was the most horrible thing that a black car came, the car for prisoners, and we got in there. It was so small; we were crammed in [...].

And in Kecskemét and Nyíregyháza, we stayed in houses, but later we did not leave the aircraft any more before arriving in Moscow. So I was together with Wallenberg there for a whole week.

[...].

And when we left Fót, and the aircraft took off, Wallenberg told me: "Look around carefully." "Why then?", I asked. We spoke in French. [...] He said: "Because you won't ever see Budapest again. [...] So he probably knew that it was not easy to return home from there." And I replied "That is not like that, I haven't done anything wrong, so I will probably be released in a few weeks when it turns out", and then he said, "You're such a big child".

[...] We had some sort of American stuff, fur, or something we used for blankets, and they gave us tinned food to eat. [...]. The aircraft was also American. [...] Everything was American. [...] But the personnel were Russian.

[...] And on the sixth day we arrived at Ljubjanka, it was a large prison, and we were taken to the cellar to wash ourselves. First I was taken to a room [...], the walls were not flat, it was all covered with leather [...] or rubber. [...] Our clothes were taken away. [...] I did not speak Russian at that time; I did not know whether I would stay here for years or for days, all in all, it was terrible. And then I never saw Wallenberg again.

After the 6<sup>th</sup> day, you mean.

Yes.

When you first met Raoul Wallenberg it was at the airport in Fót?

Yes.

**[...] did you at that time know who Wallenberg was?**

He told me he worked for the embassy and he saved many Jews and non-Jews too, [...] and we tried to figure out why we got into the same transport. I worked for a German company and Wallenberg ordered things from the company. He had those people hidden in houses, and they fed them somehow, and they bought food for them, and I once heard that he organized to get food for those people he helped and hid. [...] Because he was helping hundreds of people, not one or two.

**Did he present himself by name?**

Yes, yes, yes.

**And who else was there, who was with you during these 6 days? Was it the same persons, or did it change from city to city in the aircraft?**

[Russian soldiers].

**The same soldiers?**

It was such a long time ago, I don't remember..., but probably the same.

**Were there any other Hungarians or foreigners except for the soldiers?**

Only the soldiers.

**So it was you, Wallenberg and Russians.**

3 Russians: The general and the 2 colonels. They were held captive too. [Plus the personnel of the aircraft.]

[...]

**And were you together with Wallenberg during these 6 days all the time?**

Yes, we were sitting next to each other. Because we could talk to each other, but not to the Russians.

**Did you get any opportunities to speak to him what he had been experiencing here in Budapest, about his work and life, during these six days?**

I don't know actually, I don't know what we spoke about, I can't recall it. That he worked for the embassy, and he said he helped many people. [...].

**The Swedish Embassy?**

Yes, the Swedish Embassy, not his own embassy. *[Witness spoke silent here, this remark was not noticed, thus neither clarified.]*

**How did the Russian soldiers treat Raoul Wallenberg?**

No, they were fine, they were not violent, [...] we got food twice a day. We even remarked with Wallenberg that everything was American. [...]

**Have you told anyone from the Swedish authorities or from the embassy or the Hungarian authorities this story before?**

Yes I have been somewhere before, I think I talked to an interpreter, but I don't remember where and who she was. She worked in Sweden I think, and made an interview, I think she came to my place.

**Was she doing Wallenberg-research? Was it in that context?**

Yes, she asked me about Wallenberg, and I think it was some research in Sweden, she worked there...

**So she contacted you for an interview once and then never came back to you.**

No, she did not return.

**And are there any new facts in the story now? Or why is it that you want to tell us this story now, again?**

I don't know. It was his idea...

**Son-in-law of Witness:** It was not my idea [...]. It was the Swedish gentleman I met last summer, the husband of an acquaintance of mine, and he mentioned he would contact the embassy.

[...]

**Witness:** I spent 8 years, 9 months and 9 days in the USSR.

[...]

I stayed in Moscow till about December [1945]. The prison was the best because we were not forced to work and we were allowed to read [there was a library...]. In the labour camp we worked 12 hours every day, and we walked 8-10 km to work.

[...]

In Moscow, I was taken to Beriia [*Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beriia, chief of secret police*].



**Son-in-law of Witness:** Probably, Mr. Wallenberg was also taken to him because he was chief of the counter-espionage service.

[...]

**Witness:** In November I was taken to the labour camp in Vorkuta. [I got very ill there, I spent one year in hospital.] We went out to work until the temperature stayed above -40°C.

**If I get back to the time that you spent together with Raoul Wallenberg, do you remember the date for this when you first met him in Fót?**

It was about 5-6 weeks from 24 February. [...] In April. [...] Or middle of April.

[...]

From Moscow, the trip to Vorkuta took about 2 weeks. Then we went to Mariinsk, it took about 10 days, then we came back to Moscow, and that took about a week. Then I was taken back to Mariinsk. And then I was taken to Taishet, and from there I came home.

[...]

**And the last time you saw Raoul Wallenberg in the Ljubjanka prison was in the morning, or at what time was it?**

After lunch. And then I was put in a small room. [...]

**And in what room, what part of the prison did you see Raoul Wallenberg last?**

When the car stopped in front of the prison. Then and I was taken inside the prison. I have never met him again.

[...]

**Son-in-law of Witness:** And what was Wallenberg wearing?

He was elegant [...], and he did not seem to be sick.

[...]

**During your later imprisonment, did you meet anybody who had been speaking to Raoul Wallenberg?**

Yes [...], I heard someone heard Wallenberg was there and even after 3 years I heard someone spoke to someone who spoke to him, so he must have been there for a couple of years. [...] Many people died there, 150 000 like me were taken away, and only 3850 of us came home.

**Have you read about Raoul Wallenberg, do you know other stories that had been told by him, about his trip for Hungary and how he was captured?**

He told me he was working the embassy and he saved many lives.

**But you haven't heard other stories on how he was taken from Hungary.**

I don't even know how old he was, [...] must have been about 30. He was also captured by the Russians.

**When you met him, did he speak about how he was captured here in Budapest? The way to Fót?**

I don't know, I think he mentioned something about a car, he tried to get in or get out, and it was then ...

**But he didn't say anything where he was captured or what part of Budapest he was working in?**

[...] I think he was captured on the Pest side. [...] He was a nice person, he was calm, he was not the protesting type.

**Do you remember any other things that he told you, that he spoke about during these 6 days, any stories from his life in Hungary or in Sweden?**

It was a long time ago..., I don't remember...

**Is there anything else that you would like to tell us?**

I don't know anything more; we were only together for a week. [...] He did not believe he would ever be released. I did very much, but he didn't. [...]

[...]

**May I just ask your date of birth also?**

I am 80 today. I was born on 17 November 1924.

[...]

Why can't the Russians say anything more about Wallenberg? They must know more. [...] When I was captured I had my railway card with me. And they gave it back to me when they released me. They must know everything; they were very precise in keeping records... [...] Do they say he died in Ljubjanka? I have been in Ljubjanka, Lefortovskaya, that was a hospital, and also in Krasnaya Presnya [...], so I have been in these 3 prisons in Moscow.

[...]

**Thank you very much for coming here and telling us your story. If you come to think of other small details or stories that Wallenberg has told you, you can just contact the embassy. It is very useful, we appreciate it very much.**

Thank you.

2005/7606



Tomas Böhm  
<tomas.bohm@swipnet.se>  
2005-01-26 11:06

Till: <harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se>  
Kopia:  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: Re: Ang: Wallenberg och Vilmos Böhm

Hej,  
Tack för ditt svar. Vi får försöka på andra vägar - om de dyker upp.  
vänliga hälsningar  
Tomas Böhm

05-01-26 10.56, skrev harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se på harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se  
följande:

Hej!

P 2 EU'

Tack för ditt e-mail.

EC

Jag har från Ulrik Tideström fått svenska Moskvaambassadens notväxling med ryska UD i fallet Vilmos Böhm. Jag kan bara instämma med dig att svaret är intetsägende och förstår självfallet din frustration.

ok. a.  
HJ

Sedan jag läst notväxlingen måste jag tyvärr säga att jag inte ser hur man skall kunna gå vidare i ärendet. Jag själv och andra här på UD har under de senaste åren haft en rad kontakter med ryska UD, bl a med dess arkivchef. Vi har då begärt att få se vissa dokument och dokumentkategorier med anknytning till fallet Wallenberg, men det har inte lett någon vart. Vårt allmänna intryck är att det blivit mycket kärvare på arkivfronten under de senaste åren.

Någon "rysk forskare med kanaler till ryska arkiv" känner jag inte till. I Moskva finns naturligtvis t ex organisationen "Memorial", där jag känner ett antal personer, men inte heller de torde kunna komma åt den typ av dokumentation som du efterlyser.

Med vänliga hälsningar

Harald Hamrin

Tomas Böhm <tomas.bohm@swipnet.se>

2005-01-20 15:22

Till: <harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se>  
Kopia:  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: Wallenberg och Vilmos Böhm

Till  
ambassadör Harald Hamrin  
UD

Hej,  
Ulrik Tideström på Moskva-ambassaden rekommenderade mig att kontakta dig, eftersom han trodde att du kunde ha tankar om mitt ärende.

Min farfar var Vilmos Böhm, ungerskt sändebud i Stockholm i slutet på

Ull

40-talet och en av Raoul Wallenbergs kontakter. Vi - min bror, vår kusin och jag - inledde en förtalsprocess mot Wilhelm Agrell i höstas för hans bok om Venonaprojektet, där han ägnar ett kapitel åt att beteckna vår farfar som betald värvad agent åt Sovjet och den som förrådde Wallenberg för ryssarna. Tyvärr förlorade vi denna rättegång, som inte heller får överklagas eftersom det var ett tryckfrihetsmål. Agrell fick alltså skriva det han skrev, utifrån de indicier han tyckte sig ha sett.

I vår fortsatta strävan att rentvå vår farfar kom jag i kontakt med Tideström som kontaktade ryska Utrikesministeriet för att höra om de hade uppgifter om Vilmos Böhm som värvad agent under kriget. Efter flera månaders väntan fick vi ett intetsägende svar som sa att de inte hade några uppgifter om detta.

Nu undrar jag om du har några idéer om hur man skulle kunna gå vidare, främst för att få uppgifter från ryssarna. Utan sådana uppgifter kan man ju bara ha fortsatta spekulationer. Finns det någon rysk forskare med kanaler till ryska arkiv? Andra idéer?

Vi är mycket tacksamma om du skulle kunna hjälpa oss vidare i den här för oss mycket angelägna frågan. Agrells påståenden är ju mycket allvarliga och i nuvarande läge får de stå rättsligt oemotsagda.


med vänliga hälsningar

Tomas Böhm  
leg.läk. och författare

Harald Hamrin, *EC*  
2005-01-26 13:34

*Moskva*  
Till: Johan Molander/FOREIGN/MINISTRY, Robert  
Rydberg/FOREIGN/MINISTRY, Bengt  
Lundborg/FOREIGN/MINISTRY, Lennart  
Alvin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY, Jan  
Eliasson/FOREIGN/MINISTRY, Kjell  
Anneling/FOREIGN/MINISTRY, Madeleine  
Ströje-Wilkens/FOREIGN/MINISTRY, Carl  
Tham/FOREIGN/MINISTRY,

Kopia:  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: Wallenberg



Vänner och kollegor!

Detta handlar om en viss Max Grunberg i Tel Aviv och bif. attachment, i fortsättningen kallad "Poster".

Max Grunberg startade för ett antal år sedan något som kallas "Raoul Wallenberg Honorary Citizen Committee". Grunberg är med andra ord en RW-aktivist. Han sprider kunskap om RW och har gjort goda insatser i denna sak. För detta fick han för ett antal år sedan (minns inte exakt när, men före min tid som RW-handläggare med början i december 2001) Nordstiernan.

För ett par år sedan inledde han arbetet på en "efterlysningskampanj" som nu har resulterat i bif. "Poster". Detta arbete har till en del finansierats genom ett mindre bidrag från UD. Innehållet i "Poster" talar för sig självt. Han vill alltså sprida denna "Poster" runtom i världen och hoppas på att denna väg få fram ytterligare information om RW. Exakt vilka kanaler han har vet jag inte, men det finns ju ett antal RW-associations i olika länder och det kan finnas annat.

Hur som helst vill han också ha vår hjälp med att sprida sin "Poster". Bl a har han velat etablera något slags triangelsamarbete mellan sin egen Committee, svenska UD och israeliska UD. Vi har sagt att "Poster"-initiativet är gott, men att vi inte vill ha ett formaliserat triangelsamarbete. Ansvar för efterlysningen är i första hand hans eget och ev. information skall, som framgår av texten, lämnas till hans Committee för ev. vidarebefordran. Han har också önskat lägga ut sin "Poster" på UD:s hemsida, men detta har jag sagt nej till med motiveringen att vi där bara lägger ut vårt eget material.

Dock menar Hans Magnusson och jag att en del av våra utlandsmyndigheter skulle kunna hjälpa till. Exakt hur detta skulle kunna gå till beror på förhållandena i resp. land, som ju kan variera. Det kan ske genom myndighetens hemsida, genom länkar från myndighetens hemsida eller genom kontakt med judiska eller MR-organisationer, som kan gå vidare med spridningen.

Jag vill alltså be er att läsa igenom Max Grunbergs "Poster" i positiv anda och se hur ni skulle kunna bidra till spridningen av den.

Med vänliga hälsningar


Harald Hamrin



Poster.pdf

*a. a.  
H. H.*

*08/1*



## PUBLIC APPEAL

to individuals who may have factual  
information about the whereabouts  
of Raoul Wallenberg

# MISSING IN ACTION

## Raoul Wallenberg

Age Progressed Photo  
(courtesy of National Center for Missing and  
Exploited Children – Horace Heafner – USA)

### DETAILS ABOUT RAOUL WALLENBERG:

Among the few rays of light during the Holocaust/Shoah, were the actions of the "Righteous Among the Nations", men and women who risked their lives to save the lives of Jews from the Nazis and their collaborators.

Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat, was born in 1912 and risked his life to save thousands of Jewish people in Hungary during World War II.

Raoul Wallenberg was therefore officially recognized by "Yad Vashem" in Israel as one of those "Righteous Among the Nations". Raoul Wallenberg is an Honorary Citizen of Israel, United States, Canada and Hungary.

He was detained in Hungary in January 1945 by the Soviet Army and imprisoned in the former Soviet Union.

Raoul Wallenberg's whereabouts since then are unknown.

If you have any information as to the whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg or are able to assist in the search, please contact:

### **Raoul Wallenberg Honorary Citizen Committee**

P.O. Box 38, Ra'anana 43100, ISRAEL

Tel: +972-9-7404292 Fax: +972-9-7749495 E-mail: [offices@inter.net.il](mailto:offices@inter.net.il)

### GOAL:

**To bring Raoul Wallenberg home  
to be united with his family.**

Despite various official declarations and rumors about his fate, the civilized world at large and human rights activists in particular, are determined to find the whereabouts and fate of this great fighter for humanity.

A joint Swedish-Russian Working Group was formed in 1991 with the task of examining evidence from Russian archives and from people who may have knowledge about Raoul Wallenberg's detention in Soviet prisons and camps. The conclusion of the official Swedish report, which was published in January of 2001, is that there is still no conclusive evidence in regard to the whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg.

---

It is hoped that this public appeal will stimulate the quest for Raoul Wallenberg.

All information will be forwarded to the brother and sister of Raoul Wallenberg and the Swedish and Israeli Ministries of Foreign Affairs.

Anders Troedsson

UD Kiev(amb)  
2005-01-27 15:14

Till: Harald Hamrin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK *UD-20*  
Kopia: John-Christer Åhlander/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK  
Blank:  
Fax till:  
Ärende: Re: Ang: meddelande RW

*Raoul Wallenberg* (EC)

|            |      |         |
|------------|------|---------|
| INKOM UD   |      |         |
| 2005-02-07 |      |         |
| 01-27      |      |         |
| Avd. P     | Gr 2 | Mål EU1 |

Harald,  
tack för nedan.

Olyckligtvis hittar vi varken din instrux om Schvets som du nämner, ej heller det mail som vi tidigare kommunicerat om (dvs det om Remmer). Sistnämnda kanske mindre av ett problem, eftersom åtgärd ej påkallad (förrän den dag Remmer ev hör av sig, förstås). Tacksam dock repetition (?) av instruxen om Schvets (och även mailet om Remmer om möjligt).

Dessutom - betr Gorochoy som jag nämnde i mailet nedan har jag förstått att ambassaden tidigare haft flera kontakter med denne och hans org. Är det f.ö. kanske (m ref till Remmer-frågan) inadekvat att denne använder RW namn ("Ordförande av Donbas förening av Ukrainsk-Svensk vänskap uppkallad efter Raoul Wallenberg...")? Nekrasova vet i alla fall berätta att en av gruppens initiativtagare (som tidigare var lärare i Sverige), har haft kontakter med släktingar till RW.

Mvh,

Anders

Harald Hamrin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY

*Förskott med kurt*  
2005-02-23

Harald  
Hamrin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY

To: Anders Troedsson/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK  
cc:  
Fax to:  
Subject: Ang: meddelande RW

2005-01-19 12:03

Anders!

1. Kan inte heller hitta mejlet just nu i min egen privata pärm (men mejlet var av den karaktären att jag vill minnas att jag sände det till vårt arkiv och antagligen har det också arkiverats hos er). Det gällde en person som heter Henrich (Genrich) (von) Remmer. Han påstod han hans far skall ha träffat RW så sent som på 60-talet, vill jag minnas. Åke Pettersson och dessförinnan någon annan på Kiev-amb. har träffat honom. Han har startat något han kallar Mission of ??? i Jalta, instiftat i RW:s namn.

Jag tyckte först att hans uppgifter trots allt måste kollas upp. Undersöknigar i Moskva visade dock att han faktiskt existerat, suttit i sovjetiskt läger, men där dött redan 1939. Mitt svar till Kiev-amb gick därför ut på att bollen nu ligger hos honom, om han vill motbevisa de ryska uppgifterna.

Efter sina första kontakter med mig och ambassaden fattade han mod och undrade om vi kunde ordna en föreläsningsturne, vill minnas att det handlade om tolv föreläsningar, i något psykologiskt ämne här i Sverige. Jag svarade naturligtvis nej.

Han har av ambassaden (Åke + ?) uppmanats att inte använda RW:s namn utan tillstånd av familjen.

Åke P. deltog vid ett tillfälle i en konsert Remmer anordnat i Kiev. Bilder därifrån har han sedan använt för att "bevisa" det nära samarbetet mellan sin "Mission" och svenska ambassaden.

Jag tillrådde därför stor försiktighet i kontakterna med honom.

2. En annan sak: någon gång i höstas sände jag en instrux om en viss Grigorij Schvets, också gällande RW. Jag förstår att ni haft annat att tänka på de senaste månaderna. Men titta på det vid tillfälle.

Hälsningar

Harald  
Anders Troedsson



**Anders Troedsson**

2005-01-17 15:43

UD Kiev(amb)

Till: **Harald Hamrin/FOREIGN/MINISTRY@RK**

Kopia:

Blank:

Fax till:

Ärende: **meddelande RW**

Harald,

du sände mig i somras ett mail med vissa uppgifter mm i RW-frågan - kan nu inte finna detta, tacksam repetition, handlade, om jag minns rätt, om en viss person och nödv av återhållsamhet i kontakter med denne, liksom reservation för dennes intresseförening el dyl med RW:s namn.

Skriver detta även m a a att ambassadören har mottagit ett brev på svenska från en viss E. Gorochoy, "Ordförande av Donbas förening av Ukrainsk-Svensk vänskap uppkallad efter Raoul Wallenberg" m.m., ett "beklagande" m a a av svenska offer i Tsunami-katastrofen.

Mvh,

Anders



REGERINGSKANSLIET

ARKIV

P 2 EU'  
2005/5659  
(Ec)

2005-01-27

Utrikesdepartementet

Ambr Pontus Melander  
Ottawa

Enheten för Östeuropa och Centralasien  
Ambassadör  
Harald Hamrin  
Telefon +46-(0)8-405 3343  
E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

David Matas om förslag till samarbete kring Raoul Wallenberg

2 bil. (David Matas brev till Laila Freivalds 05 01 24 Dnr 05/4877) ? ✓

Broder!

Närslutet finner du en bil. med brev från David Matas till vår utrikesminister jämte div. underbilagor samt mitt svar till Matas.

I korthet går Matas förslag ut på följande. Kanada och Ryssland har ett bilateralt MoU gällande samarbete för att i de båda länderna om möjligt finna och åtala personer som gjort sig skyldiga till "war crimes" och "crimes against humanity" under "the Nazi period". MoU bygger på det faktum att Kanada när det gäller dessa typer av brott har en lagstiftning utan preskriptionstid. Visst samarbete pågår tydligen redan med bl a kanadensiska forskare verksamma i Ryssland. Matas föreslår nu antingen ett nytt MoU eller ett tillägg till existerande MoU, som skulle dra in Sverige i samarbetet och inkludera fallet Raoul Wallenberg.

Matas har haft en viss korrespondens i ärendet med förre (?) kanadensiske utrikesministern Bill Graham och denne har också tagit upp förslaget med förre ryske utrikesministern Ivanov. Som framgår av Grahams brev är väl den kanadensiska inställningen i allmänna ordalag positiv, men i sak skeptisk. Ivanovs besked till Graham är intetsägende (se Grahams olika brev).

Vår inställning är avvaktande. Men i princip menar vi ju att Sverige "äger" fallet Raoul Wallenberg och driver det bilateralt gentemot Ryssland. Vi är naturligtvis positivt inställda till allt seriöst arbete som

Postadress  
103 39 Stockholm  
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08-405 10 00  
Telefax  
08-723 11 76

E-post  
registrator@foreign.ministry.se  
Telex  
105 90 MINFOR S

/exp. med kurr.  
05 01 28/90


2005-01-27

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görs av andra, men vill inte multilateralisera frågan. Som du ser av mitt brev till Matas uttrycker jag mig också där avvaktande – även med hänvisning till pågående diskussioner om ett ev. svenskt bredare arkivsamarbete med ryssarna (diskussionerna om detta befinner sig i ett allra första skede här hemma).

I detta skede vill jag därför bara be dig att i lämplig form och med ansvariga personer efterhöra vad den kanadensiska inställningen till Matas förslag är. Grahams formuleringar att förslaget möjligen är "premature" och att Sverige ju under alla förhållande måste ha "the leadership" i fråga om Wallenberg antyder att entusiasmen är begränsad. Tacksam för allt du kan få fram.

Med kollegiala hälsningar



Harald Hamrin



REGERINGSKANSLIET

2005/5904

2005-01-27

P 2 EU<sup>1</sup>

EC

**Utrikesdepartementet**

Enheten för Östeuropa och Centralasien  
Ambassadör  
Harald Hamrin  
Telefon +46-(0)8-405 3343  
E-post: harald.hamrin@foreign.ministry.se

Mr. David Matas  
Barrister and Solicitor  
602-225 Vaughan Street  
Winnipeg, Manitoba  
R3C 1T7  
Canada

Dear Mr. Matas,

thank you for your letter of 20 January 2005, addressed to Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds. I have been asked to respond to the letter.

Let me first of all say that we highly appreciate your work on the case of Raoul Wallenberg. Your proposal sounds interesting, the more so since Sweden does not have the Canadian type of legislation with no prescription limit with regard to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

But let me also say that your proposal needs careful reflection against the background of recent archival policies in Russia. We all know that access to Russian archives has become much more difficult during the past several years, in particular when it comes to sensitive issues such as the Raoul Wallenberg case. It would therefore be interesting to have your judgment as to the feasibility of your proposal. Former Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov's response to Mr. Graham's request – as quoted in Mr. Graham's letter to you of 28 May 2004 – does not indicate a willingness to open all doors to Russian archives.

I would also like to inform you that we are presently discussing with a group of representatives of Swedish archives and researchers a possible Swedish initiative to establish a broader cooperation with

Postadress  
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registrator@foreign.ministry.se  
Telex  
105 90 MINFOR S

af 2005-01-27  
JH

2005-01-27

---

Russian archives on issues related to Swedish-Russian relations during the second half of the 20th century – i.e. a much wider area of issues and not necessarily related to Raoul Wallenberg. We would therefore want to see where these discussions take us before responding concretely to your proposal. I hope to be able to give you some indication as to where we are heading within the next few months.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Harald Hamrin', with a stylized, cursive script.

Harald Hamrin

---



SVERIGES AMBASSAD

2005-01-24

Nr 10 ✓

BUDAPEST

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

EC (Hamrin)


Fambs Niklas Wiberg

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Intervju med Istvánné Kubinyi om Raoul Wallenberg

1 bilaga

Bifogar härmed en utskrift av en intervju utförd på ambassaden med Mrs. Istvánné Kubinyi om en transport tillsammans med Raoul Wallenberg mellan Ungern och Sovjetunionen 1945.

  
Mats Lindström

Afsädd ✓  
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## Interview

**Subject:** meeting Raoul Wallenberg, spring 1945

**Date:** 17 November 2004

**Venue:** Embassy, Budapest

**Persons Present:**

Witness: Mrs. Istvánné Kubinyi, born November 17, 1924

Address: Szerémi ut 37, 1117 Budapest

Tel: +36-2-042-174

Son-in-law of witness: Mr. Ödön Szép

Niklas Wiberg, first secretary

Judit Radnóczy, interpreter

**Istvánné Kubinyi:**

I was carried off by the Russians 24 February 1945. It was not a Hungarian firm [*sic!*] who took me away, but it was the Russians. Because they thought they caught a big fish because I have been working for a German company [*Mittelmeyer*] for two months [...] I was 19 at that time. [...] Everybody was living in the cellars at that time before the war ended. And I asked where they were about to take me, and they said to Andrassy út 60. But I was taken to Tisza Kálmán tér [*Moszkva tér today*] or Köztársaság tér. [...] And I was placed in a cellar where there were a few people. [...] And we stayed in Budapest for a few days. [...] I was taken to a villa on the hill then. And at the end it turned out that it was not me they wanted. Because I was called Ili at work, and on the second floor, the leader of the espionage office [...] had a mistress called Ibi. [*The two names were mixed up.*]

And then I was taken to Jászakisér [village in central Hungary], and I was locked up in a bathroom together with another woman [...]. After about 5 weeks [*from 24 February*] I was taken to Fót [*village about 30 km North-East from Budapest*], there was a military airfield there, and I was taken there in the evening, and it was there I met Wallenberg. There it was me, Wallenberg, [...] and an old general from the army of the Tsar, and two

colonels from the army of the Tsar, who presumably worked in Pesterzsébet [*a district of Budapest*] as workers. [...] And later I heard there were gossips that Wallenberg was captured by the Germans in January, [...] but this is not true, because I was carried off on 24 February, and it was only 5 weeks later that we went to Moscow.

[...]

And our journey to Moscow took [...] 5 days. First we were taken to Kecskemét, we spent one day there, we were put in a house [...], and then the next day we went to Nyíregyháza. The third day, the general became sick and [...] he was taken to hospital [...] and we waited for two days at the airfield and then he was brought back. [...] This happened in Kiev. The fifth day we were in Gomel, which is a Russian city in Ukraine [*Gomel belongs to Belarus today.*], and the sixth day we arrived in Moscow, and that was the most horrible thing that a black car came, the car for prisoners, and we got in there. It was so small; we were crammed in [...].

And in Kecskemét and Nyíregyháza, we stayed in houses, but later we did not leave the aircraft any more before arriving in Moscow. So I was together with Wallenberg there for a whole week.

[...].

And when we left Fót, and the aircraft took off, Wallenberg told me: "Look around carefully." "Why then?", I asked. We spoke in French. [...] He said: "Because you won't ever see Budapest again. [...] So he probably knew that it was not easy to return home from there." And I replied "That is not like that, I haven't done anything wrong, so I will probably be released in a few weeks when it turns out", and then he said, "You're such a big child".

[...] We had some sort of American stuff, fur, or something we used for blankets, and they gave us tinned food to eat. [...]. The aircraft was also American. [...] Everything was American. [...] But the personnel were Russian.

[...] And on the sixth day we arrived at Ljubjanka, it was a large prison, and we were taken to the cellar to wash ourselves. First I was taken to a room [...], the walls were not flat, it was all covered with leather [...] or rubber. [...] Our clothes were taken away. [...] I did not speak Russian at that time; I did not know whether I would stay here for years or for days, all in all, it was terrible. And then I never saw Wallenberg again.



**After the 6<sup>th</sup> day, you mean.**

Yes.

**When you first met Raoul Wallenberg it was at the airport in Fót?**

Yes.

**[...] did you at that time know who Wallenberg was?**

He told me he worked for the embassy and he saved many Jews and non-Jews too, [...] and we tried to figure out why we got into the same transport. I worked for a German company and Wallenberg ordered things from the company. He had those people hidden in houses, and they fed them somehow, and they bought food for them, and I once heard that he organized to get food for those people he helped and hid. [...] Because he was helping hundreds of people, not one or two.

**Did he present himself by name?**

Yes, yes, yes.

**And who else was there, who was with you during these 6 days? Was it the same persons, or did it change from city to city in the aircraft?**

[Russian soldiers].

**The same soldiers?**

It was such a long time ago, I don't remember..., but probably the same.

**Were there any other Hungarians or foreigners except for the soldiers?**

Only the soldiers.

**So it was you, Wallenberg and Russians.**

3 Russians: The general and the 2 colonels. They were held captive too. [Plus the personnel of the aircraft.]

[...]

**And were you together with Wallenberg during these 6 days all the time?**

Yes, we were sitting next to each other. Because we could talk to each other, but not to the Russians.

**Did you get any opportunities to speak to him what he had been experiencing here in Budapest, about his work and life, during these six days?**

I don't know actually, I don't know what we spoke about, I can't recall it. That he worked for the embassy, and he said he helped many people. [...].

**The Swedish Embassy?**

Yes, the Swedish Embassy, not his own embassy. [*Witness spoke silent here, this remark was not noticed, thus neither clarified.*]

**How did the Russian soldiers treat Raoul Wallenberg?**

No, they were fine, they were not violent, [...] we got food twice a day. We even remarked with Wallenberg that everything was American. [...]

**Have you told anyone from the Swedish authorities or from the embassy or the Hungarian authorities this story before?**

Yes I have been somewhere before, I think I talked to an interpreter, but I don't remember where and who she was. She worked in Sweden I think, and made an interview, I think she came to my place.

**Was she doing Wallenberg-research? Was it in that context?**

Yes, she asked me about Wallenberg, and I think it was some research in Sweden, she worked there...

**So she contacted you for an interview once and then never came back to you.**

No, she did not return.

**And are there any new facts in the story now? Or why is it that you want to tell us this story now, again?**

I don't know. It was his idea...

**Son-in-law of Witness:** It was not my idea [...]. It was the Swedish gentleman I met last summer, the husband of an acquaintance of mine, and he mentioned he would contact the embassy.

[...]

**Witness:** I spent 8 years, 9 months and 9 days in the USSR.

[...]

I stayed in Moscow till about December [1945]. The prison was the best because we were not forced to work and we were allowed to read [there was a library...]. In the labour camp we worked 12 hours every day, and we walked 8-10 km to work.

[...]

In Moscow, I was taken to Beriya [*Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beriya, chief of secret police*].

**Son-in-law of Witness:** Probably, Mr. Wallenberg was also taken to him because he was chief of the counter-espionage service.

[...]

**Witness:** In November I was taken to the labour camp in Vorkuta. [I got very ill there, I spent one year in hospital.] We went out to work until the temperature stayed above -40°C.

**If I get back to the time that you spent together with Raoul Wallenberg, do you remember the date for this when you first met him in Fót?**

It was about 5-6 weeks from 24 February. [...] In April. [...] Or middle of April.

[...]

From Moscow, the trip to Vorkuta took about 2 weeks. Then we went to Mariinsk, it took about 10 days, then we came back to Moscow, and that took about a week. Then I was taken back to Mariinsk. And then I was taken to Taishet, and from there I came home.

[...]

**And the last time you saw Raoul Wallenberg in the Ljubjanka prison was in the morning, or at what time was it?**

After lunch. And then I was put in a small room. [...]

**And in what room, what part of the prison did you see Raoul Wallenberg last?**

When the car stopped in front of the prison. Then and I was taken inside the prison. I have never met him again.

[...]

**Son-in-law of Witness:** And what was Wallenberg wearing?

He was elegant [...], and he did not seem to be sick.

[...]

**During your later imprisonment, did you meet anybody who had been speaking to Raoul Wallenberg?**

Yes [...], I heard someone heard Wallenberg was there and even after 3 years I heard someone spoke to someone who spoke to him, so he must have been there for a couple of years. [...] Many people died there, 150 000 like me were taken away, and only 3850 of us came home.

**Have you read about Raoul Wallenberg, do you know other stories that had been told by him, about his trip for Hungary and how he was captured?**

He told me he was working the embassy and he saved many lives.

**But you haven't heard other stories on how he was taken from Hungary.**

I don't even know how old he was, [...] must have been about 30. He was also captured by the Russians.

**When you met him, did he speak about how he was captured here in Budapest? The way to Fót?**

I don't know, I think he mentioned something about a car, he tried to get in or get out, and it was then ...

**But he didn't say anything where he was captured or what part of Budapest he was working in?**

[...] I think he was captured on the Pest side, [...] He was a nice person, he was calm, he was not the protesting type.

**Do you remember any other things that he told you, that he spoke about during these 6 days, any stories from his life in Hungary or in Sweden?**

It was a long time ago..., I don't remember...

**Is there anything else that you would like to tell us?**

I don't know anything more; we were only together for a week. [...] He did not believe he would ever be released. I did very much, but he didn't. [...]

[...]

**May I just ask your date of birth also?**

I am 80 today. I was born on 17 November 1924.

[...]

Why can't the Russians say anything more about Wallenberg? They must know more. [...] When I was captured I had my railway card with me. And they gave it back to me when they released me. They must know everything; they were very precise in keeping records... [...] Do they say he died in Ljubjanka? I have been in Ljubjanka, Lefortovskaya, that was a hospital, and also in Krasnaya Presnya [...], so I have been in these 3 prisons in Moscow.

[...]

**Thank you very much for coming here and telling us your story. If you come to think of other small details or stories that Wallenberg has told you, you can just contact the embassy. It is very useful, we appreciate it very much.**

Thank you.



REGERINGSKANSLIET

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2005-01-31

(EC)

**Utrikesdepartementet**

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fambs Anders Troedsson  
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**Vittnesmål om Raoul Wallenberg**

e-mail Troedsson-Hamrin 2005-01-17, Hamrin-Troedsson 2005-01-19  
och Troedsson-Hamrin 2005-01-27 (bifogas) ✓  
hbrev Hamrin-Åhlander 2004-11-11 (bifogas) ✓  
hbrev Åhlander-Hamrin 2004-12-07 ✓

Broder!

Jag skall försöka reda ut ovanstående e-mail och handbrev, av vilka handbrevet från mig till John-Christer om Schvets tycks ha kommit bort hos er och det från John-Christer till mig om Sidljar försvann hos mig, men nu har flutit upp (jämte kopia, som John-Christer sände mig nyligen).

1. Vad gäller Sidljar är hans uppgifter ju mycket knapphändiga. Det enda som slår mig är påståendet att han skulle ha träffat en svensk (Wallenberg?) i Magadan 1964. I den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppens rapport "Raoul Wallenberg" (s. 162) finns en uppgift enligt vilken Wallenberg skulle ha förts till just Magadan i samband med en transport 1950 alternativt 1951. Läs igenom hela s. 162 och se om detta kan ge er några tips för ev. utfrågning. Tidpunkten stämmer ju inte, men väl Magadan och psykiatrisk klinik. Alla sådana här vittnesmål är ju svåra att följa upp och visar sig oftast sakna substans. Men det kan ändå vara värt ett försök.

2. Vad gäller fallet Schvets hänvisar jag till handbrev Hamrin-Åhlander 2004-11-11. Uppgiften, i mitt handbrev, att Wallenberg skulle ha synts i ett läger i Perm-trakten har jag också funnit i arbetsgruppens rapport. Tyvärr kan jag inte återfinna den nu – rapporten har ett personregister, men saknar ortregister.

OK! 2005-01-31  
[Signature]

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
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2005-01-31

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3. Vad slutligen gäller e-mejlkorrespondensen om **Remmer** kan jag nu inte hitta tidigare mejl om denne. Men vad beträffar såväl Remmer som Gorochov förhåller det sig som så att ingen organisation har rätt att uppkalla sig efter Raoul Wallenberg utan familjens tillstånd. Hur det förhåller sig i fallet **Gorochov** känner jag ju inte till. Sedan är det naturligtvis en annan sak att det formellt sett är på detta vis, men vi kan ju inte sätta igång aktioner mot slarvande föreningar och organisationer runtom i världen. Vid lämpligt tillfälle och i lämpliga former kan man dock påpeka detta för vederbörande – särskilt om det skulle komma propåer om samarbete med ambassaden, då vi ju hamnar i ett mera "skärpt" läge.

Med bästa hälsningar

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Harald', written over a horizontal line.

Harald Hamrin